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Abstract
This  thesis  expands  the  discussion  on  Iranian  national  identity  into  the  period  of 
Khatami’s presidency. Within the theoretical and methodological framework of discourse 
analysis this thesis contends that the multiple constructions of Iranian national identity, 
which coexist and compete with each other, can be better understood as discourses. The 
detailed  analysis  of  five  discourses of  national  identity  illustrates a  complex set  of 
relationships based on the meanings attached to Iran’s Islamic and pre-Islamic identities 
and how the West is dealt with in the construction of national identity. The first discourse 
addressed is the Islamist discourse of national identity, which prioritises Iran’s Islamic 
culture. At the opposite end of the spectrum the Iranist discourse, which is based on the 
prioritisation of  Iran’s  pre-Islamic culture, is  deconstructed. It  is  contended that  this 
represents a new indigenous Iranism that is based on a rediscovery of Sasanian Iran as 
opposed to Achaemenid Iran. Khatami’s discourse is presented as an attempt at a dialogue 
between Islamism and Iranism. It is argued that the Khatami period is unique in terms of 
the articulation of national identity because Khatami has combined for the first time ideas, 
which together form the Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity, as an official state 
discourse. These are the combination of Islamic and pre-Islamic culture, the notion of 
‘dialogue among civilisations’ and the idea of  Islamic democracy.  While  these  three 
discourses  are  based  on  the  politicisation  of  culture,  two  additional  discourses are 
presented that reject this politicisation. The first is a discourse of civic Iranian national 
identity and the second is  a discourse of cosmopolitan Iranian national identity.  It  is 
contended that Khatami and his Islamist-Iranian discourse have allowed the more open 
articulation, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, of these constructions of 
Iranian national identity. 
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Chapter One:  Orientation of the Thesis
The Question of Identity
Now, the important questions that arise are the following: where among these 
three cultures does our identity lie? What  did those saviours and reformers 
mean by “salvation”  and “identity”?  What  does  “cultural  identity” mean, 
anyway? Is it possible or desirable to aspire to a true and pure cultural identity,  
and in that case which of our three cultures would be closer and more loyal to 
us, which more faithful to our “true identity”? Which one subverts it and takes 
us away from ourselves? Is it a duty to remain loyal and to preserve the old  
culture? Is there such a thing as cultural repentance? Is any nation permitted 
rebellion against  parts  of  its  own culture? Is  there  an  opportunity  and an  
avenue for intercultural exchange, or must cultures keep their windows closed 
to one another? Is it right to advocate the hegemony of one culture over others? 
What does “returning to one’s authentic self” mean, and in whom and what 
does that “self” consist?
Abdolkarim Soroush1
The three cultures to which Abdolkarim Soroush refers in the above quote are Iranian 
culture, Islamic culture and Western culture. This is of particular importance because it is 
the relationship between and with these three cultures that  in many cases causes the 
contestation of Iranian national identity. This thesis looks in detail at how Iranian national 
identity is constructed in the Khatami period; how Islam, Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage, and 
relations with the West are dealt with.  Integral to this  process are the questions that 
Soroush raises: how is being ‘faithful to our “true identity”’ to be achieved; is it a return 
to the “old”, or is it allowing the different aspects of Iranian identity to intermingle?
1.1 Central Thesis
The contention of this thesis is that there continues to be multiple constructions of Iranian 
national identity, which coexist and compete with each other. These constructions can be 
better understood as discourses. Therefore, a complex set of relationships between two 
sets of discourses are considered. On the one hand, there are the Islamist, Iranist and 
Islamist-Iranian discourses of national identity, which are based on the politicisation of 
culture, and on the other a discourse of civic Iranian national identity and a discourse of 
cosmopolitan Iranian national identity, which reject the politicisation of culture. Based on 
a discourse analysis of the texts, it is contended that there is a new indigenous Iranist 
discourse of national identity that is based on a rediscovery of Sasanian Iran as opposed to 
Achaemenid Iran. It is also argued that the Khatami period is unique in terms of the 
1 Soroush, Abdolkarim ‘The Three Cultures’ in Sadri, Mahmoud and Sadri, Ahmad. (eds) Reason, 
Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. pp. 156-169, p. 162 
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articulation of national identity because Khatami has combined for the first time ideas, 
which  together  form  the  Islamist-Iranian  discourse  of  national  identity,  as  official 
discourse on the state level. These are the combination of Islamic and pre-Islamic culture, 
the  notion  of  ‘dialogue  among civilisations’ and the  idea  of  Islamic democracy.  In 
addition to this, the contention here is that Khatami has also allowed for a more open 
expression, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, of the articulation of a civic 
Iranian national  identity  and a  cosmopolitan  Iranian national  identity.  The  discourse 
approach to national identity also enables some conclusions to be made about the nature 
of  the state. It  is  contended that the state apparatus of the Islamic Republic  of Iran 
demonstrates the  poststructuralist  understanding  of  the  state.  This  approach  draws 
‘attention  to  the  way in  which  the  state  itself  is  politically  contested’.2 As  will  be 
illustrated, the discourses of Iranian national identity discussed in this thesis have a direct 
impact on the desired nature of the political system. Thus, there is a direct relationship 
between national identity and state identity. Furthermore, since during the Khatami period 
there are at least two discourses of national identity, each calling for a different political 
system, it  can be argued that the state of the Islamic Republic is not only politically 
contested, but it also demonstrates ‘a complex ensemble of various discursively formed 
rationalities’.3  
This  chapter  aims  to  present  the  basic  dimensions  of  the  study  by  outlining  its 
justification, epistemological framework, the statement of the problem, its argument and 
contribution to knowledge, the limitations of the study and the structure of the thesis. The 
theoretical and methodological framework, which will outline the concept of ‘discourse 
of national identity’, will be discussed in the following chapter.
1.2 Justification for the Study
Throughout the twentieth century Iran has been through a series of dramatic political 
events that have been instrumental in the articulation and continuous construction and re-
construction of its national identity; such events are the Constitutional Revolution, the rise 
of the Pahlavi Dynasty,  the rise and fall  of Mohammad Musaddiq,  the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution,  and the  Iran-Iraq war.  More  recently,  the  period  of  Seyyed Mohammad 
2 Finlayson, Alan and Martin, James. ‘Postructuralism’ in Hay, Colin, Lister, Michael and Marsh, 
David. (eds) The State: Theories and Issues. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 
pp. 155-171, p. 163
3 Torfing, J. ‘A Hegemony Approach to Capitalist Regulation’ in Betramsen, R. B., Thomsen, J. P. F., and 
Torfing, J. (eds) State, Economy and Society. London: Unwin Hayman.1991 cited in Finlayson, Alan and 
Martin, James. ‘Postructuralism’ in Hay, Colin, Lister, Michael and Marsh, David. (eds) The State: 
Theories and Issues. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 155-171, p. 162
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Khatami’s presidency - 1997 to 2005 - has also witnessed the continued reconstruction of 
Iran’s national identity. This period is of particular interest because of the internal and 
external political and social dynamics. External changes can be symbolised by the notion 
of Khatami's ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’4, which signifies a departure from economic 
and political isolation typical of the earlier stages of the Islamic Revolution. For example, 
Khatami’s interview with CNN was perceived by many as a step towards reconciliation 
with the United States; there is dialogue rather than the clash of civilisations as argued by 
Samuel  Huntington.5 Internally,  on  the  one  hand,  there  has  been  a  vibrant  debate 
regarding the very nature of the Islamic Republic, and on the other hand, there has been 
notable social and political liberalisation. These factors and events are essential  for a 
better understanding of the context of the construction of national identity in the Khatami 
period. After all, this did not take place in isolation.
The social and political liberalisation is evident in the proliferation of newspapers and 
books, as well as non-government organisations. Since the Revolution in 1979, Iran had 
not observed such an increase in the publication of newspapers and magazines.6 It  is 
argued that ‘the function of the press was in essence to set the terms of political discourse 
and dictate the agenda.’7 Whether or not this is the case, it can certainly be argued that the 
press contributed to the opening up of political discourse, the transmitting of ideas and 
discussion regarding Iran’s political development in the public space. Another example of 
liberalisation is evident in how the art community has also particularly flourished in this 
period  with  the  opening  of  numerous public  cultural  centres  and  galleries.  Tehran 
Museum of Contemporary Art, in particular, was able to sustain education through art, 
which was made available to the younger generation. Social restrictions on this generation 
were eased in response to the election results in 1997; seventy per cent of the twenty-nine 
million, who turned out, voted in favour of Khatami.8 
4 Khatami, Seyyed Mohammad. Empathy and Compassion: Believing in Dialogue Paves the way for 
Hope (Speech at the U.N. Sponsored Conference of Dialogue among Civilisations, New York. trans. 
U.S. Federal Broadcasting Information Service). 5 September 2000. 
http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2000/September/Khatami - date accessed 25 July 2006 
5 Term coined by Samuel Huntington’s ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72, 3, Summer 
1993. pp. 22-49
6 Milani, Mohsen M. 2001. ‘Reform and Resistance in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ in Esposito, J. and 
Ramazani, R. 2001. (eds) Iran at the Crossroads, New York: Palgrave, pp. 29-56, pp. 43-44; Milani 
identifies Khurdād, Nishāt and Asr-i Mā as openly supporting reform, and Kayhān, Jumhurī-yi Islāmī, 
and Risālat as those that challenged Khatami’s policies.
7 Ansari, Ali M. Islam, Iran and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change. 2nd edn. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2006. p. 119
8 Kazemi, Farhad. ‘Why Iran chose Khatami (I)’ in Middle Eastern Lectures, 3, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv 
University, 1999. pp. 9-16, 12
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This relative social and political liberalisation is positioned in a context of high rates of 
literacy and education. It is estimated that over eighty-five percent of Iran’s population 
are literate. According to the 2004/2005 National Statistics published by Iran’s Ministry 
of Education’s Educational Programme, over fifteen million individuals are engaged in 
primary and secondary education. Over half a million of these are adults seeking literacy. 
Additionally, there are three million students in higher education, including vocational 
training, many of whom have entered urban spaces from remote towns and villages for 
the first time. These figures are on the increase, and significantly sixty-five percent of this 
student body are female.9 
In addition to liberalisation and high literacy rates, it is worth mentioning that Khatami’s 
presidency  has  also  been  in  the  context  of  a  growth  in  and  advancement  of 
communication  technologies.  It  is  argued that  the  fourth most  popular  language in 
weblogs is Persian. This in turn has enabled easier communication between Iranians in 
Iran and those among the diaspora.10 More importantly, as far as this thesis is concerned, 
the growth in mass communications has enabled people to be local despite being part of a 
more globalised world. With regard to Iranian national  identity,  this  has enabled the 
articulation of both particular and general discourses of Iranian national identity. While 
communication technologies and literacy have enabled expression on the Internet, in a 
sense these reforms and changes have also allowed political and social discussions to be 
moved into the public space in Iran. 
These social changes and political liberalisation are in many ways a part of or the result of 
a vibrant intellectual debate regarding the very nature of the Islamic Republic causing 
tensions within the establishment. Hamid Dabashi, points out that ‘many of the inner 
tensions within the Islamic Republic that surfaced after … Khatami’s election … were in 
fact already present during [Ali Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani’s presidency’.11 However, he 
argues, Rafsanjani had managed to ‘co-opt all the Islamic (and even some of the secular) 
dissenters by appearing to be their only hope, thereby saving the Islamic Republic … 
from  internal  dissent.’12 This  ‘internal  dissent’ manifested  itself  in  an  ideological 
opposition  that  appeared from within  the  Islamic  Republic.  It  was  led  by  activist 
intellectuals,  who  came  to  call  themselves  Rawshanfikrān-i  Dīnī,  or  Religions 
Intellectuals.13 Asef Bayat argues that the Rawshanfikrān-i Dīnī were the main intellectual 
9 2004/2005 National Statistics. Tehran: Ministry of Education’s Educational Programme
10 Alavi, Nasrin. We are Iran. London: Portobello Books, 2005. p. 1 
11 Dabashi, Hamid. Iran: A People Interrupted. New York and London: The New Press. 2006, p. 189 
12 Ibid., p. 189
13 Ibid., p. 190 
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source of what he refers to as ‘post-Islamist practices’. He argues that their articulation of 
a ‘major discursive shift’ ‘generated one of the most remarkable intellectual movements 
in the Muslim world with far-reaching implications for religious thought and democratic 
practice.’14 Some of the proponents of this post-Islamist movement will be discussed in 
Chapter Five in relation to Khatami’s Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity. 
It  is worth mentioning that Bayat argues that there are three factors,  many of which, 
incidentally,  have  been  raised  above,  that  were  responsible  for  the  ‘post-Islamist’ 
condition. The first of these is the ‘failures and contradictions of the Islamist project that 
entailed a rethinking of Islamism from within’. The second is ‘social changes (increasing 
literacy,  urbanisation, and an economic shift)  that  generated actors (educated middle 
Classes, the young, increasingly literate women) who together … pushed for social and 
political transformation’. The third and final factor is ‘global context within which these 
changes were taking place.’15 The aim of this thesis is to deconstruct how Iranian national 
identity is constructed in the context of this environment of dissent within the Islamic 
Republic and in the context of social and political liberalisation.
As will be demonstrated, there is the continued discussion in both the public and private 
spaces, not only in  Iran but also among the diaspora, regarding Iranian identity  and 
Iranian national identity. The fact that there is a plethora of books and articles published 
during  Khatami’s  presidency in  Iran  addressing  in  the  issue  of  ‘identity  crisis’ and 
‘Iranian identity’ reflects that the nation itself is going through a process of self-analysis.16 
It is likely that this self-analysis was taking place in Iran before Khatami was elected as 
president in 1997, but they were encouraged by Khatami’s relative political liberalisation. 
Additionally,  the fact that much of the literature about Iran outside of Iran is in fact 
written by those of Iranian origin also indicates a certain sense of self-analysis regarding 
what it means to be Iranian, or a search for explanations to the political events mentioned 
above.17 A subject for further research would be how the discussions in this thesis, which 
are primarily related to Iranians within the territorial boundaries of Iran, translate among 
the  various Iranian diasporic  groups.  Taking all  these factors into  consideration,  the 
Khatami period makes for an interesting and exciting period with regard to  political 
14 Bayat, Asef. Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 2007, p. 84
15 Ibid., p. 97
16 This is evident in the very existence of edited volumes such as Guftārhā darbāra-yi Huvīyat-i Millī -yi 
Īrān (Discussions on Iran’s National Identity), Khudkāvi-yi Millī dar ‘Asr-i Jahānī Shudan (National Self-
Analysis in the Age of Globalisation), and Īrān: Huvīyat, Millīyat, Qawmīyat (Iran: Identity, Nationality,  
Ethnicity), all of which were published during Khatami’s presidency.
17 Some such works will be addressed in Chapter 6 as part of the discussion by Iranian academics on the 
issue of Iranian national identity.
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discourse in general and the articulation and construction of Iranian national identity in 
particular. 
Although the issue of identity in all its forms has been endlessly critiqued, as Stuart Hall 
highlights, it continues to be a heated discussion outside the academic sphere.18 It is worth 
stressing that Iran is  not unique in  its  discussions on national identity.  For example, 
Britain is one country among many that is witnessing public discussions regarding the 
issue of national identity. This is an issue of concern and interest for Gordon Brown, the 
United Kingdom’s Prime Minister since 2007. He has taken it upon himself to explore 
what it  means to be British. At  the Fabian Society Conference on 14 January 2006, 
Brown’s keynote speech entitled The Future of Britishness argues that there must be ‘a 
clear view of what being British means, what you value about being British and what 
gives us purpose as a nation’.19 He raises the question of whether being British is based on 
only race or ethnicity, or on common values and opts for the latter because of Britain’s 
diversity:
While we have always been a country of different nations and thus of plural 
identities -  a  Welshman can be Welsh and British, just  as a  Cornishman or 
woman is Cornish, English and British - and may be Muslim, Pakistani or Afro-
Caribbean, Cornish,  English and British -  there is  always a  risk that,  when 
people are insecure, they retreat into more exclusive identities rooted in 19th 
century conceptions of blood, race and territory - when instead, we the British 
people should be able to gain great strength from celebrating a British identity 
which is bigger than the sum of its parts and a union that is strong because of 
the values we share and because of the way these values are expressed through 
our history and our institutions.20
A more populist discussion of what it means to be British, or rather English, came to light 
during the 2006 Football World Cup. For example, Mike Marqusee, in his article ‘In thrall 
to St George’ asks why there has been ‘an unprecedented display of England flags’ in 
England not only at the matches themselves. In response he argues:
… the flag betokens Englishness, that mysterious something which we are said 
to have in common …. But it  remains difficult  to define. England is  not  a 
nation-state or significant political unit. And Englishness is a category vague 
enough to accommodate radically opposed ideas of what being English might 
be. Crucially it carries both ethnic and national connotations. (Though the usage 
is  increasingly contested, being ‘English’ is  frequently a synonym for being 
white native-born English.)21 
18 Hall, Stuart. ‘Who needs ‘Identity’?’ in Questions of Cultural Identity, London, Thousand Oaks & New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996. pp. 1-17, p. 1
19 Brown, Gordon. The Future of Britishness. 2006. http://www.fabian-
society.org.uk/press_office/newssearch.asp?newsID=520 and http://www.fabian-
society.org.uk/press_office/display.asp?id=533&type=news&cat=43 - date accessed 30 March 2006 
20 Ibid. 
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Marqusee goes on to offer several arguments for the re-emergence of a popular discussion 
on English national identity. One the one hand, some argue that this is due to the ‘EU, 
Scottish and Welsh devolution, [and] globalisation’. On the other hand, there are those 
who feel the need to fight against the ‘alien forces’ who threaten English identity. Finally, 
for some it is a case of positioning a modern and modest sense of Englishness in the 
plural world.
This plural world includes Wales, which is also worthy of mention in relation to the 
notion of British national identity. Indeed for many, Britain is not accepted as an identity; 
one is Welsh and European, not British. This is possibly because Wales is perceived by 
some as  an  English  colony.  To  this  regard, in  his  article, ‘Wales:  England’s  Oldest 
Colony’, Niall Griffiths discusses the relationship between Wales and England in terms of 
identity. In response to the question ‘What are they [the Welsh] for?’ Griffiths states: 
one of the functions of the Welsh is not to be English: that people, nation and 
language are  there  for  an  arrogant and  imperious  bully  of  a  neighbour  to 
measure itself against, and to find itself is wanting.22
The aim of highlighting these discussions on British and national identity is to show that 
Iran is not unique in her self-analysis. There are clearly contesting notions of what it 
means to be British and English. Furthermore, a closer look at the issue will show there is 
also a discussion on how the British national identities work or fit with the English, 
Scottish  and/or  Welsh  national  identities.  These examples illustrate that  the  issue of 
identity, and national identity in particular, continues to be worthy of discussion. 
1.3 Epistemological Framework
As is argued by Stuart Hall, ‘what we say is always ‘in context’, positioned.’23 Bearing 
this in mind, it  is  necessary to be aware of the standpoint or ideology by which the 
researcher is influenced. First of all, the researcher is of Anglo-Iranian heritage; therefore, 
the issues of identity in general and Iranian identity are of particular interest. In relation to 
this, it is important to be aware that the researcher has particular views of how Iranian 
national identity is constructed. Despite this, while accepting that nothing is objective and 
that the issue of identity in many ways is subjective, the aim has been to be as objective as 
possible when interpreting how Iranian national identity  has been constructed in  the 
various texts.  This  is  facilitated  by  discourse analysis.  As  will  be  demonstrated,  a 
21 Marqusee, Mike. ‘In thrall to St George’, The Guardian. 27 June 2006
22 Griffiths, Nial. ‘Wales: England’s Oldest Colony’, New Statesman, 23 April 2007. pp. 32-34, p. 32
23 Hall, Stuart. ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’ in Rutherford, J. (ed) Identity: Community, Culture,  
Difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990. pp. 222-237, p. 222
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discourse  approach to  national  identity  enables us  to  become aware of  the  multiple 
ideologies  embedded  in  the  multiple constructions  of  Iranian  national  identity. 
Consequently,  there  are  concurrent  competing  discourses.  Furthermore,  a  discourse 
analysis of the texts, whether speeches, academic articles or interviews, helps to illustrate 
how subjective the construction of Iranian national identity is despite the claims by some 
that Iranian national identity is an objective and static phenomenon.
The  researcher is  also  influenced by  postcolonial,  poststructuralist  and  postmodern 
approaches to the social sciences. Thus, it has been the aim to not treat any political or 
social unit  or  concept  in  an  essentialist  manner.  Since,  it  is  often the  case that  the 
theoretical literature approaches to  the discussion of nation, nationalism and national 
identity come from a Eurocentric standpoint; the tendency is to assume that the notions 
prescribed are universal. This is clearly not the case. One must be aware that it is possible 
that the concept of nation in Europe incurs or is associated with different references and 
interpretations to that anywhere else in the world. Therefore, any definition must not be 
treated as a monolithic concept. The conceptualisation of nation outlined below bears 
these  issues  in  mind,  by  focusing  on  how Iranians themselves, on  different  levels, 
construct their sense of Iranian national identity. In turn, the theoretical discussion on 
national  identity  is  adapted to  the  empirical  evidence.  Nonetheless,  although  these 
guidelines apply to the case for Iran, it is necessary to point out that variations of these 
guidelines may be necessary for different nations. 
1.4 Statement of the Problem
The issue of nationalism and national identity in Iran is much discussed in the existing 
literature. However, on the one hand, the discussions demonstrate a very general approach 
to the issue, or on the other hand, this tends to be restricted to events up to and including 
the Islamic Revolution. There is some discussion on nationalism and national identity at 
the time of the Iran-Iraq War. These historical studies on Iranian national identity and 
nationalism will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, ‘The Construction 
of Iranian National Identity: Historical and Intellectual Context’. The focus of this thesis, 
however, is the Khatami period and it is the detailed approach to this issue that allows this 
thesis to be a valid contribution to the existing literature.
The research question is two-fold. Firstly, what is Iranian national identity during the 
Khatami  period  and  how  does  it  compare  and  relate  to  earlier  twentieth  century 
constructions of national identity in Iran? Secondly, what does national identity during the 
Khatami period tell us about the social and political dynamics of his presidency? It must 
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be stated from the outset that this discussion of Iranian national identity is based on the 
assumption that Iran is, albeit contested, a nation. Thus, how Iran came to be a nation will 
only be discussed in as far as it relates to a particular discourse.24
1.5 Argument and Contribution to Knowledge
This thesis is a contribution to exiting literature because it expands the discussion of 
Iranian  national  identity  into  the  Khatami  period.  The  detailed  analysis  of  texts 
demonstrates that during Khatami’s presidency Iranian national identity continues to be 
contested and can be understood in terms of concurrent discourses and counter-discourses 
of  national identity  that  have a  hegemonic and counter-hegemonic  dimension. These 
competing discourses are articulated on both state and non-state levels. The aim of the 
thesis, therefore, is to contribute to an understanding of how Iranian national identity can 
be interpreted. This analysis can also contribute to more general discussions on the social 
and political dynamics of the Khatami period.
Chapters Four, Five and Six will demonstrate different ways Iranian national identity is 
articulated and contested. Five discourses of national identity have been identified for 
discussion. While acknowledging that these are by no means the only discourses in Iran 
and that they are not rigid categories, they are, for the benefit of analysis, useful labels 
and conceptual tools. It is argued, on the one hand, that the Iranist, Islamist, Islamist-
Iranian discourses of national identity are based on the politicisation what is perceived to 
be Iran’s “authentic” culture - either Īrānīyat (Iran’s pre-Islamic culture or being Iranian), 
Īslāmīyat (Islamic culture or being Islamic), or both. Politicisation, in this sense, is to be 
understood as the use of culture as the basis for a particular political system. Thus, culture 
is inseparable from the state apparatus. The basis of contestation is that authenticity is 
contested. The competition is further exacerbated by the existence of  the discourse of 
civic Iranian national identity and the discourse of cosmopolitan Iranian national identity. 
In these cases, it is contended that the contestation is based on the rejection of  either 
Īslāmīyat or Īrānīyat as the basis of Iranian national identity.
Naturally, this thesis is not able to explore every way that Iranian national identity is 
constructed  and  articulated.  Nevertheless,  a  commonality  between  the  discourses 
identified for discussion is that they all prescribe a particular political apparatus, or at 
least  critique  the  political  systems  advocated on  the  state  level  during  Khatami’s 
presidency. Thus, that which unites these discourses of national identity is that they are 
24 See Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946. London & New 
York, I. B. Tauris, 2000. for an in depth discussion on how those now within the territorial boundaries of 
Iran came to consider themselves as part of Iran as a nation.
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attached to a particular political system or apparatus. For example,  albeit in different 
ways, the Islamist  and Islamist-Iranian discourses, as will  be shown, subscribe to the 
notion that Islam is Iran’s authentic culture and is a means of justifying and legitimising 
an Islamist government, or in other words, Islam as the framework for Iran’s political 
apparatus. The Iranist discourse justifies the notion of monarchy as the country’s political 
apparatus. Since the various discourses of Iranian national identity are not necessarily 
adhered to or accepted by elements of Iran’s population, they can only essentially be 
considered as aspirations for the identity of the nation, or  huvīyat-i millī. The issue of 
huvīyat-i millī will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapter. 
The ideas and contentions presented in this thesis build on existing scholarship. With 
regard to the issue of contested constructions of Iranian national identity, this has been 
addressed in terms of nationalism during Iran’s earlier historical periods. It is Ansari’s 
contention  that  ‘many  of  the  political  debates  in  modern Iran  revolve  around  the 
contestation between various definitions of Iranian nationalism and the determination to 
monopolise discourse by imposing and ‘authentic’ version’.25 These ‘various definitions 
of  Iranian  nationalism’ are  secular  nationalism,  dynastic  nationalism  and  religious 
nationalism. This thesis contributes to this scholarship by discussing these nationalisms in 
terms of how they relate to the discourses of national identity during the Khatami period. 
Thus,  the  contestation  between the  discourses  asserting  a  particular  authenticity  is 
addressed through the notion of discourses of Iranian national identity in the Khatami 
period.  This thesis  also contributes to  the discussion of Iranian national identity  and 
nationalism by offering a detailed focus on the Khatami period. 
Nevertheless, there are also more general approaches to Iranian national identity written 
during the Khatami period, mainly in the Persian language. This scholarship, however, 
does not present Iranian national identity in terms of co-existent competing discourses. 
For example, Hamid Ahmadi identifies elements in Iranian national identity, which he 
argues is static and fixed. These elements are history, myths, geography, cultural heritage 
and religion.26 While these factors undoubtedly form part of Iranian national identity, 
Ahmadi does not take into consideration the meanings attached to these factors and that 
for different groups in Iran they mean different things. In another article, Ahmadi argues 
that throughout Iran’s history there have been ‘integrative forces’ which have enabled Iran 
25 Ansari, Ali M. ‘Iranian Nationalism’ in Choueiri, Yousef (ed) A Companion to the History of the Middle 
East, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005. pp. 320-333, p. 320
26 Ahmadi, Hamid.‘Huvīyat-i Millī-yi Īrān; Vīzhigīhā va Avāmil-i Pūyāyī-yi ān’ (‘Iranian National 
Identity; Its Specificities and the Search for its Elements’) in Mirmohammadi, Davud. (ed) Guftārhā 
darbāra-yi Huvīyat-i Millī -yi Īrān (Discussions on Iran’s National Identity), Tehran, Iran: Iranian 
Civilisation Publications, 1383 (2004/2005). pp. 189-212
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to stand-up to ‘foreign invasions’ and ‘external crises’.27 One of these ‘integrative forces’, 
as he argues, is the ‘national identity dynamic’, which is the ‘potential for action which 
resides in a mass which share the same national identification’.28 According to Ahmadi, 
the  first  manifestation  of  the  ‘national  identity  dynamic’ was the  resistance to  Arab 
dominance by  Iranians in  the  seventh and  eighth  centuries AD. The second  was in 
reaction to the Russians and Ottomans following the fall of the Safavid dynasty in 1722. 
The most recent example is the participation by almost all Iranians in the election that 
brought  Khatami to  power with  the  hope  of  a  democratic  government.29 The  other 
‘integrative forces’ are  based on  what Ahmadi considers the  ‘foundations  of  Iranian 
national identity and unity’, namely Iranian political heritage, Iranian cultural heritage 
and  the  omnipresent  role  of  religion.30 Once  again,  Ahmadi  does  not  take  into 
consideration that Iranian national identity is contested.
By exploring Iranian national identity in terms of contested competing discourses, this 
thesis is able to refute essentialist and monolithic arguments regarding Iran. For example, 
when discussing Iranian identity and Iranian nationalism, a concept that often comes up is 
the notion of the ‘Iranian psyche’ or the ‘Iranian character’. Majid Tehranian refers to the 
‘vast  strength  of  the  Iranian  psyche  that  can  withstand  the  harshest  of  political 
conditions’.31 Richard Cottam argues that despite repeated invasions of Iran throughout its 
history ‘an exclusive Iranian national character,  culture, and history have survived’.32 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami argues that Iran’s impotence against foreign interference ‘has 
left a deep and seemingly permanent scar on the Iranian psyche’ which has resulted in the 
‘rise of a condition that [he calls] … ‘the arrogance of nonsubmission’’.33 While these 
arguments  regarding  the  “Iranian  psyche”  may  contribute  to  the  construction  and 
articulation of Iranian national identity, they are by no means the full picture. A discourse 
approach allows for multiple constructions of Iranian national identity to be demonstrated 
as well as an analysis of the power relations between them.
27 Ahmadi, Hamid. ‘Unity and Diversity: Foundations and Dynamics of National Identity in Iran’, 
Critique, 14, 1. April 2005. pp. 127-147, p. 127
28 Ahmadi 2005, p. 131 cites Bloom, William. Personal Identity, National Identity and International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. pp. 53, 79
29 Op. cit. Ahmadi 2005, pp. 131-132. He also gives other examples.
30 Ibid., pp. 134-143
31 Tehranian, Majid. ‘Power and Purity: Iranian Political Culture, Communication and Identity’ in 
Jahanbegloo, R. (ed) Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity. Oxford, UK & Lanham, Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2004. pp. 185-206, p. 187
32 Cottam R. W. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Pittsburg University Press, 1979. pp. 23-24
33 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’ in Hinnebusch, R. and  Ehteshami, 
Anoushiravan. (eds) The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. Boulder & London: Lynne Reiner 
Publishers, 2002. pp. 283-310 p. 285
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In  methodological  terms, a  discourse  approach to national  identity also exists  in  the 
scholarship. Ruth Wodak et al. apply Critical Discourse Analysis to a study on Austrian 
national  identity.34 Their  work  specifically uses  Critical  Linguistics  to  study  of  the 
discursive construction of national identity. However,  the way in which the notion of 
discourse is approached in this thesis is similar to that of Larbi Sadiki in his discussion of 
democracy in the Arab Middle East. Just as Sadiki asks ‘What is democracy? Which 
democracy? Whose democracy?’ in the context  of the Arab Middle East35,  this thesis 
considers the questions: what is Iranian national identity, which Iranian national identity 
and  whose  Iranian  national  identity?  In  Sadiki’s  analysis  of  the  afore  mentioned 
questions,  his  aim is  to  ‘explore democracy in  a  variety  of  discourses and counter-
discourses, dominant and marginalised, top-down and bottom-up’.36 Similarly, the aim of 
this thesis is to explore a variety of discourses and counter-discourses of Iranian national 
identity, some of which are or have been dominant and top-down and others that are 
marginalised and bottom-up and aspire to be dominant and top-down. The ultimate aim is 
to illustrate that indeed Iranian national identity in the Khatami period is contested and 
that  this  is  evident  in  the  multiple discourses and  counter-discourses. By looking at 
national identity  through discourse analysis  it  allows  the concurrent constructions of 
national  identity  to  be  examined in  terms  of  a  hegemonic and  counter-hegemonic 
relationship. Not only does this shed light on the Khatami era, but also indirectly on any 
society. If national identity in general is examined using this paradigm of investigation, it 
is possible to learn of new dynamics.
1.6 Limitations of the Study
A limitation to the study is the absence of a discussion on certain groups in society; 
women, and ethnic and religious  minorities. It  is  recognised that national identity is 
gendered and that indeed ethnic and religious communities are part of the nation. It is 
taken for granted that some members of communities such as the Kurdish, Azeri, Baluchi 
and Arab communities offer alternative discourses of  Iranian or even non-Iranian national 
identity and challenge those of the state. Similarly, some members of the Zoroastrian, 
Sunni, Bahai, Jewish and Christian communities are likely to have their own discourses of 
national identity. Finally, how each of the discourses identified deal with the issue of 
34 Wodak, Judith, de Cillia, Rudolf, Reisigl, Martin and Liebhart, Karin. The Discursive Construction 
of National Identity. trans. by Angelika Hirsch and Richard Mitten. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999.
35 Sadiki, Larbi. The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourse and Counter-Discourses. London: Hurst & 
Company, 2004, p. 2
36 Ibid., p. 7
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gender is  not discussed. The inclusion of these issues would make for another thesis 
altogether and are indeed worthy of further research. 
A further limitation is methodological:  how the data was collected in Iran. Initially, the 
aim was  to  carry out  far  more interviews than were actually  done,  especially  with 
government officials. However, the field trip to Iran – September to December 2005 – 
took place only a few months after the election of Mahmud Ahmadinezhad in June 2005. 
Compared to the previous year, the mood was far more tense; it  was suggested on a 
number of occasions that discussions on national identity would be received with caution 
and in even in some cases with suspicion. As the thesis will reveal, how national identity 
is dealt with in Iran is varied and illustrates that it is a highly sensitive and politicised 
issue. Nonetheless, the experience of weekly Persian language sessions, which focused on 
discussions on the issue of national identity with Reformist civil servants at the Institute 
of International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided an excellent insight. These 
are limitations identified by the researcher; nevertheless, the researcher cannot be so bold 
as to claim they are the only limitations.
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
Having provided the ‘Orientation of the Thesis’ in this chapter, Chapter Two will provide 
the theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis by presenting what is to be 
understood by the notion of ‘discourse of national identity’. It is contended that nation is a 
socially  constructed political  unit  based  on  shared values  and/or  common heritage. 
Discourse is the means by which ideology is articulated. Discourses also reproduce what 
come to be considered as assumptions in society.  As will be illustrated, the notion of 
discourse of national identity allows for an examination of the ideology embedded in the 
way national  identity is  constructed. Furthermore,  the notion of discourse of national 
identity enables the constructions of Iranian national identity to be understood in terms of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic; that is discourses and counter-discourses.
These contentions will be made through a discussion of three parallel concepts - nation, 
discourse and identity – that will be brought together at the end of the chapter in the 
notion of discourse of national identity. The concept of nation will be deconstructed by 
first  considering  the Persian terminology,  millat,  and  related concepts. Secondly,  the 
arguments provided in the English language will be considered. The final aim of this 
section is to reconcile millat and nation. Using existing discussions on discourse, the aim 
of the second section is to illustrate how discourse is to be understood as the means by 
which ideology is transferred, articulated or communicated. This will be done by defining 
19
ideology and engaging with the issues of power. Following this, the chapter will turn to 
identity and national identity. Since it is argued that the discourses of national identity 
discussed here relate to particular political systems, it is also necessary to consider the 
concept of the state: the post-structuralist understanding of the state will  be outlined. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the methods used for the research where the sources will be 
considered. Further theoretical discussions regarding the meanings attached to the notion 
of nation, which are directly related to the discourse of national identity being discussed, 
will be brought into Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six. These are anti-imperialism and 
authenticity  in  Chapter Three,  culture  and  civilisation,  tradition  and  modernity,  and 
Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat in Chapter Four, and finally civic nation and cosmopolitanism in 
Chapter Six.
Naturally,  the  discourses  and  counter-discourses  of  Iranian  national  identity  in  the 
Khatami period cannot be addressed in historical isolation. The contention here is that 
several of the ideologies embedded in the construction of Iranian national identity during 
the Khatami period have existed in  earlier constructions of  Iranian national  identity. 
Therefore,  Chapter Three, ‘The Construction of the Iranian National Identity: Historical 
and Intellectual Context’, aims to contextualise the discourses identified for analysis in 
this thesis through a discussion of an intellectual and historical background. This will 
allow parallels to be drawn between the discourses explored in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six  and earlier  twentieth  century nationalisms  and  constructions  of  Iranian national 
identity. 
Before proceeding with the historical and intellectual context, Chapter Three will begin 
with a theoretical discussion of the notions of anti-imperialism, authenticity and the role 
of intellectuals. This is essential for a better understanding of the different nationalisms 
and the meanings attached to them to be discussed in the chapter.  The historical and 
intellectual context will be provided by illustrating the articulation of different Iranian 
nationalisms during  four historical periods.  As  a  means of  introducing the notion of 
discourse of national identity,  these Iranian nationalisms will  also be reconsidered in 
terms of discourses of Iranian national identity. The periods identified as the framework 
of the chapter are the late Qajar period and Constitutional period; the rise and rule of Reza 
Shah; the rule  of  Mohammad Reza Shah;  and religious nationalism and the Islamic 
Republic. This historical context is essential for a fuller understanding of the complexity 
of the constructions of contemporary Iranian national identity and enables them to be 
related to previous articulations of national identity.
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Having established the theoretical and methodological framework and the historical and 
intellectual context, Chapters Four, Five and Six provide an analysis of the concurrent 
discourses of Iranian national identity articulated during Khatami’s presidency. The focus 
of Chapter Four, ‘Islamist and Iranist Discourses of National Identity: The Polarisation of 
Politicised “Authentic” Culture’ is  on the  Islamist  and Iranist discourses  of  national 
identity.  However,  before a  discussion of these two discourses, there is  a  theoretical 
consideration of  the  notions  of  culture  and civilisation,  Īslāmīyat and  Īrānīyat,  and 
tradition and modernity. This discussion is essential for a better understanding of not only 
the  Islamist and Iranist  discourses of  national  identity,  but  also  the  Islamist-Iranian 
discourse of national identity addressed in Chapter Five.
The contention of Chapter Four is that for both the Islamist and Iranist discourses the 
basis for the construction of Iranian national identity is what is perceived to be Iran’s 
“authentic” culture. It is also contended that this “authentic” culture is politicised and 
justifies a particular political apparatus. On the one hand, it is Iran’s pre-Islamic culture 
(Īrānīyat) that is politicised in the Iranist discourse of national identity, and on the other 
hand it is Iran’s Islamic culture (Īslāmīyat) that is politicised in the Islamist discourse of 
national identity.  However,  despite the importance of  Īslāmīyat in the construction of 
Iranian national identity, it is argued that this Īslāmīyat is Iranianised Islam. Furthermore, 
it is also argued that while parallels can be drawn between the Iranist discourse in the 
Khatami period and earlier articulations, there is also a departure from the Iranism of the 
Pahlavis. This is demonstrated in the use of Sasanian Iran, as opposed to Achaemenid 
Iran, in the construction of national identity. It is also contended that the contestation 
regarding  authenticity  demonstrates  a  hegemonic  and  counter-hegemonic  dynamic 
between the two discourses.
The theme of politicised culture in  the construction of national identity continues  in 
Chapter Five, ‘Islamist-Iranian Discourse of National Identity: Khatami’s State Counter-
Discourse’. However,  the contention here is  that both cultures, Iran’s  Islamic culture 
(Īslāmīyat) and Iran’s pre-Islamic culture (Īrānīyat), are considered as “authentic”. It is 
contended that these form the first of three pillars that constitute the Islamist-Iranian 
discourse of national identity. The other two pillars are the notions of ‘dialogue among 
civilisations’ and  Islamic  mardumsālārī (democracy).  It  is  contended that  it  is  the 
bringing together of these three pillars as state discourse that makes Khatami’s presidency 
unique in terms of the articulation of Iranian national identity. The aim of the chapter is to 
also demonstrate that Khatami’s  Islamist-Iranian discourse  is  at  once hegemonic  and 
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counter-hegemonic when considered in relation to the internal ‘other’, Islamist and Iranist 
discourses of national identity, and the external ‘other’.
While Chapters Four and Five focus on discourses based on the politicisation of culture, 
in Chapter Six, ‘Alternative Discourses of Iranian National Identity’, attention is drawn to 
two  discourses  of  Iranian  national  identity  that  reject  the  politicisation  of  culture 
altogether. These are the discourse of civic Iranian national identity and the discourse of 
cosmopolitan Iranian national identity. The contention here is not that Iran’s Islamic and 
pre-Islamic cultures are not part of Iranian identity. Rather, it is their politicisation and the 
use of culture as the basis of a political apparatus that is rejected. Furthermore, it is also 
contended that it is Khatami and his Islamist-Iranian discourse that have allowed these 
constructions to be more openly articulated. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
The aim of the first is to illustrate how Iranian academics both within Iran and among the 
diaspora are engaged in the discussion of Iranian national identity and provide a critique 
of the constructions of Iranian national identity based on the politicisation of culture. 
The  second section turns  to  the  discourse of  civic  Iranian national  identity.  Before 
illustrating how such a discourse is articulated, a theoretical discussion of the notion of 
civic nation is provided. It is contended that it is the notion of citizenship in a secular 
context, rather than an ethnic or ethno-religious national identity as is the case with the 
other discourses, which is the basis of the construction of Iranian national identity. In this 
case, the rejection of the politicisation of culture reflects a counter-hegemonic dynamic; 
the notion of ethnic national identity is being resisted. The third section turns to the fifth 
and final discourse discussed in this thesis. Again, before illustrating how a discourse of 
cosmopolitan Iranian national identity is articulated, a theoretical discussion of the notion 
of ‘being cosmopolitan’ is provided. 
Finally,  the  thesis  concludes  by  bringing  together  the  complex set  of  relationships 
between the five discourses identified for analysis. Based on these relationships  it  is 
concluded that Iranian national identity in the Khatami period not only continues to be 
contested, but it must also be considered in terms of concurrent competing discourses of 
national  identity.  This  reflects  their  hegemonic and  counter-hegemonic  relationship. 
Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the fact on a daily basis Iranians are moving 
between spaces, both public and private that are dominated by these conflicting ideas of 
national identity. The implication of this must be considered.
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1.8 Translation, Transliteration and the Iranian Calendar
Unless otherwise stated, the author has carried out all translations from the Persian text. 
Transliteration from the Persian language into English is based on the transliteration table 
of the  International Journal of Middle East Studies. All transliterated terms will be in 
italics.  Certain  proper  nouns  are  based  on  versions  commonly  used  in  existing 
scholarship, such as Seyyed, Ayatollah, Hojjatoleslam, Khamene’i, and Mohammad.
The Iranian solar calendar starts on 21 March. An Iranian year can be converted into the 
Gregorian calendar by adding 621. Thus, the Iranian year 1376 refers to the period 21 
March 1997 to 20 March 1998. When a specific date is given in the Iranian calendar it is 
converted into the Gregorian date. When a year is given, such as 1376, the Gregorian date 
will be given as (1997/1998).
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Chapter Two: Theoretical and Methodological Framework: ‘Discourse 
of National Identity’
Before the construction of Iranian national identity can be an analysed and deconstructed 
in terms of discourses, it is necessary to first determine what is to be understood by the 
notion of ‘discourse of national identity’. Thus, having provided the orientation of the 
thesis, this chapter will now turn to this notion. It is in this theoretical and methodological 
framework that Iranian national identity is deconstructed. The contention here is that a 
discourse approach to the study of national identity is beneficial because it allows for an 
analysis of how ideology is or ideologies are embedded in the construction of national 
identity. Thus, the way Iranian national identity is constructed is considered in terms of 
discourses of national identity. Furthermore, by looking at the articulation of national 
identity as a discourse it allows for the construction of national identity to be examined in 
terms of power relations, which have a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dimension. 
An understanding of the notion of ‘discourse of national identity’ will  be developed 
through a discussion of three parallel concepts: discourse, nation and identity. The first 
section of the chapter addresses the first of these concepts. The reasons for a discourse 
approach  will  be  established  and  through  a  discussion  of  existing  scholarship  on 
discourse, it  is  argued that  discourse is the means by  which ideology is  transferred, 
articulated or communicated. It is also contended that discourses reproduce what comes to 
be considered as assumptions and perceived as common sense. The second section of the 
chapter focuses on the notion of nation. Also through an examination of the existing 
scholarship, it is contended that  nation is a socially constructed political unit based on 
shared values and/or a common heritage. The third section turns to the concept, identity. 
The contention here is that identity, or how one identifies oneself, is in a constant state of 
evolution and reconstruction. These three different notions discussed in the three sections 
will be brought together in the fourth section with a discussion of the notion of ‘discourse 
of national identity’. It is argued that how the identity of a nation is constructed reflects a 
particular ideology or several ideologies.  This will be followed by the fourth section, 
which delineates the post-structuralist understanding of the state. It is argued that the state 
is political contested and is best understood as an ‘ensemble of practices’. The fifth and 
final section of the chapter discusses the methods for the research. This includes an 
explanation of the sources. 
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1.9 Discourse 
The choice of using discourse analysis as the theoretical and methodological framework 
for  understanding  a  political  or  social situation  reflects how society  is  perceived to 
function.  That  is,  society is  perceived in  terms of  discourses.  This  is  based on  the 
contention  that  ‘political  concepts,  ideas,  language,  behaviour  and  institutional 
arrangements are loaded with assumptions about the nature of the social and political 
world’ and that 
discourses  reproduce  the  everyday  assumptions  of  society  and  that  those 
common perceptions  and  understandings  are  encouraged and  reinforced by 
those with access to the media, such as politicians, journalists and academic 
experts.37
Thus, the purpose here is to identify and deconstruct the assumptions regarding society in 
relation to Iranian national identity. In other words, how national identity is constructed, 
articulated and reproduced will be deconstructed through discourse analysis.
The benefit of discourse analysis is provided by David Howarth. It is his contention that, 
through a discursive approach, it is possible to:
[theorise  on]  the  complexities  of  political  identity  and  difference;  the 
construction of hegemonic formations; … and the connection between the role 
of identities and interests in the social sciences.38 
With regard to Iranian national identity, as will  be illustrated throughout the thesis, a 
discourse approach is a helpful means for deconstructing how Iranian national identity is 
constructed.  For  example,  as  will  be  demonstrated in  Chapters  Four  and  Five,  a 
deconstruction of how Iranian national identity is articulated on the state level illustrates 
that there is diversity in political identity and that ‘hegemonic formations’ are constructed.
This  thesis  is  not the place for an in-depth discussion of the merits  of the different 
approaches to discourse.39 Rather, how the notion of discourse is to be understood here is 
the  subject  of  discussion.  Louise  Phillips  and  Marianne  Jørgensen  encourage  the 
combining of aspects from the various discourse analysis perspectives. In brief, drawing 
on existing understandings of the concept, the notion of discourse is to be understood here 
as  the  means  by  which  ideology,  a  set  of  values,  is  transferred,  articulated  or 
communicated.  In  other  words,  ideology  becomes  evident  in  discourse.40 Thus,  a 
37 Burnham, Peter et al. Research Methods in Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004. p. 242
38 Howarth, David. Discourse. Buckingham & Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000. p. 6
39 See Phillips, Louise and Jørgensen, Marianne W. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London & 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002., Howarth  2000 and Torfing, Jacob. New Theories of Discourse: 
Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999. for discussions on the various approaches.
40 van Dijk, Teun. A. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage Publications, 1998., pp. 14, 
192, 193 and Fairclough, Norman. Language and Power. London & New York: Longman, 1989. p. 77
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discourse approach enables an investigation of the ideological nature of Iranian national 
identity in a more analytical manner, rather than simply referring to it in terms of the 
“Iranian psyche”.
Taking Teun van Dijk’s definition, ideology is to be understood as a system or set of 
beliefs and ideas. This system of ideas usually pertains to how society is perceived to, or 
ought to function by an individual or group.41 Furthermore, ideology can be understood as 
‘shared social representations that have specific functions for groups’.42 At one end of the 
spectrum, it is perceived that ideology does not accept that society is able to function in 
any other way. At the other end of the spectrum, an ideology can be a belief system that 
does not acknowledge that there is any set way by which the world can be interpreted. 
The contention that discourse is the means by which ideology is transferred, articulated or 
communicated draws on the arguments of both van Dijk and Norman Fairclough. Van 
Dijk  argues  that  ‘discourse  expresses or  reproduces underlying  ideologies’ that  are 
reproduced in  society.43 Fairclough  argues  that  ‘conventions  routinely  drawn up  in 
discourse embody ideological assumptions which come to be taken as mere “common 
sense”’.44 In other words, whereas ideology is a system or set of beliefs or ideas, the 
contention here is that discourse is the means of transmitting the ideas and sets of beliefs. 
Therefore, ideology is constructed and recognised in discourse. Furthermore, discourse is 
also  the  means  of  establishing  ideology  as  common  sense  or  as  one  of  society’s 
assumptions. Thus, discourse is more than just the ideology that an individual or group of 
people subscribe to; discourse also reflects the meanings attached to the ideology, or what 
comes to be “common sense”, either consciously or subconsciously.
A crucial point in understanding the concept of discourse is the relationship between 
ideology and power. Integral to the arguments of both Fairclough and van Dijk regarding 
discourse is the role of ideology in maintaining power. Fairclough contends that “common 
sense” based on  ‘ideological  assumptions’ ‘contribute[s] to  sustaining existing power 
relations’.45 Van Dijk’s contention is that ideology ‘may be used to legitimate or oppose 
power and dominance, or symbolise social problems and contradictions’.46 Thus, in the 
case of national identity, a discourse analysis of the way it is articulated reveals certain 
ideological assumptions. For example, as will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Four, the 
41Op. cit. van Dijk, p.5
42 Ibid., p. 191
43 Ibid., p. 193
44 Op. cit. Fairclough, p. 77
45 Ibid. p. 77
46 Op. cit. van Dijk, p.5
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one of the ideologies embedded in the Islamist construction of national identity is that 
Islam is all encompassing and that it is the most legitimate means of opposing what is 
perceived as Western dominance and power.
The relationship between discourse and power is  elaborated by Robert Young in  his 
introduction to Michel Foucault’s ‘The Order of Discourse’. He argues that the effect of 
discursive practices is:
to make it virtually impossible to think outside them. To think outside them, is 
by definition, to be mad, to be beyond comprehension and therefore reason. It is 
in this way that we can see how discursive rules are linked to the exercise of 
power; how the forms of discourse are both constituted by,  and ensure the 
reproduction of, the social system, through forms of selection, exclusion, and 
domination.47
To use the Islamist discourse of national identity as an example, an effective Islamist 
discourse of national identity would succeed in making people believe that it is only Islam 
that is the legitimate basis of national identity and furthermore, national identity is not 
constructed, rather it is innate. In other words, it becomes “common sense” and one of 
society’s assumptions.
Taking Foucault’s notion of power, while discourse is a means of maintaining domination, 
there is  the possibility of  resistance to  that domination.48 This brings  us  back to  the 
contentions of van Dijk and Fairclough. The latter contends that discourse plays a role in 
the sustaining of existing power relations, whereas the former attributes discourse the role 
of both legitimising as well as opposing power. Howarth offers an explanation for this. He 
argues:
…  no  mater  how  successful  a  particular  project’s  discourse  might  be  in 
dominating a discursive field, it can never in principle completely articulate all 
elements, as there will always be forces against which it is defined. In fact … a 
discourse always requires a discursive “outside” to constitute itself. 49
In other words, the identity of a discourse is dependent on ‘differentiation from other 
discourses’.50 For example, the Islamist discourse of national identity partly sustains and 
defines itself in opposition to other discourses, such as the Iranist discourse of national 
identity that rejects Islam as the basis of Iranian national identity.  Ernest Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s concept of ‘social antagonism’ also explains this. They argue: ‘social 
antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to attain their identities (and therefore 
47 Young, Robert. ‘Introduction’ to Foucault, Michel ‘The order of discourse’ in Young, Robert. (ed) 
Untying the Text: A Post-structuralist Reader. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. p. 48
48 See Mills, Sara. Michel Foucault. London: Routledge. 2003, pp. 33-34
49 Op. Cit. Howarth, p. 102
50 Ibid., p. 102
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their interests), and because they construct an “enemy” who is deemed responsible for 
this “failure”.’51 Furthermore, Foucault’s understanding of discourse is also as a ‘means 
for different forces to advance their interests and projects, while also providing points of 
resistance for counter-strategies to develop.’52 
Since ideology is constructed and it is often resisted, it must be taken for granted that 
contesting ideologies can exist parallel to each other. Fairclough argues that the ‘state of 
social relationships and social  struggle’ determines the extent of ideological diversity 
between different historical periods or societies.53 Adding to this, the contention here is 
that, social struggle also takes place within a society; ideological diversity can therefore 
also take place within a society. Thus, drawing on Fairclough’s concept of ‘ideological 
diversity’, ideologies can exist parallel to each other, some of which may compete with 
one another.  They can exist  at  the same time and compete for the same space.  For 
example,  within  a  single  society  or  a  part  of  society,  such  as  the  state  or  family, 
individuals  can  prescribe  to  competing  ideologies.  Furthermore,  since  ideology  is 
embedded in discourse there is also discourse ‘diversity’. 
Due to the contention that discourse is also a means of ‘providing points of resistance for 
counter-strategies to develop’54, it can be argued that discourses not only assert power, but 
also provide a  means of resistance. In other words, they are at  once hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic. Thus, in the case of discourses of national identity, it is contended 
that  they  have a  hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic,  as  will  be  illustrated. 
Hegemony, here, is to be understood in terms of Antonio Gramsci’s hegemony: political, 
cultural and moral leadership.55 Although he also argues that hegemony is ‘exercised by 
the leading group in a decisive nucleus of economic activity’56, the issue of economic 
activity will not be addressed in this thesis; that is not to say that the hegemonic nature of 
the discourses is  not also economic. While hegemony is  political, cultural and moral 
leadership, counter-hegemony is resistance to that leadership, often offering an alternative 
political, cultural and moral leadership.
When deconstructing  discourse,  and therefore also ideology,  how it  is  interpreted is 
influenced by the context from which the issue is addressed or approached. Whether these 
51 Ibid., p. 105
52 Ibid., p. 49
53 Op. cit. Fairclough, p. 87
54 Op. Cit. Howarth, p. 49
55 Forgacs, David. (ed) The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935. New York: New York 
University Press, 2000. p. 194
56 Ibid., pp. 211-212
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concepts are considered as a negative force for describing the ‘other’ is  a subjective 
interpretation. Similarly, whether ideology is understood as a means of justifying and 
exerting power and dominance over another group or as a means of resistance to power 
and dominance is also open to interpretation. The important point to remember is that it 
can be both.
What can be  considered as  discourse or  discursive  practice  needs to  be  considered. 
Structuralist approaches to discourse, such as that by Ferdinand de Saussure, assume that 
there is  ‘a  clear analogy between language and social  relationships’.57 In  this  sense, 
discursive practice is limited to language and more specifically to speech. For the post-
structuralist Jacques Derrida, however, discourse is extended to also include written text. 
The limitation of discursive practice to language in the form of speech or written text is 
also rejected by Laclau and Mouffe who argue that with the analysis of ‘non-discursive 
practices’, such as 
political interventions,  technologies, productive organisations -  the clearer it 
becomes that these are relational systems of differential identities, which are not 
shaped by some objective necessity (God, Nature, or Reason) and which can 
only therefore be conceived as discursive articulations.58 
This is also taken on board by Howarth who argues that discourse analysis is:
the process of analysing signifying practices as discursive forms. This means 
that  discourse  analysts  treat  a  wide  range  of  linguistic  and  non-linguistic 
material – speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, 
ideas, even organisations and institutions – as ‘texts’ or ‘writings’ that enable 
subjects to experience the world of objects, words and practices.’59 
In other words, ‘discourses constitute symbolic systems and social orders, and the task of 
discourse  analysis  is  to  examine  their  historical  and  political  construction  and 
functioning.’60 Thus, discourse is not only evident in written texts and spoken words, but 
also actions and images.
Finally, it must be stressed that discourses are fluid. As Phillips and Jørgensen highlight, 
the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is based on the notion that ‘social phenomena 
are never finished or total’61; in other words society is fluid rather than static. As will be 
illustrated, the contention here is that ideology, discourse, identity and nation are all fluid 
socially constructed phenomena. 
57 Op. cit. Howarth, p.17
58 Op. cit. Torfing, p. 90
59 Op. cit. Howarth, p. 10
60 Ibid., p. 5
61 Op. cit. Phillips and Jørgensen, p. 24
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1.10 Nation 
The  previous  section  established that  discourse is  the  means by  which  ideology is 
articulated and that discourses reproduce what comes to be known as “common sense”. 
This section addresses the issue of nation and how it is to be defined. Before proceeding, 
however, it is worth mentioning that additional theoretical considerations associated with 
the meanings attached the idea of nation will be discussed in the following chapters. 
It is contended here that nation is to be understood as a fluid socially constructed political 
unit. In relation to the Persian terminology, which will be discussed in more detail below, 
this is a combination of  millat (nation) and  dawlat (state). Although nation possesses 
specific territorial boundaries, it might also be viewed transnationally in relation to its 
diaspora. While some nations are synonymous with the state, the two are not necessarily 
contingent  on  each  other.  Nation,  as  it  is  known today,  is  a  modern phenomenon; 
nonetheless it can also have pre-modern roots. Finally, nation is not only constructed on 
the  state-level,  but  also  on  non-state  levels;  and it  is  likely  that  these constructions 
compete with each other and, therefore, the construction of nation is more often than not 
contested.
A deconstruction of national identity in the context of any country or community raises 
the methodological issue of how nation is to be defined. It is all very well examining the 
literature on nation and nationalism and coming up with a definition that fits with the 
researcher’s views on the subject or the researcher’s findings. However, what happens 
when the constructions of national identity being analysed clearly do not subscribe to the 
same definitions as that  outlined by the researcher? Thus, any discussion on national 
identity in the Iranian context must address not only how the notion of nation and identity 
in the Persian language and in the context of Iran are discussed, but also the meanings 
attached to the terminology used. This section will first look at the Persian terminology 
and will then consider the scholarship on nation and attempt to reconcile the two. 
As  Sadiki  argues,  in  his  discussion  on  discourses  and  counter-discourses  of  Arab 
democracy, ‘an understanding of the dynamics of language is crucial … for understanding 
… the structure of political societies and ideological machinery and political thought.’62 
Similarly,  Nazih Ayubi stresses that in the case of the Arab world the word for state 
(dawla) epistemologically represents different things to the Latin root.63 Bearing this in 
mind, the crucial issue, therefore, when looking at Persian language texts and interpreting 
62 Op. cit. Sadiki, p. 96
63 Ayubi, Nazih. Over-stating the Arab States: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London & New 
York: I. B. Tauris, 1995. p. 15 
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interviews conducted in the Persian language, is that it is essential to be clear as to what 
millī  (national),  millīyat (nationhood or  nationality) or  millat (nation)  mean in  that 
context. When talking about national identity, the term huvīyat-i millī is used;  huvīyat 
meaning  ‘identity’ and  millī  meaning ‘national’.  However,  to  consider  the  Persian 
huvīyat-i millī  to be a direct translation of what is understood in English as national 
identity is inaccurate, as Homa Katouzian explains:
In its classical use the word millat referred to peoples of given religions, millat-i 
Islam [people of Islam], millat-i Masih [people of Christianity/Christ], etc. … In 
the nineteenth century, while still retaining its classical sense, the term began to 
be used to mean ‘the people’ as opposed to ‘the state’ [dawlat]. … Millat did not 
therefore  have the  same  socio-historical meaning as  the  European ‘nation’, 
although later in the twentieth century this  European term and concept  was 
translated as millat at least in part because no equivalent for it existed in Persian 
language or society.  Millat is separate from dawlat and is contrasted with it, 
whereas the European ‘nation’ includes the state. 
The term millī was almost certainly coined around the turn of the century as an 
adjective:  millat meant  the  people;  millī,  popular.  ‘Democracy’ was  then 
translated into ‘hukūmat-i millī ’, or popular (though not populist) government, 
and has retained this sense ever since. However, later in the [twentieth] century 
when millat began to be used in translation for ‘nation’, millī was likewise used 
for the European ‘national’ as opposed to ‘international’. Yet, in the division of 
firms and industries into private and state-owned, millī persists as meaning non-
state … and dawlatī as meaning state-owned.64
Kashani-Sabet translates millat as citizenry65, which coincides with the definition given by 
Katouzian above.
Therefore,  when deconstructing Iranian national identity,  the relationship between the 
identity of the people of Iran and the identity the state prescribes for them needs to be 
considered. It must also be taken that any state aspirations for the identity of the nation, or 
millat, has some sort of popular following. However, the extent of the popular following 
is another issue of discussion that cannot be dealt with in detail here. Nonetheless, since 
the  individuals  within  the  state  apparatus are  also essentially  part  of  the  millat,  the 
distinction between huvīyat-i millī and huvīyat-i dawlat are not so clearly defined. 
A closer look at  millī  shows that in some contexts  millī  is used in opposition to  dīnī, 
meaning religious. Thus, millī refers to aspects of identity that are not to do with religion. 
For example, Ahmadi, in his discussion on the role of religion and nationhood in the 
Middle  East,  states:  ‘the  national  [millī]  element  among the  Arabs  and  Turks  was 
64 Katouzian, Homa. Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran. 2nd edn. London & New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 1999. pp. 258-259
65 Op. cit. Kashani-Sabet 2000, p. 7
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unprecedented; their identity search was more of a religious nature’.66 In other words, 
millī in this sense is used to refer to that which is not associated with religion. Connected 
with this is the term millīyat, which can be translated as ‘nationhood’ or ‘nationality’. 
Ahmadi states:  ‘the  relationship  between religion (dīn)  and nationhood  (millīyat)  or 
Īrānīyat and  Īslāmīyat’.67 At  another  point,  millīyat and  dīn are  interchanged with 
nasionalism and Islam respectively.68 This usage of millī and millīyat does not refer to the 
millat as defined above – the people, as opposed to the state. Rather, it refers to Iranian 
identity without Islam, or prior to Islam; in other words it is Iran’s pre-Islamic culture. 
Related to this discussion is the term nasionalist. Nasionalist, the Persianised form of the 
French  nationaliste, is  not  synonymous with the general term of ‘nationalism’ in the 
English  language.  Rather,  it  is  a  particular  type  of  nationalism, one  based  on  the 
prioritisation of Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, such as the nationalism of Mirza Fath ‘Ali 
Akhundzadah (1812-1878) or Mirza Agha Khan Kermani (1854-1896) and the Pahlavi 
regime (1921-1979). In relation to Mohammad Reza Shah, Katouzian argues that this was 
considered as nasionalist-i musbat (positive nationalist).69 These will be examined in more 
detail in the following chapter. The meanings attached to nasionalist are also similar to 
those of the Iranist discourse of national identity, which will be dealt with in Chapter 
Four.
Katouzian notes that when Mohammad Reza Shah in the 1950s used the term nasionalist, 
it was not, however, used by the former Iranian Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Musaddiq 
and the Popular Movement. He also argues that  millī has never been used to refer to 
nationalist.70 However, during the research trip to Iran between September and December 
2005, it was evident that the term millī garāyī (literally, ‘tendency towards the national’) 
was being used to refer to a sentiment of putting one’s nation or national interests first, or 
pride in the nation and wanting the best for the nation. In this sense, the meaning is more 
akin to how nationalism is understood in its broadest sense in the English language. This 
understanding can be related to Musaddiq’s discourse, as reflected in the reasons behind 
the nationalisation of Iran’s oil industry. In this case,  millī garāyī is to be differentiated 
from nasionalist. Nasionalist is often heard in conjunction with, or perceived by some, as 
66 Ahmadi, Hamid. ‘Dīn va Millīyat dar Īrān: Hamyārī yā Kishmakish’ (‘Religion and Nationhood in Iran: 
Cooperation or Conlict) in Ahmadi, Hamid. (ed) Īrān: Huvīyat, Millīyat, Qawmīyat (Iran: Identity,  
Nationality, Ethnicity. Tehran: Institute for the Research and development of Social Sciences, 1383 
(2004/2005). p. 52-114, p. 63
67 Ibid., p. 96
68 Ibid., p. 77 
69 Op. cit. Katouzian 1999, p. 259
70 Ibid. p. 259
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being similar to nizhād parast, literally ‘race worship’. This might be equated with racism 
and the sense of nationalism that considers one’s own nation as more superior in racial 
terms than others. This is not necessarily the meaning associated with millī garāyī. 
However,  millī  garāyī is also used in opposition to  Īslāmī garāyī (literally, ‘tendency 
towards the Islamic’). In this context, millī garāyī can be understood in terms of the idea 
of the prioritisation of Iran’s pre-Islamic culture and Īslāmī garāyī can be understood in 
terms of the prioritisation of Iran’s Islamic culture. The discourse that uses millī garāyī in 
this sense is referred to as Iranist in this thesis. The discourse that is Īslāmī garāyī is 
referred to as Islamist. The Islamist and Iranist discourses, along with the relationship 
between millīyat and  dīn, or  Īrānīyat and  Īslāmīyat will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter  Four  in  relation  to  the  meanings  attached  to  Iranian  national  identity. 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to briefly address these terms here because how they relate to the 
English language needs to be clarified. To avoid confusion, unless specifically stated in a 
quote, the terms Īrānīyat and Īslāmīyat will be used. 
Having illustrated the complexity of the idea of  millat,  this chapter now turns to the 
scholarship on nation in the English language. This will be done by outlining how nation 
is defined in this thesis. The idea that nation is a construction is a key factor in Benedict 
Anderson’s argument. He contends that nation is an ‘imagined political community’; it is 
imagined because its members imagine the image of communion even though they cannot 
ever know the other members.71 In his analysis of Anderson’s work, Umut Özkirimli 
points out that Anderson stresses that ‘‘imagining’ does not imply ‘falsity’’. This point is 
made when he ‘accuses Ernest Gellner for assimilating ‘invention’ with ‘fabrication’ and 
‘falsity’, rather than with ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’’.72 However, as will be illustrated, 
how the political community is imagined is contested. 
While nation is an ‘imagined political community’, the basis on which it is constructed is 
contested. Anthony Smith provides two types of nation: ethnic and civic. The former’s 
‘distinguishing feature is its emphasis on a community of birth and native culture’. The 
latter is based on ‘historic territory’ and a ‘common civic culture and ideology’.73 Civic 
nation can be further clarified by Smith’s analysis of national identity. He contends that 
nation has  ‘some common institutions  and a  single  code of rights and duties for all 
members of  the community’.74 For example, the role of  institutions is  considered in 
71 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London & New York: Verso, 1983. p. 66
72 Özkirimli, Umut. Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. London: Macmillan, 2000., p. 144
73 Smith, Antony D. National Identity. Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991. p. 11
74 Ibid., p. 9
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Brown’s  construction of national identity.  He outlines institutions, such as  the army, 
monarchy, the National Health Service and the British Broadcasting Corporation, as a 
symbol of the ‘real Britain’ and as ‘founded on the core value of fairness’.75 However, it 
must be noted that the ‘single code of rights and duties’ is often contested. Furthermore, 
as will be illustrated, both the ‘native culture’ and ‘historic territory’ are constructed and 
also contested. 
The focus of this thesis is not a discussion or analysis of ethnicity and ethnic identity in 
Iran.76 However, since nation can be constructed on the basis of ethnicity, it is concept that 
needs to be addressed. Furthermore, as will be illustrated, it is argued that Iranian national 
identity is also sometimes constructed on the basis of the idea of an ethnic nation as 
opposed to a civic one. With regard to the definition of ethnicity, Max Weber contends:
We shall call, ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective 
belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of 
customs or both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration; this 
belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it 
does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.77
In  other words,  ethnic groups  are  constructed on  the  basis  of  constructed myths  of 
common descent and shared values and/or memories. 
However, it must be pointed out that it is also argued by some that ethnicity is innate and 
primordial as opposed to constructed. Furthermore, those belonging to an ethnic group 
may not perceive this identity as constructed. Rather, it is for them a matter of birth. This 
is alluded to by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, in their discussion of ethnic groups:
Ethnic [refers] to the way individuals and groups characterise themselves on the 
basis of their language, race, place of origin, shared culture, values and history. 
Ethnicity is generally but not always a matter of birth. Central to the notion of 
ethnicity is a conception of a common descent, often of mythic character.78
This definition of ethnicity and ethnic group demonstrates that such a group of people are 
‘characterised’ in a certain way. They also argue that it can be a ‘matter of birth’, which 
suggests it is perceived by some as primordial as opposed to socially constructed.
75 Op. Cit., Brown
76 For discussions on ethnicity and ethnic groups in Iran see Higgins, P. J. ‘Minority-State Relations in 
Contemporary Iran’ in Banuazizi, A. and Weiner, M. (eds) The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: 
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986. pp. 167-197; Keddie, Nikki 
‘Religion, Ethnic Minorities, and the State in Iran: An Overview’ in Banuazizi, A. and Weiner, M. (eds) 
The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1986. pp. 157-166; and Ahmadi, Hamid. Qawmīyat va Qawm Garāyī dar Īrān: Afsānih va Vaqīyat 
(Ethnicity and Ethnicism in Iran: Myth and Reality). Tehran: Nasharni, 1378 (1999/2000).
77 Weber, Max. Economy and Society, Vol. I. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
1978
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In  addition  to  these  arguments,  that  provided  by  Smith  must  also  be  taken  into 
consideration.  His  concept  of  ethnie acknowledges  the  historicity  of  such  a  social 
grouping. Smith’s aim is to provide ‘an analysis that will bring out the differences and 
similarities between modern national units and sentiments’ and ethnie: the collective units 
and sentiments of previous eras.79 In other words, the idea of ethnie implies a pre-modern 
existence.  Smith identifies  the  ‘concepts of  ‘form’,  ‘identity’,  ‘myth’,  ‘symbol’ and 
‘communication’ codes’ as key to his analysis.80 The characteristics of the  ethnie are 
collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, 
an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.81 Smith argues that there 
are two types of ethnie: the ‘lateral ethnie’ and the ‘vertical ethnie’. Whereas the ‘lateral 
ethnie’ are ‘aristocratic, though usually clerical and scribal strata are included, along with 
wealthier urban merchants’, the ‘vertical ethnie’ are:
urban-based, priestly, trading and artisan in their composition, with their ruling 
strata often thrown up from the wealthy and powerful factions in the towns; 
alternatively, they are loose coalitions of tribesmen under their clan chiefs.82
Of particularly interest to this thesis is Smith’s use of Iran as an example of the ‘lateral 
ethnie’ because it shows that Iran, as a nation, has pre-modern roots. Smith contends that 
the Persian Achaemenids, who ruled over the largest empire in the ancient Near East, 
formed a dual ethnie providing Court, bureaucracy, nobility and clergy. However, Smith 
argues that the Achaemenids were not successful and their dynasty collapsed; they failed 
to socially penetrate the local peasantry and reduce their sacred traditions to scriptural 
canons. It must be asked, however, what is to be understood by successful; surely the 
every existence of the empire alludes to some sort of success. Nonetheless, according to 
Smith,  it  was the Sasanians who were more successful in  stabilising  an ethnic  state 
through religious reform under Kartir. 83 
As  mentioned  above,  although  this  thesis  is  not  a  deconstruction  of  the  various 
constructions of ethnic identity in Iran, ethnicity or ethnic group needs to be clarified 
because it is used in the construction of Iranian national identity. Thus, in summary, it is 
argued that  ethnicity  and is  fluid  and socially  constructed.  It  is  also  acknowledged, 
however, that those constructing it my not perceive it as a construction, but as static and 
79 Smith, Anthony. D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford & Malden, Massachusetts, 1988. p. 13
80 Ibid., p. 14
81 Ibid., pp. 22-31
82 Ibid., p. 76
83 Ibid., pp. 81-82
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innate. Finally, social groups with the characteristics of ethnic groups, as outlined above, 
existed in pre-modern times.
Considering the definitions of ethnicity and nation are indeed quite similar, the question 
of how ethnicity and nation differ needs to be addressed. As Banuazizi and Weiner point 
out, ‘the presence of an ethnic identity does not in itself imply that the group is politically 
articulate and assertive’.84 Thus, it is the political nature of nation that differentiates it 
from ethnicity;  essentially  nation is  a  politicised ethnicity and therefore constitutes a 
political unit. As mentioned above, nation is an ‘imagined political community’. 
Due to the political nature of nation, the relationship between nation and state also needs 
to be addressed. It is argued that nation is synonymous with the state or that one cannot 
exist without the other.85 However, this is problematic; state and nation are not always 
synonymous. For example, England, Wales and Scotland are all nations within a state, the 
United Kingdom, but without their own states. In addition to these identities, there also 
exists the idea of Britain as a national identity. However, as addressed in Chapter one, 
there are parts of the Welsh and Scottish nations that will contest Britain as their nation 
and vice versa. The examples of the Palestinians and the Kurds, who are stateless nations, 
also prove that nation is not necessarily congruent with a state. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean the identity of a nation cannot be constructed as synonymous with the state.
As has been illustrated, the concept of culture is  integral to the construction of both 
ethnicity and nation - in both its civic and ethnic forms. It can be argued that it is culture 
that differentiates one ethnicity from another or one nation from another.  Thus, it  is 
necessary to address briefly the notion of culture here. However, it will be explored in 
more detail  in  Chapter Four in  relation  to  the  meanings  attached to  culture  in  the 
constructions of Iranian national identity. Generally speaking, culture can be understood 
in terms of the notion of shared values, norms or knowledge among a group of people or 
in a community that distinguishes it from another group or community.86 
With regard to the relationship between nation and culture, it is Gellner’s contention that 
industrial society is one of cultural homogeneity.87 This, however, is problematic. Rather, 
society, and therefore nation, is culturally heterogeneous. To consider society or nation in 
terms of one culture is simplistic. Furthermore, if the nation is made up of more than one 
84 Op. cit. Banuazizi and Weiner, p.3
85 Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983., pp. 1-6
86 For a list of references which define culture along these lines, see 
http://www.carla.umn.edu/cultre/definitions.html - date accessed 23 June 2006.
87 Op. cit. Gellner, p. 35
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ethnic or religious group, it is one of culturally heterogeneity. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that there are not attempts to construct nation on the basis of an ideology that 
prescribes that there is only one “true” and “authentic” culture. In this case, it  is the 
contention here that the construction can only be considered as an aspiration for the 
identity of the nation. As will be illustrated with the case of Iran, culture is contested and 
indeed what  is  considered to  be  the  “authentic”  culture  is  contested.  For  example, 
although this thesis makes the assumption that there is an Iranian nation, albeit contested; 
Iran is clearly a culturally heterogeneous nation because it is inclusive of the cultures of 
several religious and ethnic groups, such as Kurds, Arabs, Azeris, Baluchis, Bahai, and 
Jews.  Furthermore,  the  existence  of  multiple  constructions  of  national  identity  also 
implies cultural heterogeneity. 
Although the state, as we know it today, is a modern phenomenon, the idea of a nation 
can have pre-modern roots.  Thus, modernist  approaches such as  that  of  Gellner  are 
problematic. Gellner  argues  that  it  is  the  age  of  industrialisation  that  is  the  age  of 
nationalism; because it  is  only  under these  conditions,  rather than those of  agrarian 
society, that the components for nation – will, culture and political units - converge and 
become the norm. Furthermore, ‘It is nationalism which engenders nations, not the other 
way around’ and therefore, the nation can only exist in the age of nationalism.88 
Anderson also has a modernist approach to the notion of nation. He argues that the nation 
is  sovereign  because the  concept  came  about  in  an  era  when  ‘Enlightenment  and 
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic 
realm’.89  He also argues that nation, nation-ness and nationalism are ‘cultural artefacts’, 
which were created towards the end of the eighteenth century.90 Furthermore, as far as he 
is concerned, the decline in ‘three fundamental cultural conceptions’ of antiquity helped 
the evolution of the imagined community of nation. The first is ‘the idea that a particular 
script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth, precisely because it was an 
inseparable part  of  that  truth’.  The second  is  ‘the  belief  that  society was  naturally 
organised around  and under high centred monarchs … who ruled by  some form of 
cosmological (divine) dispensation’. The third is the ‘conception of temporality in which 
cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the  origins  of  the  world  and of  man 
essentially identical’.91 Again, Anderson argues that it was under these conditions, which 
88 Ibid, pp. 54 & 55
89 Op. cit. Anderson, pp. 6-7
90 Ibid., p. 2
91 Ibid., p. 36
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were provided by the Enlightenment, when a fundamental change was taking place in 
modes of apprehending the world, which, more than anything else, made it possible to 
‘think’ the nation’.92 
However,  to  his  credit, Anderson does acknowledge that  ‘nation-ness’ can have pre-
Enlightenment roots. He argues that in fact the concept of nation-ness developed in the 
Creole communities of America well before it did in Europe. Although Anderson accepts 
the popular reasons for the Creole resistance – ‘the tightening of Madrid’s control and the 
spread of liberalising ideas of the Enlightenment’ - he does not accept them as sufficient 
explanation for how Chile, Venezuela and Mexico came to be plausible political and 
emotional entities.  Rather,  he argues, it  is  the fact that  these communities  had been 
administrative  units  from  the  sixteenth  to  the  eighteenth  centuries  that  developed 
economically, politically and geographically over time.93 
Despite  the  shortcoming of  a  modernist approach, there  are  aspects  of  Anderson’s 
modernist argument that are beneficial if put into context. To his credit, unlike Gellner, in 
his analysis of how nation, nation-ness and nationalism came into ‘historical being’ he 
differentiates between European nations and those of the ex-colonies. It is with reference 
to  the  European  context  that  he  develops  his  argument  that  print-capitalism  (the 
convergence of capitalism and print technology) was fundamental in the popularisation of 
the idea of ‘nation’.94 It is his contention that the ability to ‘think’ the nation was aided by 
‘print-capitalism’ (the convergence of capitalism and print technology) because it was a 
fundamental tool by which people were able ‘to think about themselves, and to relate 
themselves to others, in profoundly new ways’.95 
It cannot be denied that the conditions outlined above in the Enlightenment period and 
print capitalism aided the proliferation of nationhood and the nation. However, it cannot 
also be argued that nation did not have pre-modern roots. To this regard, Smith provides a 
credible argument. Smith finds the modernist approach problematic because they argue 
that  nation  and nationalism are  purely modern phenomena and products  of  modern 
developments such as capitalism, bureaucracy and secular utilitarianism.96 It is in response 
to  the  perennialist,  primordialist  and  modernist  explanations  of  nation,  which  he 
considered to be insufficient that Smith develops his ‘ethnie’ argument, outlined above. 
92 Ibid., p. 22
93 Ibid., pp. 50-52
94 Ibid., Chapter 3
95 Ibid., p. 36
96 Op. cit. Smith 1988, pp. 8-13
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Another issue that is contested with regard to the notion of nation is whether or not nation 
includes the diaspora. While acknowledging that the term ‘diaspora’ was originally used 
to refer to the dispersing of the Jewish community after the fall of the Temple, Spencer 
and Wollman draw attention to Cohen’s definition, who argues that the common features 
of diaspora include: 
a variety of reasons for original dispersal; a collective memory and myth about 
the homeland; a distinctive popular ethnic group consciousness involving an 
idealised view  of  the  supposed  ancient  homeland,  and  sometimes popular 
movement of return; and a commitment to its well-being, or even to its creation 
or recreation if it no longer exists; a difficult and insecure relationship with the 
host society; and a ‘sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in 
countries of settlement’.97
Cohen also argues that with regard to national identity ‘diasporas point to alternative 
forms of identification’ because identity becomes deterritorialised as the nation-state also 
includes citizens who are no longer within its territorial boundaries. Nevertheless, they 
maintain their social, political, cultural and often economic ties with the nation-state of 
the ancestors.98
While a nation is based on territorial borders it is not confined to them. Anderson argues 
that  nation  is  limited  because it  has  boundaries  beyond  which  are  other  nations.99 
However, Smith argues:  
[Nation] also suggests  a  definite  social  space, a  fairly  well demarcated and 
bounded territory, with which members identify and to which they feel they 
belong.100
Of particular importance here is  the notion of belonging. Those outside the physical 
territorial boundaries of the nation also have a sense of belonging to the nation. The 
diaspora  therefore is  also  considered part  of  the  nation  and  so  nation  can  also  be 
transnational. For example, many among the diasporas of Iran, Iraq and Palestine among 
others, continue to consider themselves part of the Iranian, Iraqi and Palestinian nations 
respectively and contribute to discussions on the articulation and construction of national 
identity. The contention here is that the Iranian diaspora is part of the Iranian nation and 
therefore has its role to play in the articulation and construction of national identity. 
97A summary of Cohen, R. Global Diasporas: An Introduction, London: UCL Press, 1997. p. 26 cited in 
Spencer, P. & Wollman, H. (eds) Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage Publications, 2002. 
p. 164
98 quote from Cohen, 1997, p. 136 in Spencer & Wollman 2002, p. 165
99 Op. cit. Anderson, p. 7
100 Op. cit. Smith 1991, p. 9
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In  support  of  this  argument  is  that  of  Spencer  and  Wollman.  They  illustrate  the 
complexity of the issue of implications of diaspora communities on national identity by 
highlighting the fact that there are a variety of both diasporic conditions and political and 
identity responses. They provide the cases of Zionism and the support of Irish Americans 
for  the  IRA as  two  examples. With  regard to  Zionism, the  point  made is  that  the 
nationalist  movement  grew out  of  the  diaspora.  Although the  nationalist  movement 
emphasises the desire to return to the homeland as an integral part of Jewish identity, in 
reality many had no intention of leaving the host country. Spencer and Wollman draw a 
parallel with the support of Irish Americans for the IRA; although there is  financial, 
cultural and physical support, there is no desire to return to Ireland. 101
The construction  of  nation  is  also historically contextual.102 For example, as  will  be 
discussed further in Chapter Three, the state construction of the Iranian nation in the 
Pahlavi period differed greatly to that following the 1979 Revolution. The construction of 
Britain as a nation has also evolved through its history and is therefore fluid, which is 
indicated in the extract from Brown’s speech at the beginning of the previous chapter. He 
wants to move away from the idea of British national identities being associated with race 
and  ethnicity  towards a  construction  based  on  shared values  in  order  to  be  better 
positioned to  deal with  reality of  the ‘modern world’.103 These two cases also  show 
‘nations  are  situated in  specific historical  moments  and  are  constructed by  shifting 
nationalist discourses promoted by different groupings competing for hegemony.’104
The construction of nation is also culturally contextual. Özkirimli identifies the scholars 
Partha  Chatterjee  and  Ranajit  Guha  for  their  contribution  in  providing  ‘a  ‘non-
Westocentric’ interpretation of anti/postcolonial nationalisms’.105 Chatterjee argues:
anti/postcolonial nationalism … was never totally dominated by Western models 
of nationhood. It could not imitate the West in every aspect of life, for then the 
very distinction between the East and West would vanish and ‘the self-identity 
of national culture would itself be threatened.106
Both Chatterjee and Guha, according to Özkirimli, attempted an analysis of South Asian 
history from the view of the ‘subordinated’, rather than the ‘hegemonic discourses of the 
101 Op. Cit. Spencer & Wollman, p. 168
102 Yuval-Davis, Nira. Gender and Nation. London: Sage Publications, 1997. p. 4
103 Op. cit. Brown 
104 Op. cit. Yuval-Davis, p. 4
105 Op. cit. Özkirimli, p. 194
106 Özkirimli, p. 194 paraphrases and quotes Chatterjee ‘The Nationalist Revolution of the Women’s 
Question’, in Sanghari, K. & Vaid, S. (eds) Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History. 1990 
New Brunswick, N.J : Rutgers University Press
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West’.107 In the case of Iran, however, as Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr point out, neither 
European nor colonial/post-colonial  patterns of  state-building apply  to that of Iran.108 
Although it is ‘anti/postcolonial nationalisms’ that Chatterjee and Guha discuss, it is still 
of relevance to Iran because of the importance of anti-imperialism in Iranian nationalisms 
and discourses of national identity. The point here is that it must not be assumed that 
nations world-wide are constructed in the same way. However, while an analysis of nation 
and national identity must not be entirely based on theories that have been made based on 
the Western or post-colonial experience, a comparative approach can be beneficial. 
Not only is the construction of nation historically and culturally contextual, but it must 
not be assumed that the state has a monopoly on its construction. Although this is not an 
argument addressed in detail by Anderson, he does acknowledge, through his analysis of 
Creole nationalism, that the ‘imagination’ of nation is not restricted to the state or elite 
levels. He argues that the American states of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries are of interest because nationalism was tied to the politicised lower classes, 
rather than to the intelligentsia.109 He argues that the Creole were made to feel part of a 
community through religious pilgrimages and through the pitmen’s newspapers.110 It was 
the combination of these two factors that enable the people to be imagined as a nation.
The non-state construction of nation is dealt with by Nira Yuval-Davis in more detail. In 
her critique of Gellner and Smith, she argues it  is  women in the private sphere that 
‘reproduce nations biologically, culturally and symbolically’, rather than the intelligentsia 
and the bureaucracy of the public sphere. Yuval-Davis’ differentiation between the public 
and private spheres draws on the argument provided by Pateman and Grant to explain 
why it is the case that the role of women is excluded from the discussion of nationhood. 
They argue that women are located in the private domain, rather than the public domain, 
whereas theories of nation tend to be restricted to the public domain.111 As Billing and 
Mclintock contend, it is actually in every day life where it can be seen how ‘ordinary 
people continue to imagine themselves as an abstract community’.112 To this regard, as has 
been mentioned before, sometimes the construction of Iranian national identity by some 
can really only be considered as aspirations. 
107 Op. cit. Özkirimli, p. 194
108 Gheissari, Ali and Nasr, Vali. Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. p. 3 
109 Op. cit. Anderson, pp. 47-48
110 Ibid., pp. 53-64
111 Op. cit. Yuval-Davis, p. 2
112 An analysis of Billing Mclintock is carried out by Özkirimli, p. 195
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In accordance with this, Özkirimli argues that the ‘orthodox or classical’ conceptions of 
nationalism and national identity are challenged because of their ‘involvement in the 
reproduction  of  dominant  discourses’.  That  is  they  do  not  take  into  account  ‘the 
experiences of the ‘subordinated’, for example the former European colonies and their 
postcolonial successors, or women, ethnic minorities and the oppressed classes’.113 While 
Iran is  not  strictly speaking an ex-colony,  it  is  essentially  part  of  the  ‘other’ in  the 
dominant Anglo-Saxon discourse reflected in many discussions of nation. Bearing this in 
mind,  it  is  necessary to  look at  how nation  is  constructed from the  view of  those 
constructing it.
1.11 Identity
Having established that discourse is a means of articulating ideology and nation is a 
socially constructed political unit, attention is now directed at the notion of identity. The 
meanings attached to the term huvīyat in the Persian language will first be considered, 
followed by how identity is to be understood in this thesis.
As  mentioned  above,  the  term  huvīyat-i  millī  is  used  in  the  Persian  language  in 
discussions  on  national  identity.  However,  just  as  millī  and  millat are  not  directly 
synonymous with the national  or nation in English, nor,  strictly  speaking,  is  huvīyat 
synonymous with identity. The meaning attached to huvīyat is more spiritual and is more 
in line with the English term essence. This is possibly why identity appears to be such an 
emotive issue in Iran. While accepting the roots of huvīyat, for the sake of analysis and 
ease when huvīyat is mentioned in texts it has simply been translated as identity.
Hall effectively and clearly outlines three main concepts in relation to his discussion on 
cultural identity: the Enlightenment subject, the sociological subject and the post-modern 
subject.114 The  Enlightenment notion  of  the  subject  was  an  ‘individualist’ notion  of 
identity  that  argued  that  the  self  remained  the  same  throughout  its  existence.  The 
sociological notion of subject, however, was an ‘interactive’ notion that saw that the self 
was ‘formed in  relation to significant  others’. Finally,  the post-modern notion of the 
subject saw the self as ‘having no fixed, essential, or permanent identity’.115 The following 
contention provided by Hall in his discussion on cultural identity and the Afro-Caribbean 
diaspora adds to the debate:
113 Op. cit. Özkirimli, p. 192
114 Hall, Stuart. ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, 1995, in Hall, Stuart, Held, David, Hubert, Don, & 
Thompson, Kenneth. (eds) Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996. pp. 595-634, p. 597
115 Ibid., pp. 597-8
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Identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of 
thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact … we should think, instead 
of identity as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and 
always constituted within, not outside representation.116
In other words identity is in a constant state of evolution and reconstruction. Bearing this 
in mind, the contention here is that identity is a combination of the sociological notion of 
subject and the post-modern subject that provides the most accurate picture of the nature 
of identity. It is by no means permanent or static and the case of the identity of the Iranian 
nation illustrates this. Nonetheless, this does not mean that those constructing the identity 
of the nation understand identity in this way. Indeed, for some it is quite to the contrary. 
As will be illustrated, identity is understood more in terms of the Enlightenment notion 
mentioned above; the self is thought to remain the same throughout its existence. In other 
words,  identity  is  perceived to  be  static  and  what  is  perceived to  be  the  ‘true’ or 
‘authentic’ identity is sought. 
It can now be contended that national identity can be understood as how the nation can be 
identified. It is often the case that national identity is often constructed in relation to 
‘significant others’. In other words, an important aspect of identity that must also be 
acknowledged is that identity is also a means of differentiating oneself from the ‘other’. 
Like  the  subject  or  the  self,  the  significant  other  is  also  fluid  and thus  identity  is 
repeatedly reconstructed in relation to this. The interactive nature of identity is evident in 
Ahmad Ashraf’s contention as outlined in his examination of Iranian ethnic and national 
identity:
Identity has a meaning of existence; it is a means of knowing an individual that 
is a collection of individual properties and behavioural characteristics by which 
the individual is distinguished from the group and the other. National and ethnic 
identity is a type of collective identity and has sentiments connected with the 
greater national  and ethnic society,  and has  an  awareness of  sentiments of 
loyalty  and  devotion.  National  and  ethnic  identity  is  similar  to  individual 
identity in terms of our struggle to identify ourselves in terms of the other: Iran 
compared to Iran, Greece compared to the Barbarians … Persia compared to the 
Arabs and the Turks compared to the Tajiks. Therefore, self-awareness of our 
existence, as well as awareness of the existence of the ‘other’, come together. 
The ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are two sides of the same coin; and one without the 
other is meaningless.117
This extract is also interesting because not only does it refer to the ‘other’ as an external 
foreigner, but also within Iran. This is a theme that will be developed in Chapters Four 
116 Op. cit. Hall 1990, p. 222
117 Ashraf, Ahmad, ‘Iranian Identity’ Goft-o-Gu (Dialogue), Favardin 1373 (March/April 1994/1995), pp. 
7-23, pp. 7-8
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and Five. In other words, the identity of the nation is constructed in terms of how it 
identifies both internally within the nation and externally.
In sum, the definition of national identity contended here is that first of all it is a socially 
constructed  phenomenon. Secondly,  the  articulation  of  national  identity  is  how  the 
individual or a group of individuals articulate the nation or how they can identify with the 
nation. Therefore, taking into consideration the arguments outlined above, how the nation 
is identified with depends greatly on how the nation is defined in the first place. The third 
point  follows on  from the previous point;  the articulation of national identity is  not 
restricted to the state level; other groups within society can have their own articulation of 
national identity.
Although the definition of national identity has been established, further clarification is 
needed. The term ‘Iranian identity’ is not synonymous with the term ‘Iranian national 
identity’. Since nation is a political unit, Iranian national identity is a political identity. 
However,  the cultures that  are considered as  part of Iranian identity  are also part of 
Iranian national identity  in  some cases, but  in  the case of the latter  they have been 
politicised. The difference between ‘Iranian national identity’ and ‘national identity in 
Iran’ also needs clarification. The latter allows for the perception that there can, in fact, be 
more than one national identity within the territorial boundaries of the state of Iran, such 
as Kurdish national identity. The phrase ‘Iranian national identity’, on the other hand, 
makes the assumption that there is an ‘umbrella’ identity that incorporates into it  and 
celebrates the diversities of religion, ethnicity and language within the confines of the 
territorial boundaries of Iran. This thesis is based on the second term, that is, it is assumed 
that there is an Iranian national identity inclusive. However, as mentioned before, Iranian 
national identity is contested.
1.12 Discourse of National Identity
Having established how discourse, nation and identity are to be understood, these parallel 
parts can now be brought  together in  the notion ‘discourse of national identity’.  By 
looking at  the  constructions  of  Iranian national  identity  in  terms of  discourses  it  is 
possible to gain a deeper understanding of the multiple and often conflicting meanings 
attached to the idea of Iran as a nation and its identity. Thus, the ‘complexities of political 
identity and difference’118  are addressed.
118 Op. cit. Howarth, p. 6
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Since discourse is to be understood here as the means by which ideology is transferred, 
articulated or communicated, by looking at  the construction of national identity it  is 
possible to  see that  how the  identity  of  a  nation is  constructed reflects a  particular 
ideology or ideologies. This is based on the contention that ideology is articulated through 
the  construction  of  national  identity.  In  other  words,  ideology is  embedded in  the 
construction  of  national  identity.  For  example, it  can  be  argued that  there  are  two 
important factors that define the Islamist articulation of Iranian national identity: anti-
imperialism and Islam. This is embedded in the discourse of Khamene’i’s discourse. For 
example,  he states, ‘Islam is  the  most important  pillar  of  our national culture’119.  In 
addition to this, it becomes apparent from the murals that have been painted on the walls 
of the old American Embassy, which call for ‘Death to America’, how the relationship 
with the United States is perceived; a power that must be resisted at all costs in order to 
maintain Iran’s independence.  The latter example also illustrates that discourse is  not 
limited to language for it is not only through language that meaning is transmitted, but 
also through behaviour, clothes and art among other things. 
As mentioned above, by looking at the articulation of national identity as a discourse it 
allows us  to  explain the power relations between the different discourses of national 
identity.  Thus, not only is  does the notion of discourse of national identity enable a 
deconstruction of the ideologies embedded in the construction of Iranian national identity, 
but also to explore how the different discourses of national identity relate to each other 
and also to external forces in terms of power relations. Indeed, it is contended that there is 
a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dimension to their relationships. 
This contention is made possible because on the one hand, a discourse approach enables 
the identification of ‘the construction of hegemonic formations’120 in the articulation of 
national  identity.  However,  while  some discourses may be  hegemonic, there  is  also 
resistance;  the  identity  of  a  discourse  is  dependent  on  ‘differentiation  from  other 
discourses’.121 Therefore, the construction of Iranian national identity is not only examined 
in terms of discourses, but also in terms of counter-discourses that resist the perceived 
hegemony of  other  discourses. Furthermore,  it  is  possible  to  uncover the  unargued 
assumptions and internal contradictions’122 and power relations within and between the 
119 Khamene’i, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali. The Cultural Viewpoints of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran. Tehran: Centre for Cultural and International Studies, Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, 
2000. p. 7
120 Op. cit. Howarth, p. 6
121 Ibid., p. 102
122 Op. cit. Phillips and Jørgensen, p. 24
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discourses. For example, as has been outlined above, Khamene’i’s articulation of national 
identity is part of a discourse that prescribes Islam as a fundamental aspect of Iran as a 
nation. However, there are groups in both the Iranian government and Iranian society that 
reject the perceived hegemony of this  discourse and have created their own counter-
discourse in which their articulation of national identity is embedded. 
By deconstructing the constructions of Iranian national identity in terms of discourses it is 
also possible to contextualise them historically and intellectually. In other words, it  is 
possible to  explore how the ideas and meanings attached to Iranian national  identity 
change, relate to their historical context and also relate to each other. For example, having 
established the ideologies embedded in the constructions of Iranian national identity in 
the Khatami period, it is possible to turn to Iran’s historical experience and see how and 
whether or not the same or similar ideologies are used at other stages in Iran’s history. For 
example, a factor that has been used and continues to be used is the issue of what is 
perceived to be authentic Iranian culture, which has been and continues to be contested. 
Through a positioning of the discourses of national identity in a historical and intellectual 
context, it  can also be contended that there is a continuous process of reconstruction. 
Furthermore, by drawing parallels in this way with earlier periods in Iran’s history not 
only can it also be argued that the construction of the identity of the Iranian nation, or 
what Iranian national identity means, is contested during the Khatami period, but that it 
has always been contested. Thus, since the construction of Iranian national identity is 
contested, there is no single permanent national identity; identity is fluid, rather then fixed 
or permanent. Furthermore, not only is it the case that there are competing discourses at 
different stages in Iran’s history, but also on different levels within state and society. In 
other words, not only have different groups within state and society contributed to the 
construction of the articulation of Iran’s national identity at different times in its history 
for different purposes, but also within a single period. Thus, Iran is an ideal example of 
how the idea of nation of Iran shifts according to the nationalist discourses competing for 
hegemony.  
Finally, it must be noted that the notion discourse of national identity is not synonymous 
with the notion of nationalism. If nationalism is a political movement that places nation at 
the centre of its ideology, then, as is the contention here, nationalism reflects a discourse 
of national identity.
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1.13 State
The notion of state is contested, as will be shown below. Nevertheless, the aim of this 
thesis is not to explore and discuss various definitions of the state. Rather, the aim is to 
consider the empirical findings of this thesis regarding the nature of the Islamic Republic 
and relate them to the concept of the state. Alan Finlayson and James Martin provide a 
useful discussion largely based on the understanding of Laclau and Mouffe of the state.123 
It  is  argued  here  that  this  poststructuralist  understanding  of  the  state  fits  most 
appropriately with the empirical findings of this thesis. Conclusions to this regard will be 
provided in Chapter Seven, ‘Conclusions’.
A common definition of the state in the literature is that provided by Weber:
A compulsory political organisation with continuous operations will be called a 
“state” insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force on the enforcement of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.124
However, contrary to Weber’s definition of the state, poststructuralists understand ‘the 
state not as a ‘thing’ but as a practice or ensemble of practices.’125 Furthermore,  as was 
mentioned in Chapter One, a poststructuralist understanding of the state ‘draws attention 
to the way in which the state itself is politically contested’.126 Thus, taking these factors 
into consideration, Weber’s definition is somewhat restrictive; it does not allow for the 
fluid nature of the state, and it assumes that the state is a monolithic entity.
A less restrictive approach is one based on a poststructuralist understanding of society and 
politics as a whole. Finlayson and Martin argue that poststructuralism:
insists that we cannot establish fixed rules of thought or language, tradition and 
community that underpin all or some political institutions or groups. … They 
are systems of meaning that are the object and the mechanism of social control 
and contestation. For poststructuralists all actions and objects are meaningful 
but derive their meaning from their relationship to other actions and objects: 
which is to say from traditions and institutions but also from the ways in which 
political  (or  other)  actors  make  use  of  activate  them.  Furthermore,  for 
poststructuralists, the ‘actor’ does not exist independently of ‘frameworks’ or 
systems of meaning and the action it carries out within or against it … .’127
123 Finlayson, Alan and Martin, James. ‘Postructuralism’ in Hay, Colin, Lister, Michael and Marsh, 
David. (eds) The State: Theories and Issues. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 
pp. 155-171
124 Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. 1978, p. 54
125 Op. cit. Finlayson and Martin 2006,  p. 155
126 Ibid., p. 163
127 Ibid., p. 159
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Naturally, the understanding of the sate is based on these assumptions. Thus, as Finlayson 
and Martin conclude, the state, therefore, can be understood as:
not a single ‘institution’ or even a number of ‘institutions’ tied together, but, 
rather, a series of practices, of actions and reactions that draw from ‘traditions’ 
and ‘habits’ but also redraw them – rearticulate them – in every action.
As will  be revealed throughout the thesis,  and especially with regard to Khamene’i’s 
Islamist  discourse  of  national  identity  and  Khatami’s  Islamist-Iranian discourse  of 
national identity, this aptly defines the nature of the Islamic Republic. For example, it is 
clear that the factors that underpin the Islamic Republic’s state apparatus are contested 
and fluid. This is demonstrated in the fact there is more that one state discourse of Iranian 
national identity, each advocating a different political system.
Not only is the notion of state contested, but also the nature of the relationship between 
the nation and the state and indeed between nationalism and the state. For example, it has 
been demonstrated that Gellner’s argument that nation is synonymous with the state or 
that one cannot exist without the other128 is somewhat problematic. The poststructuralist 
approach to the concept of the state is  also ‘to understand the sort of reasoning that 
constitutes it and that is constituted by it, that defines the parameters within (and without) 
which legitimacy can be established.’129 In the case of Iran, it becomes very clear, as will 
be demonstrated, that it is national identity and what is perceived to be authentic that 
gives legitimacy to the particular state systems advocated in the various discourses of 
national identity. To this regard, Anthony Giddens’ argument regarding the relationship 
between the state and nation is very apt. It is his contention that essential to the process of 
state formation is  nationalism because it  supplies the state’s  ‘myths of origin’.130 The 
reference to ‘myths of origin’ is of great significance here; for it is these, articulated in the 
construction of national identity, that give legitimacy and authenticity and provide the 
basis of the desired state apparatus. However, this is very fluid; as will be demonstrated in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six, what is perceived to be Iran’s authentic national identity is 
contested.
1.14 Method 
The method of the research has been to deconstruct a number of sources, by determining 
how discourse emerges out of the ‘text’. Chapters Four, Five and Six are based on an 
analysis of primary sources. These include speeches and articles on Iranian identity in 
128 Op. cit. Gellner 1983, pp. 1-6
129 Op. cit. Finlayson and Martin 2006, p. 158
130 Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985, p. 221
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general or nation identity in particular. In addition to these, informal discussions with 
academics, friends and family both within Iran and outside of Iran have contributed to a 
deeper understanding of issues surrounding the construction of Iranian national identity.
The  two  state  discourses,  Islamist  and  Islamist-Iranian, are  primarily based  on  the 
speeches  of  Khamene'i  and  Khatami  respectively.  Khatami’s  speeches  are  usually 
collected in an edited volume organised according to subject matter. Most of these have 
an introduction by his former vice-president Seyyed Mohammad Ali Abtahi. An interview 
was also carried out with Abtahi by the author in November 2005. Many of Khamene’i 
sermons have been published as booklets and pamphlets. 
The non-state discourses, the Iranist discourse of national identity and the discourses of 
civic and cosmopolitan national identity,  are based on  a  number of sources. Various 
articles, newsletters and academic works on Iranian identity or Iranian national identity 
form a major part. With regards to academic articles, it  is often the case that Iranian 
national identity is discussed in terms of what their perception of Iranian national identity 
is, rather than a discussion of various approaches to national identity. For this reason they 
can be identified as being part of a particular discourse. Two interviews were also carried 
out  with  two  individuals  in  their  official  capacity:  former  vice-president  Seyyed 
Mohammad Ali Abtahi (as mentioned above) and Hamid Severi, the head of the Tehran 
Museum of Contemporary Art’s Research Department at the time the research was carried 
out. 
The  historical  and  intellectual  analysis  of  Iranian nationalism  and  national  identity 
addressed in Chapter Three is  based on secondary sources that have addressed these 
issues. This essentially forms a review of the literature, which tends to deal with different 
Iranian ‘nationalisms’. In light of this an attempt has been made to deconstruct what has 
been defined as Iranian nationalism in terms of ‘discourses of national identity’. 
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Chapter Three: The Construction of Iranian National Identity: 
Historical and Intellectual Context 
The previous chapter provided the theoretical and methodological framework for the 
thesis by demonstrating the benefits of a discourse approach to national identity. This was 
done by establishing that ‘discourse of national identity’ is a means of determining the 
ideology or ideologies used in constructing national identity. Furthermore, it also allows 
for an explanation of the power relations between the different discourses of national 
identity in terms of a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic. It is now necessary to 
apply the notion of ‘discourse of national identity’ to how national identity in Iran is 
constructed.  While the  aim of  this  thesis  is  to  consider the constructions of  Iranian 
national identity in the Khatami period in terms of discourses of national identity, the aim 
of this chapter is to provide the historical and intellectual context and background for this 
period. 
This historical approach is necessary not only because of the need to contextualise the 
discourses of national identity in the Khatami period, but also to illustrate the complexity 
of  the  issue  of  Iranian national  identity  in  general. As  Ansari  contends,  unlike  the 
emergent nationalism of the rest of the Third World, the ‘resources’ of Iranian nationalism 
were much deeper; not only the identity of Iran, but also the idea of Iran was based on a 
‘rich, complex tapestry of historical experience and myth’.131
The aim of this chapter is  to deconstruct the various Iranian nationalisms during the 
twentieth century through a discourse approach. In other words, the aim is to present the 
various nationalisms as discourses of national identity that are concurrent and competing 
with each other for hegemony. This will be done, on the one hand, by illustrating the 
ideologies embedded in the construction of the Iranian nation; and, on the other hand, by 
highlighting the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic relationship between the different 
nationalisms or discourses.
It  is  contended that one of the recurring ideologies  embedded in  the construction of 
Iranian national identity is the need for the nation to be independent, or in other words, 
anti-imperialism. In support of this argument, Ansari contends that it was ‘the struggle 
against  perceived imperial powers’ that  shaped nationalism in  Iran.132 This  is  further 
strengthened by Hamid Enayat’s discussion of nationalism:
131 Op. cit. Ansari 2003, p. 16
132 Ibid., p. 16
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In the history of political thought, the term nationalism sometimes refers to a 
movement for guarding a nation’s independence and freedom in the face of an 
external  aggressor,  and  at  others  to  an  intellectual  assertion  of  a  nation’s 
separateness and identity – or, in its extreme form, of superiority over other 
nations.133
It is the contention here, however, that the first two understandings of nationalism are 
indeed interlinked; one cannot really exist without the other. On the one hand, if there is 
no independence, a sense of separateness and identity cannot really be achieved. On the 
other hand, the  question  must be raised: can independence be  achieved without  ‘an 
intellectual assertion of a nation’s separateness and identity’? In the case of Iran, as will 
become evident, these two understandings of nationalism often go hand in hand. In some 
cases, there is also the notion of ‘superiority over other nations’, albeit subtle.
In addition to anti-imperialism, the contention here is that there are different sets of values 
or  ideologies  being  used  to  achieve independence; these  are  cultural  authenticity  - 
Īrānīyat (being Iranian) and/or  Īslāmīyat   (being Islamic) - democracy and the idea of 
national “progress”. These issues are of particular interest because of their relevance to 
the discourses of national identity in the Khatami period under discussion in this thesis. It 
must be stressed that these are by no means the only factors considered in the construction 
of Iranian national identity. The position of religious and ethnic minorities and language 
among others are also often dealt with in the literature and considered as crucial to Iranian 
national identity, and/or its contestation. However, due to the restrictions of space, these 
will not be addressed in detail here. 
The  multiple  concurrent  discourses  of  national  identity  will  be  analysed  within  a 
chronological  and  intellectual  framework,  primarily  during  Iran’s  twentieth  century 
history. This historical and intellectual contextualisation will illustrate that there has been 
a continuous construction and reconstruction of Iranian national identity and that there is 
a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dimension between the different discourses. The 
subsequent  chapters will  illustrate  that  the  construction  of  Iranian national  identity 
continues to be renegotiated during Khatami’s presidency. 
However,  before proceeding with  the  ‘historical experience’,  the  first  section of  the 
chapter, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, will address the notions of anti-imperialism and 
authenticity, in addition to the role intellectuals play in transmitting ideas. The focus of 
the rest of the chapter is  primarily on Iran’s twentieth century discourses of national 
identity. However, the end of the nineteenth century is also taken into consideration. For 
133 Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 1982. pp. 111-
112
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the benefit  of analysis, the remaining part of the chapter is divided into four periods 
largely based on what Ansari considers as crucial in Iran’s political development.134 The 
first is the ‘Late Qajar Period and Constitutional Period of 1906-1921’. Here, the events 
of the tobacco protest movement and the Constitutional Revolution, and the ideas of 
individuals such as Seyyed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mirza Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadah, and 
Mirza Agha Khan Kermani will  be discussed in terms of the construction of Iranian 
national identity. This will be followed by ‘The Rise and Rule of Reza Shah, 1921-1941’, 
which focuses on the nationalism of Reza Shah. The following section ‘The Rule of 
Mohammad Reza Shah,  1941-1979’ considers the ideas espoused by Dr Mohammad 
Musaddiq, Mohammad Reza Shah, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, and Ali Shari’ati. The final section 
of the chapter ‘Religious Nationalism and the Islamic Republic’ focuses on how Ayatollah 
Ruhollah  Khomeini  articulates  national  identity  and  how  this  translates  into  the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic. Finally, the section addresses how the articulation of 
the Iranian nation changes during the Iran-Iraq War.
1.15 Theoretical Considerations
This  section  will  first  determine what  is  to  be  understood  by  the  notion  of  anti-
imperialism. This will be followed by the notion of authenticity, and finally, the role of 
intellectuals.
In order to understand anti-imperialism, it is first necessary to clarify imperialism. Robert 
Young  points  out,  ‘the  words  ‘empire’,  ‘imperial’ and  ‘imperialism’ have  different 
histories  and  different  political  resonances.’135 Imperialism  covers  ‘a  wide  range of 
relationships of domination and dependence’.136 In part imperialism can be understood as:
a political system of actual conquest and occupation … [and/or] in its Marxist 
sense  of  a  general  system  of  economic  domination,  with  direct  political 
domination being a possible but not necessary adjunct.137
These definitions do not include the notion of cultural imperialism. Edward Said argues 
that it is culture that has a privileged role in the ‘modern imperial experience’.138 Thus, 
imperialism can also be understood as cultural imperialism. At different times in Iran, 
imperialism is understood in different ways. Anti-imperialism, thus, is the rejection of 
134 Ansari, Ali. Islam, Iran and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change. London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2000. p. 25
135 Young, Robert J. C. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Malden, MA & Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2001. p. 25
136 Baumgart 1982, p. 1 as cited in Young 2001, p. 26
137 Williams 1988 as cited in Young 2001, p. 26
138 Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. p. 3
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imperialism – whether military, socio-economic, political or cultural form - in its fullest 
sense. Therefore, in order for a nation to be independent, it must rid itself of anything that 
is perceived to be imperialism.
The relationship between imperialism and anti-imperialism is  similar to that between 
hegemony and resistance or counter-hegemony. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
hegemony is  to  be  understood as  political,  cultural  and  moral  leadership.  Counter-
hegemony,  therefore,  is  to  be  understood  as  the  resistance  to  what  is  perceived as 
hegemony. The important point here is that what is  perceived as hegemonic is what is 
resisted. Whether or not it is hegemonic is another matter.
As will be illustrated, the hegemonic discourse is often an elite discourse and not that of 
the popular masses. Indeed, if imperialism is perceived as hegemonic, then any discourse 
that resists it, namely one of anti-imperialism, is counter-hegemonic. However, as will be 
demonstrated in this chapter and the following chapters, it is not just imperialism or what 
is perceived as imperialism that is considered as the hegemonic discourse. The hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic dynamic reveals a complex relationship between discourses of 
national identity essentially competing for hegemony.
In the case of twentieth century Iran, a number of different ideas and factors have been 
advocated in the struggle against imperial powers and for independence from what is 
perceived as  imperialism.  After  all,  what constitutes  imperialism is  contested. Since 
imperialism is contested, then so too is nationalism. It is not surprising therefore, that Iran 
has been and continues to be a country of multiple nationalisms: 
Nationalism  remained  an  essentially  contested  concept  in  both  theory  and 
practice in Iran, and secular nationalism found itself competing with religious 
and dynastic  forms of  nationalism, each appealing  to  particular sections  of 
Iranian society.139
Thus, how independence is achieved or how it is thought it should be achieved and how 
anti-imperialism is expressed is contested. This is largely to do with what is considered as 
“authentically Iranian”.
The idea of authenticity implies original, indigenous or true. However, the question that 
has to be asked is what the “original”, “indigenous” or “true” Iran is. Furthermore, the 
notion of “authenticity” implies that if a nation adheres to its “authentic” identity and 
culture  then  it  will  be  a  in  a  better  position  to  resist  imperialism  and  achieve 
independence. Thus, the quest for authenticity can be considered in terms of nativism. In 
139 Op. cit. Ansari 2003, p. 15
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his deconstruction of Iranian intellectuals during the period of the 1950s to the early 
1990s, Mehrzad Boroujerdi defines nativism as:
[a] doctrine that calls for the resurgence, reinstatement or continuation of native 
or indigenous cultural customs, beliefs and values. Nativism is  grounded on 
such  deeply  held  beliefs  as  resisting  acculturation,  privileging  one’s  own 
“authentic” ethnic identity and longing for a return to “an unsullied indigenous 
cultural tradition”.140
However, just as nationalism and imperialism are contested, so are notions of what are 
perceived to be Iran’s “authentic” and “indigenous” culture. Boroujerdi’s discussion of 
nativism is in relation to the post-colonial Third Worldist trend of the post-World War II 
period. In this  framework it  is  largely Islam that  is  perceived to  be Iran’s  authentic 
heritage and culture. However, if the idea of nativism is understood as the “return to 
authenticity”, then the concept can be applied to earlier stages in Iran’s history when it is 
not necessarily Iran’s Islamic culture, or Īslāmīyat, that was perceived as the indigenous 
culture.  Rather,  in  some cases it  was  Īrānīyat,  Iran’s  pre-Islamic culture.  Therefore, 
Īslāmīyat and/or  Īrānīyat can  be  considered as  among the  factors that  are  used  to 
construct Iranian national identity. A more in-depth discussion of the relationship between 
culture, Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat and the meanings attached to these labels in the Khatami 
period will be provided in Chapters Four and Five.
Within the framework of the historical periods outlined below, an intellectual context will 
also  be  provided.  The  intellectual  contextualisation  of  Iran’s  discourses  of  national 
identity is based on the premise that intellectuals and/or thinkers have a crucial position in 
society  because of  their  dissemination  of  ideas.  As  mentioned in  Chapter  Two,  the 
concern of this thesis is the relationship between discourse, ideology and national identity. 
Since  ideology is  reflected in  discourse  and  nationalism  itself  is  an  ideology,  how 
ideology is constructed, reconstructed and used is of importance. One such way is through 
the intellectual activity of certain individuals. Van Dijk argues that it is the micro level 
where ‘ideological production and reproduction  is  actually being achieved by  social 
actors in social situations.’141 Intellectual context can be determined through the ideas 
espoused by political activists, intellectuals and thinkers. 
The purpose here is not to determine who is an intellectual or not, rather to illustrate that 
both those who can be called intellectuals and the intellectual activity produced by certain 
members in Iranian society is of importance to the construction and reconstruction of 
140 Williams and Chrisman 1994, p. 14 cited by Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: 
The Tormented Triumph of Nativism. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996. p. 14
141 Op. cit. van Dijk, p. 191
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Iranian national identity in the twentieth century. Ultimately, of importance here is the 
dissemination of ideas.
1.16 The Late Qajar Period and Constitutional Period (1906-1921)
The aim of this section is to illustrate different articulations of Iranian national identity 
during the late Qajar period and the Constitutional period. One of the motivating factors 
for nationalism in Iran at this  time was the need to resist  imperialism. However,  the 
responses to imperialism were varied, which resulted in various concurrent nationalisms. 
In order to understand the dynamics at this time, it is necessary to first consider certain 
events at the end of the Qajar period (1796-1925). Imperialism during this period was 
evident in the increasing involvement in Iranian affairs from foreign powers, primarily 
Britain and Russia.142 Whether the Qajar state was a pawn of European hegemony, or was 
proactively  seeking  European influence in  Iran is  not  for debate  here.  The issue is, 
however, that the end product was that Qajar Iran was heavily influenced by the West, 
which would have intellectual, political and socio-economic ramifications.
An event that reflects resistance to the perceived imperialist hegemony of the West, and 
Britain in particular, is the tobacco protest movement. In 1890 a British company was 
given a monopoly over Iran’s tobacco production, sales and exports and in 1891 Iran 
witnessed  mass  protests  against  the  concession.143 The  importance  of  the  tobacco 
concession  and  resultant  mass  protest  is  in  the  significance  to  Iranian  political 
mobilisation. The following statement sums up the event: 
The tobacco protest movement had several features found again in subsequent 
nationwide mass movements in Iran – the constitutional revolution of 1905-
1911,  the  Musaddiq  nationalist  movement  of  1951-53,  and  the  Islamic 
Revolution of 1978-79. In all of these there was an involvement of the bazaar 
(and later other middle class elements), of part of the ulama, and of intellectuals 
– reformist, revolutionary, and nationalist.144
Katouzian argues  that  the  tobacco protest  movement ‘was  the  first  time  a  popular 
movement had succeeded in defeating the arbitrary state on a major issue’; essentially 
dawlat was challenged by millat.145 Furthermore, this led to the beginning of the Popular 
Movement of Iran, which later formed the National Front (Jibhi-yi Millī -yi Īrān). The 
perceived hegemony of the West was not only met with popular resistance, but also with 
intellectual resistance, which in turn would influence the masses.
142 Keddie, Nikki. Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796-1925. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda 
Publishers, 1999. p. 44
143 Ibid., p. 47
144 Ibid., p. 48
145 Op. cit. Katouzian 1999., p. 3 & 42
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One of the responses to what was perceived by many as imperialism at the end of the 
Qajar period was the conviction that Islam was the most appropriate means for resistance. 
Nationalist sentiment based on anti-imperialism was reflected in the ideas and intellectual 
contribution  of  certain individuals.  Such an  individual  was  Seyyed Jamal al-Din  al-
Afghani, known as ‘al-Afghani’ or ‘Afghani’.146 Indeed, Afghani cannot be excluded from 
any discussion of anti-imperialism during this period. As Keddie points out, he was the 
champion  of  ‘Muslim  independence  against  foreign,  and  especially  British, 
encroachments’.147 His reaction to these was his call for pan-Islamic unity under the rule 
of  the  Ottoman  sultan-caliph;  a  political  reaction  against  the  presence  of  Western 
imperialism in the Muslim world.148 Essentially, Islam was politicised and being used as a 
basis of national identity and as a means of combating imperialism. 
Not  only  does  the  significance  to  Iran’s  intellectual  heritage  lie  in  Afghani’s  anti-
imperialist sentiment, but also in his approach to Islam. According to Ansari, Afghani, 
who was  not  adverse to  Western intellectual  achievements despite  his  resistance to 
Western imperialism, profoundly influenced subsequent thinkers in their endeavour to 
reconcile Islam and the  challenges of  the  modern age.  Ansari argues that  Afghani’s 
understanding of Islam was not necessarily incompatible with secularism. Of significance 
to this  thesis  is  his  contention that ‘it  is  the continuing existence of this  intellectual 
ferment which allows for the possibility of a synthesis between Islam and democracy’.149 
The relationship between Iranian national identity, Islam and democracy will be discussed 
in  more detail  in  Chapter Five.  It  is  these  concepts  that  form an  essential  part  of 
Khatami’s discourse of national identity.
As mentioned above, it was not only resistance to the perceived imperialism of the West 
that  was  a  fundamental part  of  Iranian nationalism,  but  also  the  notion  of  national 
“progress”. For many, Iran was believed to be in a state of decline. In reaction to this, it 
was thought by some that nationalism based on pre-Islamic ideas of Iran, or Īrānīyat, to 
be  the  most  appropriate  means  of  achieving  “progress”  in  Iranian  society.  It  was 
perceived that  Iran’s  recent decline was partly  attributed to  Islam and Arab rule;  in 
146 for an in depth analysis of contradictions evident in al-Afghani’s works see Keddie, Nikki. Iran: 
Religion, Politics and Society. London: Frank Cass and Co., 1980. pp. 28-33 and Keddie, Nikki. Sayyid 
Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”: A Political Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. pp. 
36-45
147 Op. cit. Keddie 1999, p. 46
148 Keddie, Nikki. Modern Iran: Roots of Revolution. 2nd edn. New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2003. p. 175
149 Op. cit. Ansari. Iran, Islam and Democracy. 2006, p. 17. This is part of a wider discussion whereby 
Ansari discusses the ambiguity of the terms such as ‘Islam’ and ‘secularism’ and argues that they are 
contested.
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contrast to  this  Iran’s  pre-Islamic practices were considered as  a  source for  modern 
institutional reform.150 In this case, the desire for national “progress” is an essential part of 
nationalist discourse; Īrānīyat is associated with “progress”, while Īslāmīyat is associated 
with decline.
This Iranian nationalism was advocated by the nineteenth century intellectual Mirza Fath 
‘Ali Akhundzadah, referred to as a ‘radical critic of religion’. He called for a ‘modern 
political order that limited the powers of the shah and reduced European domination of 
Iran’.151 In his discussion of the ‘Hazards of Nationalist Extremism’, Abdolkarim Soroush 
contends that Akhundzadah was among those who: 
believed that all the problems of Iranian society – which lagged far behind the 
caravan of civilisation – originated in the Arabs’ influences and the remedy 
would be to return to our pure national pre-Islamic culture. This group insisted 
that a foreign thought is foreign regardless of its origins. Thus Islam, being the 
product of foreigners and belonging to Arabs, is an unbecoming patch sewn on 
our culture.152
This stress on ‘the virtues of the pre-Islamic past, [and] seeing Islam as a cause of Iran’s 
decline’ is also advocated by Mirza Agha Khan Kermani. Kermani was influenced by 
Akhundzadah and was a devoted follower of Afghani. Ansari argues that he was among 
those thinkers who ‘argued in favour of a vigorous Iranian nationalism, stripped of the 
deviations of Arabism, and to a certain extent, Islamism’.153 In Keddie’s opinion, this 
represented the adoption of ‘western racial views that saw Iranian “Aryans” as superior to 
Semitic Arabs.’154 She also argues that Kermani was among those anti-clerical nationalist 
intellectuals who believed in copying the West and was ‘rather hostile to the ulama as a 
backward force.’155 Kermani’s Iranian nationalism, rather than being based religion, was 
based on the notion of Iran’s pre-Islamic culture and ‘Aryan’ past. His anti-Arab and anti-
Islamic ideas would influence the intellectual Ahmad Kasravi, who, according to Keddie, 
‘developed the trend of an anti-Shi‘i Iranian nationalism’.156 However, it is also argued 
that Kasravi’s aim was to rid Islam of Mystical Islam. 
Here,  anti-imperialism,  pre-Islamic culture,  or  Īrānīyat,  and  the  desire  for  national 
“progress” are being used in the construction of national identity; Īrānīyat is perceived as 
150 Op. cit. Keddie 1999, p. 6
151 Afary, Janet. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996. p. 25
152 Op. cit. Sadri & Sadri, p. 158
153 Op. cit. Ansari. Islam, Iran and Democracy. 2000, p. 27
154 Op. cit. Keddie 1999, p. 46
155 Ibid., p. 45
156 Op. cit. Keddie 2003, p. 178 & 185
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the means of attaining progress and restricting European dominance. However, in the case 
of Kermani, imitation of the West can also be understood as a means of combating the 
West. For this type of Iranian nationalism, the perceived hegemony is not only that of the 
West, but also that of the Arabs and Islam, both of which are being resisted.
Iranian nationalism that is based on Īrānīyat as an essential factor in the construction of 
national identity is often associated with idea of land and territory. Mustafa Vaziri argues 
that territorial boundaries were the basis for development of the secular perception of 
national identity, which developed at the end of the Qajar era and into the Pahlavi era.157 
This  is  reflected in  the aspirations  of  the notable Malkum Khan among others. His 
aspirations to bring unity, mobilise the masses and modernise the state were reflected in 
his newspaper, Qānūn (laws). As Vaziri argues, the importance of the territory of Iran was 
reflected in his use of terms such as  khalq-i Īrān (people of Iran),  khāk-i Īrān (soil of 
Iran), and Īrān khān-i māst (Iran is our home). Also integral to Malkum’s nationalism was 
the rejection of Islam and the Arabs. This is reflected in his call for the de-Arabisation of 
the Persian language; Arabic words were to be taken from Persian and the alphabet was 
also to be changed. The aim was ‘Pure Persian’.158 
Worthy of comment here is the reference to ‘secular’. Ansari advocates a clarification of 
‘secular’ in the Iranian context. For example, with regard to ‘secular’ intellectuals such as 
Kermani, it was not necessarily the case that they were irreligious. He argues that, while 
in  the  West  ‘secular  intellectuals’ are  characterised  as  leaning  towards  atheism or 
agnosticism, in the case of Iran it is not ‘irreligious’.159 In other words, while Islamism, or 
Islam in its political form, might have been rejected, it was not Islam that was rejected. 
Ansari contends that ‘many arguably viewed the state of Islam in much the same way as 
… al-Afghani – namely, as in need of fundamental reform which would free it  from 
reactionary dogma.’160 
Thus far, it is clear that nationalism has been constructed in several ways. In addition to 
these discourses, however, there is also one whereby nationalism based on either religion 
or ethnicity is rejected. This is articulated in the Iran-i Naw Journal:
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a  new concept  of  nationalism  that  was  neither exclusionary  nor  based on 
religion  or  ethnicity  but  rather  on  a  broad  secular  humanist  concept  of 
nationalism in the tradition of Enlightenment.161
This is the discourse of the Democrat Party.  This party was among the new political 
parties that were formed in August 1909 in the run-up to the second Majlis by Seyyed 
Hassan Taqizadeh, one of the early important leaders of the Constitutional Revolution, 
and colleagues.162 
For many, imperialism was not only represented by the growing interference in Iran’s 
affairs from external forces, but also by the Qajar establishment. One of the means of 
establishing an end to this imperial influence over Iran was the attempt to establish more 
democratic practices. Several groups in Iranian society including some among the secular 
intelligentsia and bazārīs advocated a constitution similar to that of Belgium along with 
the establishment of a  Majlis,  or national assembly.  It  is  argued that this  Majlis was 
considered ‘as a guardian against certain foreign encroachments’ and a means of holding 
the Shah to account.163 The establishment of the constitution came to be known as the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906/1907. 
It is argued that the constitution was a means of creating some sort of unity in Iran. Vaziri 
contends that with the end of the Qajar period Iran had to make a transition from empire 
to modern nation-state.  In order to  do this,  the constitution and democratic practices 
provided the ‘legal bond of national identity’.164 He also argues that the constitutional 
reforms ‘carried an inseparable message of territorial consciousness. Thus, the various 
inhabitants of Iran, regardless of their particular denominations, were now territorially 
and  constitutionally  termed  Iranians.’165 It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the 
constitutional  period of  1906-1921 has  been described as  ‘a  pivotal  moment  in  the 
formation of the modern Iranian identity’.166 Furthermore, it was also during this period 
that nationalism was born ‘as a viable tool of political action’167. 
This period in Iran’s history is interesting not only because it illustrates the existence of 
concurrent  nationalisms,  but  also  because  it  shows  certain  themes  evident  in  the 
discourses  of  national  identity  in  the  Khatami  period.  To  differing  degrees,  these 
nationalisms are based on anti-imperialism, democratic practice, Īslāmīyat,  Īrānīyat and 
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the desire for national “progress”. In other words, these different nationalisms illustrate 
different ideologies that were embedded in the construction of Iranian national identity. 
Therefore, they can be considered in terms of concurrent competing discourses of national 
identity.
The events and the ideas of the individuals portrayed here illustrate that there was a strong 
anti-imperialist  sentiment  among  many  groups  in  society.  This  is  reflected  in  the 
contention  that  anti-imperialism  was  perceived  as  an  important  part  of  Iranian 
nationalism. Anti-imperialism, however, was articulated in several ways. Nonetheless, all 
the articulations express the desire to change the status quo. Thus, they can be considered 
as  counter-hegemonic  discourses.  While  the  Constitutional  period  sees  Iranian 
nationalism, in its many forms, being articulated on the non-state level, the reign of Reza 
Shah is dominated by nationalism as a state discourse.
1.17 The Rise of Reza Shah (1921-1941)
In terms of Iranian nationalism, the period of 1921 to 1941 is essentially defined by the 
‘dynastic nationalism’ of Reza Khan, later Reza Shah. This nationalism can be considered 
partly as a reaction to imperialism and partly as an attempt to make Iran strong so as to 
make the country one of national “progress”. 
Imperialism in this period is reflected in the occupation of Iran by Russian and British 
troops during World War I when the country ‘largely disintegrated as an independent 
entity’.168 The occupation was further exacerbated by the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, 
which gave Britain virtual military and financial control. It is argued that these events 
would be the trigger for ‘a new direction’ in Iranian nationalism169, which was to take 
form under the leadership of Reza Khan. Iran was to be ‘rescued’ by Reza Khan by 
developing ‘the  myth of  the  saviour’.170 As  commander of  the  Cossack Brigade, he 
initiated a coup in February 1921 that overthrew the government. By 1923, he was Prime 
Minister and in 1925 the Pahlavi dynasty was established with Reza Khan, now Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, as its king.
It was thought that a strong centralised state could resist external pressure from Britain 
and Russia characteristic of earlier periods. Thus, integral to Reza Shah’s nationalism, 
were policies of modernisation and centralisation.171 On the one hand, a strong centralised 
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government was needed to consolidate the country and create unity172 and on the other, 
modernisation would strengthen the nation.173 Part of Reza Shah’s notion of a strong state 
and national progress was the emancipation of women; ‘for the first time women became 
a focus of state policy.’174 Modernisation was also reflected in his use of nationalism to 
create a modern army. Iran’s national integrity would be enforced through the elimination 
of that which could harm the authority of the state.175 The anti-imperialist aspect of Reza 
Shah’s nationalism was also reflected in the establishment of Bank Milli (National Bank 
of Iran), in 1928, in an attempt to break down British economic dominance.176 
Nonetheless,  Reza  Shah’s  nationalism cannot  only  be  thought  of  in  terms  of  anti-
imperialism. With the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah redefined Iranian 
nationalism by centring it on himself and so began ‘dynastic nationalism’.177   As Ansari 
contends,  this  nationalism ‘was  an  exclusive  nationalism  in  which  ‘patriotism’ was 
defined as much as by one’s loyalty to the dynasty as to the nation.’178 In other words, the 
nation was synonymous with the dynasty. Also integral to this construction of Iranian 
national identity was Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, or Īrānīyat.
As mentioned above, the idea of pre-Islamic Iran, or  Īrānīyat,  as the basis of Iranian 
nationalism  was  popular  with  intellectuals  in  the  Qajar  period.  This  increased  in 
dominance  during  the  Pahlavi  period  when  the  Pahlavi  shahs,  along  with  many 
intellectuals, ‘glorified pre-Islamic Iran’.179 It should be stressed that it was specifically 
the Persian aspect of Iran’s ancient culture that was of particular interest. While Iran’s 
cultural and political decline was associated with the Arab-Islamic conquest, for many a 
strong independent Iran became linked with pre-Islamic Iran.180 As Ansari points out, 
‘appeals to a sense of Aryan ethnicity and pre-Islamic Zoroastrian culture were echoed in 
the sentiments and actions of Reza Khan’.181  Parallels can be drawn here between the 
nationalism of Reza Shah and that of the likes of Mirza Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadah and Mirza 
Agha Khan Kermani.
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During the reign of Reza Shah, the Persianisation of the state became a fundamental part 
of government policy,  which was reflected in  the  insistence of Persian titles such as 
Shāhanshāh and  the  attempt by  the  Persian Language  Academy to  rid  the  Persian 
language of Arabic words.182  Another important aspect of this nationalism and later that of 
Mohammad Reza Shah, was the importance of land, or Iranzamin. It is Kashani-Sabet’s 
contention that the ‘land carried solemn connotations in a world of empires’. She also 
argues that ‘it symbolised the monarch’s might and verified illusions of grandeur and 
superiority.’ Thus,  ultimately,  it  was  the  land  of  Iran  that  was  ‘the  most  powerful 
embodiment of the nation’ for the Pahlavi shahs.183 Also worthy of note here,  is  the 
relationship between Persia, Persianisation and Īrānīyat. In 1935, Reza Shah insisted that 
foreigners refrain from using the name ‘Persia’ in favour of ‘Iran’. Vaziri argues that the 
West was ‘unaware of the complexity of the socio-cultural components of what they 
called  Persia,  simply  called  everything  in  the  region  Persian;  whereas  this  crude 
perception failed to distinguish the areas of culture, language and ethnicity.’184  Ansari 
notes through an extract from a memorandum from the Iranian Foreign Ministry,  the 
significance of  this  is  that  ‘Persia’ and ‘Persians’ were introduced by ancient  Greek 
historians and do not correlate with ‘Iran’.185 
These sentiments reflect a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dimension that is common 
today both in Iran and among the diaspora. In one sense, the insistence of Īrānīyat as part 
of Iranian national identity reflects a distinct discourse of separateness from Arabs and 
resistance to  their  perceived hegemony.  In  another  sense,  the  insistence of  ‘Iran’ as 
opposed to ‘Persia’ as the country’s official name reflects resistance to the perceived 
hegemony of the West with its Greek heritage. Finally, the desire for national progress 
and determination for a strong independent Iran also reflects a  resistance to imperial 
presence in Iran. Thus, in more ways than one, the Persianist ‘dynastic nationalism’ of 
Reza Shah is a counter-hegemonic discourse. However, it is also a hegemonic discourse 
because it asserts a certain moral, political and cultural leadership. In addition to it is 
ultimately Persian identity that is considered more superior to others in Iran, which gives 
it its exclusive nature.
This exclusivity of ‘dynastic nationalism’ is reflected in the issues surrounding the policy 
to establish Persian as the lingua franca. Vaziri argues that the Persian language was a 
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tool for carrying out the nationalists’ secular programmes. It was hoped that a common 
language would be a means of linking the diverse groups, which was essential in ensuring 
that they could share the same myths, history and heritage to enable the creation of a 
common bond within the territory.186  However, it is Cottam’s contention that the existence 
of a common language is not essential for a common sense of national identity. Although 
a common language is a necessity in several definitions of nationalism, Cottam argues 
that,  in  the  case  of  Iran,  language was  not  a  particularly  unifying  force  in  Iran’s 
nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century. He identifies two reasons for this. 
First of all, he argues that when the people of a country speak a diversity of languages it is 
a difficult task to persuade them that they are unique. Secondly, he argues that because a 
large proportion of the population was illiterate they were even less likely to be exposed 
to or learn Persian. He concludes, therefore, that illiteracy, along with the isolating nature 
of the geography, tended to make nationalism the ‘property of the educated elite’.187
Reza Shah was considered as ‘a modernising reformer who could give Iran national unity 
and restore the  country’s  pride  and independence’; ‘a  strong  government that  could 
restore economic and political  stability  to  the  nation  …  would  benefit  all  strata  of 
society’188.  However,  ultimately  his dynastic  nationalism grew increasingly elitist  and 
hegemonic. A possible flaw in the success of Reza Shah’s nationalism was the integral 
nature of modernisation and its dependence on the incorporation of foreign ideas. He 
‘alienated not only the ulama, who still enjoyed considerable support among the mass of 
the people, but (arguably more importantly) the intellectual pillars of his support’. 189 The 
exclusivity  of Reza Shah’s Persianist  ‘dynastic nationalism’ was also reflected in the 
persecution of all those that did on subscribe to his idea of Iran. He grew intolerant of 
anyone who did not approve of his articulation of national identity; ‘ethnic, political, and 
religious ‘deviants’ were all targeted’, which included the Shi’a ulama.190 
Reza Shah and his ‘dynastic nationalism’ sees a continuation of several of the themes in 
the nationalist discourses during the Constitutional period, namely anti-imperialism, the 
importance of Īrānīyat, and the desire for national “progress”. However, his espousal of 
‘Western’ policies and approaches brings into question his anti-imperialism since it  is 
modernisation, often conflated with westernisation, which is used as the framework for an 
anti-imperialist approach. Nonetheless, this is also used as a means of resistance; in order 
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to beat them you have to beat them within their discourse. Thus, Reza Shah’s tools for 
anti-imperialism are different  to  those of  the  likes of  Afghani, for whom a  political 
approach to Islam is integral to the construction of national identity is, as opposed to 
Iran’s pre-Islamic culture. 
1.18 The Rule of Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979)
Many of the themes espoused in the construction of nationalism in the first half of the 
twentieth century continue to  be articulated throughout  the rule of Mohammad Reza 
Shah. The intellectual activity during this period, which includes discussions on the nature 
of Iran and its  identity,  is  phenomenal.  Indeed, as Ansari points  out,  ‘the concept of 
nationalism and the definition of patriotism were hotly contested’.191 However, due to the 
restrictions of space this section can only provide an overview. This will be done by 
focusing  on  Dr.  Mohammad  Musaddiq  and  his  liberal  nationalism,  the  dynastic 
nationalism  of  Mohammad  Reza  Shah,  Jalal  Al-e  Ahmad  and  his  discourse  of 
gharbzadagī and finally  Ali  Shari‘ati  and  the  discourse of  bāzgasht  bih  khīshtān.  A 
natural progression from the ideas espoused by  Al-e Ahmad and Shari‘ati  are those of 
Ayatollah  Khomeini.  However,  these  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  following  section, 
‘Religious Nationalism and the Islamic Republic’.
The nationalism of Musaddiq, along with the discourses of Al-e Ahmad and Shari‘ati, can 
be understood in terms of resistance to imperialism. The perceived imperialism during the 
rule of Mohammad Reza Shah can be equated with the increased Western presence in Iran 
that coincided with the end of Reza Shah’s reign and the end of World War II. As was the 
case with earlier periods in Iran’s history, the western presence was that of the Russians 
and the British. These two powers divided Iran into three zones with the Russians in the 
north and the British in the south.192 Ansari contends that the inability to resist this Allied 
occupation of 1941 reflects the failure of nationalism and the weakness of Reza Shah’s 
‘dynastic nationalism’.193 Furthermore, the fact that in 1941, Reza Shah was forced to 
abdicate and was succeeded by Mohammad Reza Shah, his son, under the pressure of the 
Allies,194 also illustrates continued involvement from external powers in Iranian affairs. In 
addition to British and Russian presence, Iran experienced, for the first time, considerable 
American presence. For many Iranians, the Allied Occupation was the first encounter 
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with Westerners and Western culture.195 This exposure and the perception of some Iranians 
that it was corrupting traditional Iranian values contributed to ‘the growth of a popular 
and distinctive ‘national’ consciousness’.196 As  will  be  illustrated, the  impact of  this 
encounter with the West was to be profound.
Susan  Siavoshi  refers  to  the  nationalism  of  Dr  Mohammad Musaddiq  as  ‘liberal 
nationalism’,  the  aims  of  which  were  an  ‘independent  and  democratic Iran’.197 As 
Katouzian points out: ‘given the continuing domination of Iran by foreign powers, the 
interrelated  issues  of  independence and  democracy became  the  overriding political 
objectives of the Popular Movement in the twentieth century.’198 Musaddiq’s nationalism 
also advocated a more inclusive counter-nationalism based on being Iranian, as opposed 
to  being  Persian.  In  other  words,  by  popularising  nationalism,  he  ‘Iranianised’ the 
Persianist nationalism of Reza Shah.199 As Ansari contends, ‘Musaddiq was able to capture 
a moment in Iranian history when nationalism emerged from its intellectual and elitist 
cocoon and became a force for political action.’200 This more popular nationalism was 
reflected in  the  activities  of  the  Popular Movement,  whose  roots  were born in  the 
nineteenth century struggle against the foreign domination of the tobacco industry. 
As  with  the  issue  of  tobacco,  the  issue  of  oil  was  also  met  with  the  desire  for 
independence and democracy.201 The 1933 Oil Agreement ensured that the concessionary 
period for the British was extended for another thirty years. This agreement was perceived 
by many to be the product of a British plot. It is not surprising, therefore, as is pointed out 
by Katouzian, that: 
[Iran’s] most fundamental grievance was that the company had not only turned 
an important part of the country into an almost autonomous colony, but that it 
indirectly ran the country as well.202
Thus, for many, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was a symbol of British imperialism. For 
the Popular Movement, many of whose members formed the National Front, the means of 
resisting this imperialism and achieving independence was democracy. Therefore, in this 
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case, democracy can be considered as a fundamental factor in the construction of Iranian 
national identity.
The National Front, a coalition of parties, was established on 23 October 1949. Those 
involved were described as millīyūn. Katouzian considers the meanings attached to millī, 
from which millīyūn derives:
Millī did not mean ‘nationalist’: it meant both ‘popular’ or ‘democratic’, as well 
as ‘national or non-foreign’. And it neatly described the Movement’s aim to 
attain the country’s full independence in order to be able to establish and extend 
democratic government.203
In other words, as Ansari puts it, the National Front was motivated by ideas of ‘self-
determination, nationhood, and anti-imperialism’204 that were to be achieved by the people 
through democracy.
However, worthy of note here is that ‘democratic’ mentioned in the above explanation of 
millī, seems to ignore women. While the concept may be more inclusive than the dynastic 
perception of Iranian national identity, it still remains exclusive. A letter from the feminist 
Sediqeh Dowlatabadi (1882-1961) to Musaddiq written on 11 April 1951 illustrates this. 
She states:  
Despite the fact that the government attaches great importance to the progress 
and maturity of the Iranian nation, it is limited to men only and no share is given 
to women.205 
This letter draws Musaddiq’s attention to the fact that women are yet to have suffrage.206 
Parvin  Paidar argues  that  Dowlatabadi  opened a  new era  of  women’s  feminist  and 
nationalist activities, which pre-dated Musaddiq. For example, in her newspaper Women’s 
Language (Zabān  Zanān)  she  published  letters  criticising  the  1919  Anglo-Persian 
Treaty.207 This  proves that  women were also  involved in  the  construction  of  Iranian 
national identity; it was not just the domain of men. 
In 1951 Iran’s oil industry was nationalised under the leadership of Musaddiq, now Prime 
Minister, and the National Front. However, he was overthrown in August 1953 in a coup 
orchestrated by the American Central Intelligence Agency.208 The impact of the 1953 coup 
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on the Iranian sense of nationhood cannot be ignored. It is Ansari’s contention that the 
‘myth of 1953’ continues: 
It  is  impossible  to  underestimate  the  importance  to  the  Iranian  political 
consciousness of the oil nationalisation crisis and the coup that followed. The 
anniversary of the passing of the oil;  nationalisation bill  remains a  national 
holiday and is perhaps the closest things to an Iranian independence day.209
Despite the coup, the ideas of the National Front continued with the National Resistance 
Movement (Nahzat-i Muqāvimat-i Millī) as it became in 1954, but repression and internal 
conflict were to lead to its collapse.210 Nonetheless, Mehdi Bazargan and Hujjat al-Islam 
Mahmud Taleqani, two of its members, created the Liberation Movement (Nahzat-i Āzād-
i  Īrān), which joined with the second National Front, in the period between 1960 and 
1963. Their main goals were to ‘serve the people’s religious, social and national needs’.211 
This is reflected in the following statement chosen by Ervand Abrahamian: 
We  are  Muslims,  Iranians,  constitutionalists,  and  Mossadeqists:  Muslims 
because we refuse to divorce our principles from politics; Iranians because we 
respect our national heritage; constitutionalist because we demand freedom of 
thought, expression, and association; Mossadeqists because we want national 
independence.212
The significance of this statement is that it illustrates the complexity of the construction 
of Iranian national identity and the meanings attached to it.
Musaddiq, the  Popular  Movement, National  Front and the  nationalisation  of  the  oil 
industry also represent an  alternative nationalist  discourse to  the  Pahlavis’ ‘dynastic 
nationalism’. It is essentially a more inclusive counter-discourse of national identity that 
rejects the  perceived hegemony of  the  Pahlavis;  anti-imperialism and the  desire for 
democratic progress are the basis for their construction of national identity. These ideals, 
symbolised here by Musaddiq and the nationalisation of oil, are significant in the Khatami 
period because, as will be illustrated in Chapters Five and Six, for some it is democratic 
aspirations that constitute the basis of Iranian national identity. 
After the fall of Musaddiq, dynastic nationalism became a ‘deeply personal affair’ base on 
a narrative that connected the Iranian monarchy intimately with the nation, which was 
perceived to stretch back to the Achaemenids’ Cyrus the Great. Indeed, Cyrus the Great 
was believed to be the ‘founding father of the Iranian nation’. It can be argued that the 
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ultimate expression of Mohammad Reza Shah’s dynastic nationalism was the celebration 
in 1971 for the 2,500 years of Persian monarchy, which took place at Persepolis and 
Pasargardae. The link with the Achaemenids was accentuated by Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
eulogy at the tomb of Cyrus the Great. This was followed, in 1976, with the changing of 
Iran’s calendar to an ‘imperial calendar’. Thus, rather than it being 1355, it was in fact 
2535, which included the 35 year reign of Mohammad Reza Shah.213 In this case it is clear 
that the pre-Islamic culture that is being aspired to and used is that of Achaemenid Iran 
rather  than  that  of  any  other  pre-Islamic  period.  The  use  of  Achaemenid Iran  in 
Mohammad Reza  Shah’s  nationalism is  significant in  relation  to  the  construction  of 
national identity in Khatami’s Iran. As will be illustrated, while there continues to be a 
construction of Iranian national identity based on pre-Islamic culture, it is Sasanian Iran 
rather than Achaemenid Iran. 
Ansari argues that the importance of monarchy to the ‘religious and spiritual well-being 
of the nation’ defined Mohammad Reza Shah’s dynastic nationalism. As he points out, 
this is articulated in the following extract from Mohammad Reza Shah’s book, Toward 
the Great Civilisation.214  It states:
In Iranian culture, the Iranian monarchy means the political and geographic 
unity  of  Iran  in  addition  to  the  special  national  identity  and  all  those 
unchangeable values which this national identity has brought  forth. For this 
reason no fundamental change is possible in this country unless it is in tune with 
the fundamental principles of the monarchical system.215
This extract shows how the political system is intrinsic to national identity. In this case it 
is monarchy. However, as will be illustrated it is monarchy, seen as a symbol of the use of 
Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, that is resisted and continues to be rejected by some.
Despite the re-invigoration of ‘dynastic nationalism’ under Mohammad Reza Shah216, the 
notion that to be Iranian was to show loyalty to the Pahlavi state and to prioritise Iran’s 
‘Aryan’ heritage was rejected.217 Not only did ‘dynastic nationalism’ face resistance from 
Kurdish and Azeri nationalism218, it was also met with a discourse of national identity that 
placed Islam at its base. This resistance to the perceived hegemony of Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s linking with Achaemenid Iran is represented by Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s use of Shi'ism 
as articulated in his book  Gharbzadagī (Occidentosis or  Westoxification), published in 
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1962. In the first chapter, ‘Diagnosing an Illness’, Al-e Ahmad explains that gharbzadagī 
has two poles. One is the Occident, which includes the Soviet Union, Europe and North 
America, and the other is  the East, developing countries, of  which Iran is  one. The 
division is made on economic grounds; ‘The West comprises the sated nations and the 
East, the hungry nations’. This polarised world is also given binary identities: ‘wealth and 
poverty, power and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, prosperity and ruin, civilisation 
and savagery’.219 Gharbzadagī is compared not only with an infestation of weevils, but 
also with tuberculosis. His point is that gharbzadagī is a disease that requires a diagnosis 
and hopefully a cure.220 He concludes the chapter by arguing:
If  we  define  occidentosis  as  the  aggregate of  events  in  the  life,  culture, 
civilisation, and mode of thought of a people having no supporting tradition, no 
historical continuity, no gradient of transformation, but having only what the 
machine brings them, it is clear that we are such a people.221  
In other words, as far as Al-e Ahmad is concerned, Iran has lost  its sense of history, 
culture and civilisation and only has what the machine of the West has brought.
Much attention  has  been  given  to  Gharbzadagī in  the  literature with  regard to  its 
significance and  the  reasons  for  it.  One  argument is  that  gharbzadagī represents a 
resistance to westernisation in Iran. This is not surprising since following the 1953 Coup, 
westernisation and Western presence was intensified. It is Yann Richard’s contention that 
for many this was associated with ‘Western politico-economic domination’. As mentioned 
above, this was met with an anti-imperialist counter-discourse. However, the discourse of 
Al-e Ahmad was somewhat different to that of Musaddiq. He also comments that ‘anti-
Westernism and anti-regime ideas turned increasingly to the masses’ Shi‘i outlook’.222
This reference to a ‘Shi‘i outlook’ raises the issue of the significance of Shi'ism in Iranian 
national identity. Integral to this is the role played by the Safavid rulers, who adopted 
Shi'ism as the official state religion in 1501. It is Keddie’s contention that these territorial 
(relative  territorial  stability  was  established)  and  religious  ‘accomplishments  were 
important for Iran’s future identity and territorial integrity’.223 She argues that the adoption 
of Shi‘ism by the rulers was an attempt to distinguish Iran from the Sunni Ottomans and 
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Uzbeks.224 Furthermore,  most of the population was converted to Shi’ism from Sunni 
Islam.225 Consequently, Shi‘ism was the principle by which most Iranians were unified 
despite the existence of non-Shi‘i minorities.226 It is argued that adherence to Shi’ism was 
likely to have reinforced a feeling of independence.227 
The idea of independence and differentiation from the external ‘other’ brings up the 
perceived ‘Iranian’ nature of Shi‘ism. It is not uncommon to hear in Iran the theory that 
the Safavids essentially Iranianised Islam. Cottam argues that part of the Shi‘i belief is 
indicative of the historical strength of Iranian particularism.228 For example, it is argued 
that the line of imams were symbolically Aryanised through the belief they were the 
descendents of Ali following the marriage of his son Hussain to the last Sasanian monarch 
Yazdgerd III. To this regard, Henry Corbin suggests that the ‘idea of the Twelfth Imam 
presents a  remarkable affinity  with  the  Saviour of  Saoshyant  of  ancient  Zoroastrian 
Persia’.229 Thus, as the title of his book suggests, En Islam Iranien, the Shi’ism of Iran is 
essentially  Iranian Islam.  The difference here between  Īslāmīyat (being Islamic) and 
Īrānīyat (being Iranian) is, therefore, not so clear-cut and the interrelated nature of these 
identities needs to be taken into consideration when discussing Iranian national identity. 
The relationship between Shi'ism and a feeling independence is particularly evident in the 
case of the  gharbzadagī discourse. Shi‘ism was to be the vaccine that could cure Iran 
from gharbzadagī, and the clergy were the doctors who could prescribe the cure as they 
were the only group that had not surrendered to western domination.230 Richard argues:
[Al-e Ahmad’s] struggle was for the identity of the Shi‘i Iranian. What he asked 
of Islam, at the moment (ca. 1963) when it again became a symbol of national 
struggle against monarchy, was to raise politics to its just position. … Then 
Islam might again be a liberator as it was for the seventeenth-century Iranians.231 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  as  Boroujerdi  points  out,  that  ‘Al-e  Ahmad  adopted  an 
instrumentalist view of Shi‘ism as a mobilising political ideology”.232 Thus, not only does 
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gharbzadagī illustrate the Islamisation of the anti-imperialist counter-discourse, but also 
the politicisation of  Īslāmīyat.  With Al-e Ahmad, there is the turn to a discourse that 
emphasises the role of Islam in the articulation of national identity and the rejection of 
secular notions of Iranian national identity. 
While gharbzadagī can be considered as a response to the westernisation of Iran and the 
Pahlavi regime, it  seems it  is  not  quite that simple. Ali  Mirsepassi  argues that  ‘Al-e 
Ahmad’s critique of  gharbzadagī is  a complex and contradictory concept  that cannot 
simply be reduced to an anti-Western polemic.’ Rather, Mirsepassi contends, his ‘return to 
Islam was a quest to realise a national modernity in Iran’.233 It must be mentioned that Al-e 
Ahmad was writing at a time when many believed that ‘modernisation and westernisation 
are identical concepts, and that Islam must be abandoned in the name of progress.’234 
Thus, while Īslāmīyat is part of a search for an “authentic” Iranian identity, it can by no 
means be considered in isolation.
Perhaps, most important of all is the legacy of Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadagī; it gave birth to 
a discourse, of the same name, which was ‘the modern Iranian articulation of nativism’ 235 
Boroujerdi argues: ‘It has been almost impossible for Iranian intellectuals to speak of 
their cultural conflict with contemporary Western civilisation without paying homage in 
some  way  to  his  theory  of  gharbzadagī.’236 He  illustrates  well  the  anti-imperialist 
discourse in his outline of the mood and sentiment that Al-e Ahmad symbolised:
Al-e Ahmad was part of a generation that was at once inspired by the West yet 
politically opposed to it; a generation xenophobic toward the West, yet drawing 
inspirations from the thoughts  of its  leading thinkers;  a  generation dodging 
religion and traditionalism, yet pulled toward them; a generation aspiring for 
such modernist goals as democracy, freedom, and social justice, yet sceptical of 
their  historical  precedents  and  contemporary problems.  As  Iran’s  leading 
intellectual of the 1960s, Al-e Ahmad epitomized this state of mental torment. 
He was representative of  a  generation  of  Iranian intellectuals  who became 
disillusioned with both liberalism and socialism as political alternatives. Al-e 
Ahmad’s disillusionment with liberalism was caused by the fact that despite its 
vow  to  safeguard  democracy  all  that  the  West  provided  for  Iran  was 
(neo)colonialism and support for autocratic rulers.237 
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The influence of  Gharbzadagī,  therefore,  is  a  clear  illustration of  the  common and 
perhaps dominant anti-western discourse in Iran at the time. In this case, Iranian national 
identity  was  to  be  constructed on  what  was  perceived to  be  authentically  Iranian: 
Īslāmīyat. Furthermore, of particular interest here, as will be illustrated in Chapter Four, is 
that the Islamist discourse of national identity as reflected in the rhetoric of Ayatollah 
Khamene’i is very much reminiscent of the gharbzadagī discourse. 
Ali Shari‘ati is said to have continued where Al-e Ahmad left off. Like Al-e Ahmad he 
was  part  of  an  anti-imperialist  counter-discourse.  According to  Mirsepassi,  Shari‘ati 
‘considered himself a modern Shi‘i ideologue of the future, fighting for technological 
advancement and national independence’.238 As was the case for Al-e Ahmad, for Shari‘ati 
Īslāmīyat was  politicised,  but  it  also  had  secular  tone,  as  will  be  illustrated below. 
Developing Al-e Ahmad’s ideas, his focus was on constructing and popularising Shi'ism 
as  an  authentic  alternative  ideology  to  secular  ideologies,  which  would  enable  the 
liberation of the Iranian nation.239 This was reflected in his discourse of  bāzgasht bih 
khīshtān (return to  the self),  an Iranianised replica of  Frantz Fanon’s  ‘return of  the 
oppressed’, which complemented Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadagī. These two discourses came 
to be interrelated discourses and popular in intellectual circles.240 
The discourse of bāzgasht bih khīshtān can be considered as a reaction to a particular 
perception of the West. According to Boroujerdi, Shari‘ati viewed the Orient  and the 
Occident as culturally and ontologically different. The Occident  was characterised by 
‘rationalism,  materialism,  objectivism,  and  profit-seeking’;  where as  the  Orient  was 
characterised by ‘ecclesiastical, collectivist, subjectivist and moral traits’.241 Furthermore, 
according to Mirsepassi, as far as Shari‘ati was concerned, Western domination in Iran 
was not simply economic and political; it was more a case of Iranian society ‘suffering 
from Western infestations’.242 His response to this was Islam, which is articulated in one of 
Shari'ati’s major works, Return to Self. He states:
Now I want to address a fundamental question raised by intellectuals in Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia: the question of ‘return to one’s roots’ … Since the 
Second World War, many intellectuals in the Third World, whether religious or 
non-religious, have stressed that their societies must return to their roots and 
rediscover their history, culture and popular language. I want to stress that non-
religious intellectuals, as well as religious ones have reached this conclusion. In 
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fact, the main advocates of ‘return to roots’ have not been religious – Fanon in 
Algeria, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Leopold Senghor 
in Senegal …   When we say ‘return to one’s roots’, we are really saying to 
one’s cultural roots. … Some of you may conclude that we Iranians must return 
to our racial roots (Aryan) roots. I categorically reject this conclusion. I oppose 
racism, fascism, and reactionary returns. What is more, Islamic civilisation has 
acted like scissors and has cut us off completely from our pre-Islamic past. The 
pundits, such as archaeologists and ancient historians, may know much about 
the Sassanids, the Achaemenids and even older civilisations. But our people 
know  nothing  about  such  things.  They  do  not  find  their  roots  in  these 
civilisations. They are left unmoved by the heroes, myths, and monuments of 
these ancient empires. They remember nothing from this distant past and do not 
care to learn about these pre-Islamic civilisations … Consequently, for us to 
return to our roots means not a rediscovery of pre-Islamic Iran but a return to 
our Islamic roots.243
As far as Mirsepassi is concerned, this illustrates Shari'ati’s conviction that it  is only 
Islam that can be used as a revolutionary ideology and a means of creating political unity 
in order ‘to mobilise the masses to fight for social change and a new society’.244 Thus, 
Islam can be considered as a means of creating political unity and consequently as the 
basis  of national identity.  However,  according to  Ashraf,  Shari‘ati ‘conceived Iranian 
national identity as stemming from the two equally important bases of Iranian nationhood 
and Shi‘ism.’245
Although Islam was used as the basis of national identity, Shari‘ati advocated a particular 
Islam. He believed that Islam needed theoretical and organisational reform: 
Theoretically, it had to undergo a transformation process from a culture to an 
ideology, from a collection of assorted learning into an organised body of social 
thought. He maintained that Islam was neither a scientific specialisation nor a 
culture but instead an idea, a belief system, and a feeling about how societies 
must be governed.246
The  result  of  this  was  a  reinterpretation  Shi‘ism’s  ‘historic-victim’  discourse  of 
martyrdom, historical persecution and the promise of eternal salvation for those who 
confronted the  “unjust”,  ‘in  a  modernist vein’.  This  was  embedded with  a  call  for 
resistance. Thus, the Shah’s political and economic injustices were met with the ‘historic-
victim’ discourse of Shi'ism ‘impregnated with nativism’.247 
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Not only was Shari'ati’s interpretation of Islam based on the martyrdom of Hussein at the 
battle of Kabala, it was also the Islam of the masses. This is reflected in the following 
extract from one of his works. Shari‘ati states:
Islam has  two separate Islams. The  first  can be  considered a  revolutionary 
“ideology”. By this, I mean beliefs, critical programmes and aspirations whose 
goal is human development. This is true religion. The second can be considered 
scholastic “knowledge”. By this I mean philosophy, oratory, legal training, and 
scriptural learning. The second can be grasped by academic specialists, even 
reactionary ones. The first can be grasped by uneducated believers. This is why 
sometimes true believers understand Islam better than faqīh (religious jurists), 
and ‘ālim (scholars), and the philosophers.248
In  other words,  “true Islam”  is  that of  the masses. Even though Marxism and class 
struggle  are integral aspects of  Shari'ati’s  ideology,  Marxism was also  an  ‘objective 
phenomenon to be taken by Iran and “Islamicised” from its Western roots.’249 
Shari'ati’s ideas reflect a  discourse where Islam, as an ideology,  is  embedded in the 
construction of Iranian national identity. Furthermore, there are certain meanings attached 
to  this  understanding  of  Islam: ‘Islamic reformism granted a  sense  of  self-respect, 
collective  and  national  identity,  and  cultural  authenticity.’250 It  is  worth  noting  that 
Shari‘ati ‘is nowadays regarded as the … “main ideologue” of the 1979 revolution’.251
This period illustrates how nationalism in Iran continued to be contested. On the one 
hand, there was the state discourse of ‘dynastic nationalism’, and on the other hand there 
were non-state discourses resisting this state nationalism. These are reflected in the liberal 
nationalism  of  Musaddiq  and  the  discourses  of  Al-e  Ahmad  and  Shari'ati,  which 
advocated  Īslāmīyat,  and specifically Shi‘ism as the base of Iranian national identity. 
Although the discourses of Musaddiq, on the one hand and Al-e Ahmad and Shari'ati, on 
the other hand, are very different, their commonality is the expression of anti-imperialism. 
This reflects a resistance to perceived imperialism, which is represented not only in the 
actions of external forces, but also in Mohammad Reza Shah himself.  Thus, this period 
demonstrates a  hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic which is  reflected in the 
meanings attached to the various constructions of Iranian national identity.
1.19 Religious Nationalism and the Islamic Republic 
The aim of this section is to explore how Iranian nationalism and national identity have 
been  constructed  by  the  Islamic  Republic.  This  will  be  done  by  first  considering 
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Khomeini and his discourse of ‘religious nationalism’. Although much of Khomeini’s 
rhetoric took place whilst in exile prior to the 1979 Revolution, it is included here because 
of his integral role in the Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. This 
will be followed by a look at how national identity is constructed in the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic, and finally how it is expressed during the Iran-Iraq War. 
Existing alongside Mohammad Reza Shah’s dynastic nationalism and Musaddiq’s liberal 
nationalism, there was also a discourse of ‘religious nationalism’. Ansari describes this as 
a hybrid construction based on the notion of ‘national resurrection’, which can only be 
‘achieved through a  return to  cultural authenticity,  of which Shi’ism was an integral 
part.’252 Thus, similarities can be drawn with the  gharbzadagī discourse of Al-e Ahmad 
and the bāzgasht bih khīshtān discourse of Shari'ati. However, according to Ansari, it was 
Ayatollah  Ruhollah  Musavi  Khomeini  who  ‘symbolised  the  force  of  ‘religious 
nationalism’’.253 
Khomeini’s resistance to the Pahlavi regime is evident  in his vocal opposition to the 
granting of diplomatic immunity to American military personnel and the commitment to a 
$200 million loan from the United States to buy military equipment in 1964. Khomeini’s 
response to this  was to force him into exile. On October 27 1964, Khomeini gave a 
speech from Qom entitled The Granting of Capitulatory Rights to the US. He states: 
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit this nation to be the 
slaves of Britain one day, and America the next. If the religious leaders have 
influence, they will not permit Israel to take over the Iranian economy; …. If the 
religious leaders have influence, they will not permit the government to impose 
arbitrarily such a heavy loan on the Iranian nation. … If the religious leaders 
have influence, they will not permit a handful of individuals to be imposed on 
the nation as deputies and participate in determining the destiny of the country. 
If  the religious  leaders have influence, they will  not  permit some agent of 
America to carry out these scandalous deeds; they will throw him out of Iran.254
Khomeini’s discourse in this extract from the speech is clear here. There is a strong sense 
of anti-imperialism and the belief that if there were a religious government Iran would not 
fall to being a pawn of the West. Thus, Islam, in a political sense, is perceived as the 
means of combating imperialism. 
Also during this period, Khomeini began to develop a new understanding of the state. 
Although the intellectual background for this development is not clear, it is suggested that 
he may have been influenced by Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadagī, and also by Shari‘ati among 
252 Op. cit. Ansari 2003, p. 201
253 Ibid. p. 201
254 Khomeini, Ruhollah. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. trans. and 
annotated by Hamid Algar, London and Melbourne: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. pp. 181-188 
75
others.255 In the 1970s, while in exile in Najaf, Khomeini’s ideas evolved into something 
more concrete. He gave a series of lectures entitled  Vilāyat-i Faqīh: Hukūmat-i Īslāmī 
(The Jurist’s Guardianship: Islamic Government). Abrahamian comments: 
In these lectures, he [Khomeini] declared in no uncertain terms that Islam was 
inherently incompatible  with all  forms of  monarchy (saltanat).  … and that 
Imam Hosayn had raised the banner of revolt in Karbala because he rejected 
hereditary kingship on principle.256 
Khomeini is also said to have stated:
The Prophet Mohammad had declared mālik al-mulūk (king of kings) to be the 
most hated of all titles in the eyes of the Almighty – Khomeini interpreted this 
to be the equivalent of shah of shahs.257
This rejection of monarchy reflects Khomeini’s aversion to a particular political system. 
This was obviously radical, since prior to the 1979 Revolution Iran had not experienced 
any other form of government. Khomeini legitimises his rejection of monarchy though his 
references to Imam Hussein and the Prophet Mohammad. The rejection of monarchy also 
symbolises a rejection of Iran’s pre-Islamic culture in favour of its Islamic culture. As will 
be illustrated in Chapter Four, this discourse of rejecting monarchy continues to be used 
in the Islamist discourse of national identity, as articulated by Ayatollah Khamene'i. The 
ideas articulated  in  these  lectures  were to  later  form the  foundation of  the  Islamic 
Republic and vilāyat-i faqīh, the basis of Iran’s new political system. 
The rejection of monarchy also reflects the populist  nature of Khomeini’s  discourse. 
Abrahamian contends that ‘Khomeinism, despite its religious dimension, in many ways 
resembles Latin American populism.’258 This resemblance was evident in the middle-class 
nature of the movement, which ‘mobilised the masses with radical-sounding rhetoric 
against the external powers and the entrenched power-holding classes’. It also ‘claimed to 
be a  “return to  native roots”  and a  means for eradicating “cosmopolitan ideas” and 
charting  a  noncapitalist,  noncommunist  “third  way”  toward  development.’259 The 
populism of Khomeini’s discourse is also recognised by Ansari. He states:
…  it  took  religious  nationalism  to  free  Iranian nationalism  from its  elite 
pretensions and make it popular. Indeed, religious nationalism, the politicisation 
of Iranian identity as  it  had formed in  the nineteenth century,  reflected the 
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successful synthesis of an elite imposed ideology and the Islamic realities of 
popular politics.260
It  must  be  stressed  that  although  anti-imperialism  and  populism  were  integral  to 
Khomeini’s discourse, it was Islam, and particularly Shi'ism, that was considered as the 
overriding ideology and the means of achieving Khomeini’s aims – independence  and 
what  he  perceived to  be  a  more “just”  society.  For  this  reason, ‘Khomeinism’ and 
religious nationalism can be considered in terms of an Islamist discourse of national 
identity. It must also be emphasised, however, that Islamist here does not simply mean 
political Islam. The meanings attached to this term are more complicated. As was the case 
with Al-e Ahmad and Shari'ati, Islam was seen as the only “authentic” Iranian identity 
and the most appropriate means of resisting the imperialism evident both directly and 
indirectly. 
Khomeini’s Islamist discourse of national identity is also both hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic. It is counter-hegemonic in many of the same ways that the other ideas and 
discourses articulated during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah are, as illustrated above. 
First of all, Khomeini’s discourse, like those of Musaddiq, Al-e Ahmad and Shari'ati, is 
resisting not only the perceived hegemony of imperialism, but also that of the Pahlavi 
government and  its  dynastic  nationalism.  However,  unlike  Musaddiq,  and  like  Al-e 
Ahmad and Shari'ati, it is Islam that is used as the most appropriate means of resistance. 
The discourse is  hegemonic in that it  is  prescribing a  particular set  of values  as the 
dominant values, culturally, morally and politically, which are to be achieved through 
vilāyat-i faqīh.
The aim of this section is not to discuss Iran’s revolution of 1979. Rather, it is to illustrate 
how the Iranian nation is officially constructed once the Revolution has taken place and 
the  Islamic Republic  established.  This  is  evident in  the  Constitution  of  the  Islamic 
Republic. Many of the themes articulated here are reminiscent of Khomeini’s discourse. 
The opening statement of the ‘Preamble’ to the Iranian Constitution makes this very clear. 
It states:
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran advances the cultural, social, 
political,  and  economic  institutions  of  Iranian  society  based  on  Islamic 
principles and  norms, which  represent an  honest  aspiration  of  the  Islamic 
Ummah.261
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The use of Islam as the basis of not only the Constitution, but also as society as a whole, 
is  unmistakable. Furthermore,  the reference to  ‘Islamic Ummah’ is  also of particular 
interest. It represents an understanding of Iranian identity in transnational terms. As will 
be illustrated in Chapter Four, this is also the case in the discourse of the current Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khamene'i. 
The populist  nature of Khomeini’s  discourse is  also evident in the Constitution. The 
following extract is taken from ‘The Form of Government in Islam’. It states:
In the view of Islam, government does not derive from the interests of a class, 
nor does it serve the domination of an individual or a group. Rather, it represents 
the fulfilment of the political ideal of a people who bear a common faith and 
common outlook, taking an organised form in order to initiate the process of 
intellectual and ideological evolution towards the final goal,  i.e.,  movement 
towards Allah. Our nation, in the course of its revolutionary developments, has 
cleansed itself of the dust and impurities that accumulated during the past and 
purged itself of foreign ideological influences, returning to authentic intellectual 
standpoints and world-view of Islam. It now intends to establish an ideal and 
model society on the basis of Islamic norms.262
The claim here is that the government is not one that is based on a particular group in 
society or class. Rather, it is implied that it is the government of the people who share a 
‘common faith and outlook’. However, bearing in mind the several discourses of national 
identity prior to the 1979 Revolution and during the Khatami period, this is clearly not the 
case. Nonetheless, this does not deny the enormous support that the Revolution did have. 
The issue of authenticity is also raised. In this case, it is specifically Iran’s Islamic culture, 
or Īslāmīyat, to which Iran has “returned” having rid itself of all that is perceived to be 
foreign, including Iran’s pre-Islamic culture or Īrānīyat. Having “restored” authenticity to 
Iran, it is perceived that Islam, as Iran’s all-encompassing ideology, can provide the basis 
of society, morals and government. Thus, in this sense the discourse of the Constitution is 
hegemonic.
However, while the discourse here is hegemonic, it is also counter-hegemonic. This is not 
only expressed in the rejection of the previous government and state articulated national 
identity, but also in the endeavour to achieve and maintain the independence of Iran as a 
nation. The importance of independence is reflected in Articles 152 (Principles) and 153 
(No Foreign Control)  in  ‘Chapter X Foreign Policy’ of the Constitution.  Article 152 
states: 
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of 
all  forms of  domination,  both  the  exertion of  it  and  submission  to  it,  the 
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preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial 
integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to 
the  hegemonist  superpowers,  and  the  maintenance  of  mutually  peaceful 
relations with all non-belligerent states.263 
The discourse articulated here is very similar to that which continues to reverberate from 
certain  elements  of  the  Islamic  Republic.  It  is  also  reflected  in  Iran’s  ties  with 
international organisations such as the Non-aligned Movement and the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference. 
The resistance to imperialism and the attempt to assert Iran’s independence is further 
elaborated in the subsequent article of Chapter X. Article 153 states: 
Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, 
economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national 
life is forbidden. 264
As mentioned above, it is also cultural imperialism that is resisted. Furthermore, taking 
into consideration Iran’s experience in the tobacco and oil industries, it is not surprising 
that  the Constitution of  the  Islamic Republic also stresses  Iran’s  independence from 
foreign interference in economic affairs. Indeed, it has been argued that:
In  this  new  Islamic-nationalist  economic  system,  it  was  hoped  that 
nationalisation of a  wide range of industries and services would reduce the 
scope for interference of the domestic private sector and their foreign partners in 
the economy.265
There is  some debate as to whether or not following the 1979 Revolution Islam has 
replaced nationalism as the dominant ideology on the basis that ‘Islam does not recognise 
national boundaries, [and] it would be incompatible with nationalism’.266 This is clearly 
not the case. If nationalism is to be understood as a ‘movement for guarding a nation’s 
independence and freedom in the face of an external aggressor, and … an intellectual 
assertion of a nation’s separateness and identity’267, this is precisely the aim of Khomeini’s 
discourse. However,  it  is  Islam, perceived as an all-encompassing ideology,  which is 
considered to be the most appropriate way of achieving an independent Iranian nation and 
the “authentic” identity. 
263 Article 152 (Principles) in ‘Chapter X Foreign Policy’, Iran – Constitution, 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html - date accessed 12 June 2007
264 Article 153 (No Foreign Control) in ‘Chapter X Foreign Policy’ Iran – Constitution, 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html - date accessed 12 June 2007
265 Pesaran, Evaleila. Business-State Contestations and the Shifting Approach to Foreign Investment in 
Post-Revolutionary Iran. PhD Thesis unpublished. section 2.2 of Chapter 2
266 Op. cit. Siavoshi, p. 185
267 Op. cit. Enayat, pp. 111-112
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It is essential to note that although it is only religious nationalism that has been addressed 
in this section, it does not mean that there are not co-existing competing discourses of 
national identity.  It  must  not be assumed that with the Revolution in  1979 all  other 
discourses ceased to exist.  The ideas articulated throughout  this  chapter continued to 
exist, either in exile among the diaspora, or simply just in private. As will be illustrated in 
the coming chapters, the ideas espoused by the Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah and 
Musaddiq continue to be articulated during Khatami’s presidency. 
Although the Islamic Republic and its Constitution places a strong emphasis on Islam, 
with  the  Iran-Iraq War  (1980-1988)  the  situation  somewhat changed.  According  to 
Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, both sides of the war attempted to ‘universalise’ the 
war: ‘Iraq by “Arabising” it and Iran by “Islamicising” it’. However, in the case of Iran, 
the Islamisation was not without an emphasis on  Iranian nationalism.268 To this regard, 
Ansari argues that by the end of the war ‘the tensions implicit in religious nationalism 
were  being  resolved  in  favour  of  nationalism’.  It  is  his  contention  that  this  was 
‘encouraged by  Iraqi propaganda portraying the war against Iran as  an extension of 
historic  Persian/Arab  antipathies.’269 Shireen  Hunter  also  attributes  official 
acknowledgement of both Islamic and Iranian identity; she contends that in order ‘to rally 
popular support for the war effort, the government had to appeal not only to Islam, but 
also to Iranian nationalism.’270 Although the invasion of Iran by Iraq and the subsequent 
threat to territorial integrity were reasons for the government to adopt rhetoric that no 
longer excluded Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, there was also pressure from Iranian society. 
To this regard, Ansari contends that there was ‘recognition that for much of the Iranian 
population, their distinctive [Iranian] identity remained important.’271 
Following the war, the idea of building on both Iran’s cultures continued to be part of the 
government discourse in some circles. According to Hunter, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s there was a subtle change in the government’s approach to cultural issues and the 
“Iranian” aspect of the country’s culture.272 She contends:
once  in  power,  the  Islamists  no  longer felt  seriously  threatened by  Iranian 
nationalism as an ideological revival. As a result, the religious establishment 
began reverting to its more traditional attitude toward Iran’s pre-Islamic culture 
and its relationship to Islam, as well as to the post-Islamic Iranian culture, with 
268 Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles. Iran and Iraq at War. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988. p. 9
269 Op. cit. Ansari 2003, p. 240
270 Hunter, Shireen. Iran after Khomeini. New York & London: Praeger, 1992. p. 93
271 Op. cit. Ansari 2003, p. 240
272 Op. cit. Hunter 1992, p. 92
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its  delicate blending of Islamic principles, pre-Islamic Persian concepts, and 
other non-Islamic Philosophies.273
This argument is supported by Ashraf. He contends that an Islamic-Iranian conception of 
Iranian identity has been adopted, presumably in the early 1990s when his article was 
written, by Iran’s ‘leadership and the lower echelons of the Islamic regime’.274 In 1992, 
Hunter stated that ‘The regime has now accepted the notion of an ‘Iranian nation’, and it 
has also concluded that the nature of the Iranian culture is ‘Iranian-Islamic’.’275 To this 
regard, writing in 1995, Hooshang Amirahmadi argues that there is a “new nationalism” 
in Iran. He describes this new nationalism as follows:
The new nationalism is neither anti-Islamist nor anti-Western; rather it  is an 
attempt to reconcile the contradictions between Iran and Islam, modernity and 
tradition,  globalism and political  isolation. … it  is  imperative for  the  new 
nationalists to strike a balance between Iranianism, Islamism and globalism.276
Despite  these contentions,  it  must  be highlighted that the government of the Islamic 
Republic is  by no means homogeneous when it  comes to  the articulation of Iranian 
national identity. This is certainly apparent during the Khatami period when there is a 
clear difference between the discourses of Khamene’i and Khatami. As will be illustrated 
in Chapters Four and Five, while Khamene'i may be accepting Iran as a nation he still 
asserts that  Islam as synonymous with the nation. Furthermore, Khatami’s criticism of 
Islamism alludes to  the continuation of a  trend of prioritising Islam over Iran’s  pre-
Islamic culture. Nonetheless, an issue that must also be raised here is with regard to the 
nature of Islam in Iran. As has been addressed above, there is the argument that Shi’ism in 
Iran is essentially ‘Iranianised Islam’. If this is the case, then the boundaries between 
Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat are not so distinct. Furthermore, it is Islam that is being used to 
defend the nation from imperialism. Thus, despite the association between Islam and the 
’ummah, the nation still remains all important.
1.20 Conclusion
The aim of  this  chapter has  been to  historically  and intellectually contextualise the 
discourses of Iranian national identity in the Khatami period. This is necessary in order to 
illustrate that the roots of national identity construction during Khatami’s presidency are 
based on  a  complex ‘historical experience’.  The contextualisation  has  been done by 
illustrating how Iranian nationalism,  in  its  various forms, has  been articulated on an 
273 Ibid., p. 93
274 Op. cit. Ashraf 1993, p. 162
275 Op. cit. Hunter 1992, p. 95
276 Amirahmadi, Hooshang ‘Emerging Civil Society in Iran’ in SAIS Review, 16, 2, Summer/Fall 1996. pp. 
87-108, p. 100
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intellectual level though the ideas of certain individuals and groups, and in  practice, 
through the actions of certain groups in society. These ideas and actions have shown that 
there is a continuous construction and reconstruction of Iranian nationalism, on both the 
state and non-state levels. 
This intellectual and historical contextualisation has demonstrated several factors crucial 
to an understanding of Iranian national identity and nationalism. First of all, the issue of 
imperialism is  a  common theme. An important  aspect in  the construction of  Iranian 
nationalism throughout Iran’s twentieth century history has been resistance to imperialism 
and the  goal  of  achieving an independent Iranian nation.  For example,  the  ideas of 
Afghani reflect a resistance to Western imperialism. In his case, Islam was perceived to be 
the  most  appropriate means  of  achieving  an  independent nation.  Existing  alongside 
Afghani’s approach is the ‘secular’ nationalism of Akhundzadah, Kermani and Kasravi. 
In  their case, they advocate the values of  Iran’s  pre-Islamic culture as  the most the 
appropriate means of resisting imperialism. Part of this, is the idea that the decline of the 
Iranian nation is due to the foreign interference from Arabs and/or Islam. The late Qajar 
period and the Constitutional period also bore witness to the roots of liberal nationalism 
as  reflected in  notion  that  democracy  is  the  most  appropriate  means  of  achieving 
independence. Taking into consideration that more than one notion of Iranian nationalism 
existed  in  this  period,  it  can  be  contended  that  there  are  concurrent  nationalisms 
competing for hegemony.
This trend continues throughout the rest of Iran’s history until the present day. Many of 
the ideas of ‘secular’ nationalism are reflected in the ‘dynastic nationalism’ of Reza Shah. 
It was his belief that a strong Iranian united nation based on Iran’s pre-Islamic culture 
would be a means of resisting British and Russian presence. Thus, what was a non-state 
discourse during the Qajar era becomes a hegemonic state discourse; the leadership is 
based on a particular culture and ideology.  ‘Dynastic nationalism’ evolved under Reza 
Shah’s  son,  Mohammad Reza  Shah.  However,  Mohammad  Reza  Shah  came  to  be 
perceived as a pawn of the West rather than as a means of combating it. 
The notion of democracy as the most appropriate means of resisting imperialism also 
continued during the Pahlavi era with the liberal nationalism of Musaddiq, among others. 
Alongside ‘dynastic nationalism’ and liberal nationalism, the notion of Islam as the most 
appropriate means of  resisting  imperialism also  continued.  This  was  evident  in  the 
gharbzadagī discourse of Al-e Ahmad, Shari’ati’s discourse of bāzgasht bih khīshtān, and 
also  the  ‘religious  nationalism’ as  articulated  in  the  ideas  of  Khomeini.  It  can  be 
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contended that  it  was  a  combination  of these last  three discourses, along with other 
factors, that culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Republic.
This illustrates that while anti-imperialism is a common theme, the most appropriate way 
of  dealing  with  imperialism and  asserting the  independence of  Iran  as  a  nation  is 
contested. Thus, Iranian nationalism and national identity are contested. As has been 
demonstrated, to  varying degrees the notions  of  cultural authenticity (Īrānīyat and/or 
Īslāmīyat), democracy and the idea of national “progress” have been used as a means of 
resisting imperialism or what  is  perceived as imperialism. In the case of secular and 
dynastic nationalism it is Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, or Īrānīyat, that it perceived as Iran’s 
“authentic” culture and most appropriate means of dealing with resistance.  In liberal 
nationalism it  is democracy; and for the religious discourses it  is  Islam or  Īslāmīyat. 
However, not only is the contestation in some cases based on whether or not it is Iran’s 
Islamic culture  or  pre-Islamic culture  that  is  used  as  the  basis  of  national  identity 
construction, but also Islam or Īslāmīyat itself is contested. Thus, Islam in the context of 
Iran cannot be considered as a monolith; there are different interpretations culturally and 
historically. There is also contestation with regard to how Islam is used politically.  The 
way in  which these the ideas are used and embedded in the construction of  Iranian 
national identity can be understood as a discourse of national identity. This illustrates the 
‘complexities  of  political  identity  and  difference’277 in  Iran’s  discourses of  national 
identity.
These different constructions of Iranian nationalism also reflect different representations 
of political systems. On the one hand, dynastic nationalism is based on monarchy. On the 
other hand, the political system advocated and also realised by Khomeini and religious 
nationalism is an Islamic government. In addition to these, liberal nationalism and the 
calls for democracy reflect the desire for a system based entirely or partly on the notion of 
democracy. Thus, it can be contended that the different notions of Iranian national identity 
also translate into different types of political system. 
It is also clear that the attitude towards and relationship with the West, the source of 
imperialism in this case, was important in how the nation was to be constructed. These 
dynamics can be understood in terms of a ‘self-other’ relationship. Throughout Iran’s 
twentieth century constructions of national identity, and also prior to this period, as the 
Safavid example shows, demonstrate that identity is constructed in relation to the ‘other’. 
This ‘other’ is often the foreign ‘other’. Thus, the relationship with the ‘other’, namely 
277 Op. cit. Howarth, p. 6
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the West, is crucial in constructing the identity of the ‘self’. However, it is essential to 
mention, that the ‘other’ is not always the West. In the case of the Iranian nationalism of 
Akhundzadah, Kermani and Kasravi and the ‘dynastic nationalism’ of both Reza Shah 
and Mohammad Reza Shah, the ‘other’ is also Arabs and/or Islam. Furthermore, as the 
difference between Iran’s different nationalisms are exacerbated by politics; those who 
represent a particular nationalism can also be considered as the ‘other’ of those who 
represent an alternative nationalism. For example, the ‘other’ for the discourses of Al-e 
Ahmad, Shari‘ati and Khomeini are not  only the external West, but also the internal 
represented in the discourse of Mohammad Reza Shah. Thus, the ‘other’ is both internal 
and external. 
The coexistence of these nationalisms and the resistance to the West or to the internal 
‘other’ reflects a  hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic. On  the one hand,  the 
different nationalisms are counter-hegemonic, which is demonstrated on more than one 
level. The perceived hegemony of the imperial powers is being resisted by the various 
approaches. On the other hand, the anti-imperialist discourses are also hegemonic as they 
all prescribe political, cultural and moral values that are prescribed as the  only way of 
bringing the Iranian nation out of “decline”. They are also expected to be adopted by the 
nation. In this sense, many of the nationalisms are exclusive. It is clear, therefore, that the 
relationship  between the  multiple  nationalisms  reflects  a  complex set  of  dynamics: 
imperialism and anti-imperialism; hegemony and counter-hegemony; and exclusivity and 
inclusivity. 
The final and concluding point is that many of the themes articulated in Iran’s multiple 
nationalisms or discourses of national identity are reflected in the discourses of national 
identity in the Khatami period. A number of factors are used to construct Iranian national 
identity  and  these are influenced by both  internal and external factors.  As has been 
mentioned before, five discourses have been identified for discussion:  the Iranist  and 
Islamist discourses  (Chapter Four), the  Islamist-Iranian (Chapter Five) and finally a 
discourse  of  civic  Iranian national  identity  and  a  discourse  of  cosmopolitan  Iranian 
national  identity,  both  of  which  reject  the  politicisation of  culture  (Īslāmīyat and/or 
Īrānīyat) on which the other three discourses are essentially based (Chapter Six). Anti-
imperialism continues  to  be  a  major  issue  in  the  construction  of  national  identity, 
particularly in the state Islamist and Islamist-Iranian discourses. Both of these also have 
an external ‘other’, however the way in which they deal with it, namely the West, varies. 
The Iranist discourse’s external ‘other’ is the Arab world in much the same way as the 
discourse of Kermani or Kasravi. Finally, the idea of ‘democracy’ also continues to be a 
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basis for the construction of Iranian national identity. In the case of the Islamist-Iranian 
discourse it is within the framework of Islam and in the case of the discourse of civic 
Iranian national identity, it is a secular understanding of democracy.
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Chapter Four: Islamist and Iranist Discourses of National Identity: 
The Polarisation of Politicised “Authentic” Culture
The previous chapters have contextualised the  discourses of  national  identity  in  the 
Khatami period. This  has been done by first  establishing that  ‘discourse of  national 
identity’ can  be  understood  as  the  means  by  which  ideology is  articulated  in  the 
construction  of  national  identity.  This  was  followed  by  a  deconstruction  of  Iran’s 
twentieth century historical experience whereby themes evident in the construction of 
Iranian  national  identity  during  the  Khatami  period  were  identified.  These  earlier 
expressions of Iranian nationalism and national identity  were considered in  terms of 
discourses of national identity. A hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic between the 
discourses was also demonstrated. This thesis now to turns to the first of three chapters 
that focuses on the Khatami period. As mentioned in Chapter One, there is a plethora of 
discussion, both in private and public spaces, regarding the nature of Iranian national 
identity. This chapter will focus on two of the discourses of national identity identified for 
analysis: the Iranist and Islamist discourses.
By using discourse analysis it is possible to deconstruct the meanings attached to the 
terminology used to construct how the Iranian nation is perceived and described. In other 
words, it  is  possible  to  determine the  sets  of  values or  ideologies  embedded in  the 
construction of Iranian national identity. The first contention of this chapter is that the 
ideology used in the construction of Iranian national identity of both the Islamist and 
Iranist discourses is based on what is perceived to be “authentic” culture. On the one 
hand, the Iranist  discourse is  based on the prioritisation of Iran’s  Islamic culture,  or 
Īrānīyat. At the other end of the spectrum, the Islamist discourse prioritises Iran’s Islamic 
culture, or Īslāmīyat. What is perceived as “authentic” is clearly contested; for one it is 
Īrānīyat, whereas for the other it  is  Īslāmīyat. The aim of the chapter, therefore, is to 
illustrate that the basis of contestation is a perceived dichotomy between two cultures. 
Ironically, the difference between these two discourses is also their similarity; they are 
both based on the notion of what is considered Iran’s “authentic” culture. 
The second contention is that culture is politicised; this is to be understood as culture 
being used as the basis of or justification for a particular political system. Furthermore, it 
can also be argued that the adoption of a particular “authentic” culture –  Īrānīyat or 
Īslāmīyat - as the main factor of national identity is part of a quest for legitimacy. For the 
Islamist discourse Īslāmīyat is used to justify or is integral to Islamist theocracy.  For the 
Iranist discourse Īrānīyat is used to justify or is integral to the political systems of pre-
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Islamic Iran, namely monarchy.  These political systems have been experienced in  Iran; 
the Islamic Republic is currently based on Islamist theocracy and prior to the Revolution 
in 1979 the Pahlavi regime was a monarchy.
A discourse approach to national identity also allows for the construction of national 
identity to be examined in terms of power relations. Thus, the third contention is that 
there is  a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic between the two discourses of 
national identity. This is reflected in how the two discourses are competing for hegemony, 
in cultural, political and moral terms, and control of the government apparatus in order to 
implement their notion or construction of national identity and their discourse as the 
identity of the nation. Furthermore, they are constructed in relation to their ‘other’. Thus, 
both discourses are at once hegemonic and counter-hegemonic. Since national identity is 
fluid and constructed so are these discourses, they are not rigid monolithic categories; 
they are fluid and evolve, often in reaction to their ‘other’. There is no means of telling 
exactly how representative the discourses are. However, it is fair to say that they exist and 
have strong emotional and political attachments, in addition to popular followings.
This  chapter  is  divided  into  three  sections:  ‘Theoretical  Considerations’,  ‘Islamist 
Discourse of National Identity’, and finally ‘Iranist discourse of National Identity’. The 
first section will first provide a theoretical discussion of notions that are integral to the 
meanings attached to the constructions of Iranian national identity under discussion. The 
first two are the closely linked notions of culture or farhang and civilisation or tamaddun. 
This will be followed by further explanation of Īrānīyat and Īslāmīyat: the two cultures 
that are perceived by some to be in total  opposition to each other and irreconcilable. 
Finally, the section will address the issue of tradition and modernity as these concepts are 
also brought up in relation to Īrānīyat and Īslāmīyat. 
The second section of the chapter outlines and deconstructs the Islamist discourse of 
nation of identity. This is done through a discourse analysis of primarily Khamene'i’s 
speeches and also an article from Kayhān newspaper. Three contentions will be made 
with regard to the Islamist discourse of national identity. The first is that it is based on the 
politicisation and prioritisation of  Īslāmīyat.  However,  it  is  also argued that although 
Īslāmīyat is prioritised, it is still ‘Iranianised Islam’. The second contention is that the 
discourse is typical of Occidentalist discourse. The third and final contention is that that 
the Islamist discourse of national identity is at once hegemonic and counter-hegemonic, 
which will be addressed throughout the section. 
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In the third section of the chapter, attention is turned to the Iranist discourse of national 
identity.  Here the  discourse will  be  outlined  and deconstructed through a  discourse 
analysis of texts taken from an organisation called Afraz. It is contended that Īrānīyat is 
used as the basis of Iranian national identity and that it  is  specifically Sasanian Iran 
culture and heritage that is used in the construction of Iranian national identity. 
1.21 Theoretical Considerations
In  this  section the concepts of culture and civilisation will  be defined. This  will  be 
followed by an examination of the notions of Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat. Finally, the section 
turns to the concepts of tradition and modernity.
1.21.1 Culture and Civilisation  
The contention that the above-mentioned discourses of national identity are based on 
what is perceived as “authentic” culture and civilisation is based on a recurring theme in 
discussions of Iranian national identity. As will be illustrated, speeches and academic texts 
on Iranian identity, repeatedly stress the importance of and pride in farhang (culture) and 
tamaddun (civilisation). Furthermore, in many academic discussions on Iranian national 
identity, national identity is considered only in terms of Iran’s culture and/or civilisation. 
In discussions on political identity and on identity in general culture and civilisation are 
often interchanged. Due to the importance of culture and civilisation in the construction 
of Iranian national identity, it is necessary to determine what these notions mean.
Culture in both the English and Persian languages can be understood in several ways.278 
On the  one  hand, culture  refers to  ‘all  those  practices, like  the  arts  of  description, 
communication, and representation … that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of [whose] 
… principal aims is pleasure’.279 This will be referred to as high culture. The other notion 
of culture can be understood in terms of shared values. The use of farhang, in the Iranian 
context, often implies a set of shared values, which are based on the importance of and 
the  endeavour  to  attain  high  culture,  which  is  coupled  with  civilisation,  or  the 
advancement and progress of society towards a more civilised situation. Thus, not only is 
high  culture an important  part  of  Iran’s  culture,  but  also civilisation  and everything 
attached to it, such as progress. In the context of this thesis, therefore, this is how the 
notion of culture is to be understood. 
278 See Sarangi, Srikant. ‘Culture’ in Verschueren, Jef, Őstman, Jan-Ola and Blommaert, Jan. (eds) 
Handbook of Pragmatics, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publ. Co., 1995. pp. 1-30 for a 
survey of the different approaches to the concept of culture. 
279 Op. cit. Said 1993, p. xii
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Fernand Braudel argues that ‘the word ‘civilisation’ … emerged in eighteenth-century 
France. It was formed from ‘civilised’ and ‘to civilise’, which had long existed and were 
in general use in the sixteenth century.’ In the eighteenth century understanding of the 
term it ‘meant broadly the opposite of barbarism. On one side were the civilised peoples: 
on the other were the other, primitive savages and barbarians.’280 For Braudel, civilisation 
also has a geographic understanding: 
Every civilisation … is based on an area with more or less fixed limits. Each has 
its own geography with its own opportunities and constraints, some virtually 
permanent and quite different from one civilisation to another.281  
Indeed, Braudel’s geographic understanding of Western civilisation demonstrates this. For 
Braudel, Western civilisation is ‘the ‘American civilisation’ of the United States, and the 
civilisations of Latin America, Russia and … Europe’, which in turn ‘contains a number 
of civilisations – Polish, German, Italian, English, French’, which he refers to as ‘national 
civilisations’.282 However,  it  must  be  mentioned that  what  is  included  in  ‘Western 
civilisation’ is  largely subjective.  For many,  Western civilisation  would  also include 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  even  Japan  and  Israel.  Nonetheless,  this  geographic 
understanding of civilisation is of interest because, as will be illustrated, the notion of 
civilisation on many occasions in the sources deconstructed conjures up the idea of a 
specific geographic space.
Braudel also contends that  ‘society and civilisation  are inseparable’. As far as he is 
concerned, ‘the two ideas refer to the same reality’; ‘the idea of ‘society’ implies a wealth 
of content’ and therefore resembles the idea of civilisation.283 To explain this point, he uses 
the example of  ‘industrial  society’,  which he argues is  the driving force of Western 
civilisation. In this context, as he contends: 
it would be easy to characterise Western civilisation simply by describing that 
society and its component parts, its tensions, its moral and intellectual values, its 
ideals, its habits, its tastes, … in other words by describing the people who 
embody it and who will pass it on.284 
It is natural that Braudel’s starting point for his analysis of civilisation to be the West, and 
Europe in particular. However, this is a rather Eurocentric approach. 
280 Braudel, Fernand. A History of Civilizations. trans. by Richard Mayne. New York: Penguin Books. 
1993, pp. 3-4
281 Ibid., p. 11
282 Ibid., p. 12
283 Ibid., p. 16
284 Ibid., p. 16
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This discussion of civilisation in the Western context is all very well; an understanding of 
the term in the Iranian context must also be considered. The use of civilisation, or in the 
Persian language tamaddun, brings up all sorts of connotations and questions. According 
to Farhang-i Farsī-yi ‘Umīd, tamaddun is defined on the one hand as being of a town-like 
or urban disposition and on the other hand as the collaboration of people in matters of 
living and the constructing of its tools for progress.285 Part of that process is high culture, 
which is believed to be only achievable in urban settings. In this sense, the definition of 
high culture is very close to that of civilisation. 
This definition is not unlike that of Ibn Khaldun. Furthermore, even though the term may 
not have occurred until the eighteenth century in the West, it does not necessarily mean 
that this was the case in Iran. To this regard, it is worth considering how the fourteenth 
century scholar of Arab lineage, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), writing in the Mediterranean 
part of the Muslim World286, dealt with the concept of ‘civilisation’. Ibn Khaldun begins 
his first book of the Kitāb al-‘Ibar in  al-Muqaddimah with the following statement: ‘It 
should be known that history … is information about human social organization, which 
itself is identical with world civilisation.’287 Thus, it  is clear the notion of civilisation 
(hadārah in Arabic) is central to his analysis of society. In fact, he states that civilisation 
is indeed one of the four aspects that distinguishes ‘man’ from other beings and he defines 
it thus:
[Civilisation] means that human beings have to dwell  in common and settle 
together in cities and in hamlets for the comforts of companionship and for the 
satisfaction of human needs, as a result  of the natural disposition of human 
beings toward cooperation in order to be able to make a living … .288
This definition is not dissimilar to Braudel’s association of civilisation with society. It 
should  also be  noted that  Ibn  Khaldun observes that  civilisation  occurs in  different 
contexts:  human civilisation  in  general, desert  or Bedouin civilisation, and  sedentary 
civilisation.289 Furthermore, he observes that there can be ‘little’, ‘medium degree of’ or 
‘great deal of’ civilisation depending where on the globe one happens to be. This is due to 
geographic conditions.290 
285 Umid, Hassan. Farhang-i Fārsī. Amir Kabir Publishers. 1384 (2005)
286 Lawrence, Bruce B. ‘Introduction to the 2005 edition’ in Ibn Kahldun. The Muqaddimah: An 
Introduction to History. trans. by Franz Rosenthal; abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2005 (1st edn. 1967). pp. vii-xxv, p. vii
287 Ibn Kahldun. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. trans. by Franz Rosenthal; abridged and 
edited by N. J. Dawood. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2005 (1st edn. 1967), p. 35
288 Ibid., p. 43
289 Ibid., p. 43
290 Ibid., pp. 54-57
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What is  of  interest and significance here is  that  Ibn Khaldun’s  al-Muqaddimah was 
written at the end of the fourteenth century. Thus, the discussion of civilisation exists, in 
the Islamic world at least, somewhat earlier than in Europe as argued by Braudel. This 
alludes to Braudel’s rather Eurocentric approach to the notion of civilisation and makes 
his approach problematic. 
All the same, it is essential, however, to consider what the term ‘civilisation’ means to 
those using it. Thus, just as one must consider the meanings attached to the notion of 
nation, so it must be the case that one must consider the meanings attached to the notion 
of civilisation. As this thesis will illustrate, integral to the construction of nation is the 
idea of civilisation. Thus, even though the term may not have existed during the period 
that is being ‘remembered’ by Iranians does not take away from the meanings attached to 
the idea of Iran as an Islamic and/or Iranian civilisation. Robert Cox’s article ‘Thinking 
about Civilisations’,  Hall’s  discussion  of  culture  and that  of  Said provide  a  helpful 
framework for deconstructing the meanings attached to the notions of civilisation and 
culture.  This  is  largely  to  do  with  the  ‘self–other’ dynamic  and  how  the  issue  of 
authenticity relates to this.
Cox points out that ‘the word “civilisation” – in the singular but also in the plural – has 
become common … in the mouths of politicians and in the writings of international 
relations academics.’ He argues that ‘when politicians evoke civilisation, it  is usually 
when they want to arouse their constituents  against some demonised enemy.’291 Since 
Cox’s argument is in the context of international relations, presumably the ‘demonised 
enemy’ is another international actor, or another state. In the case of discourses of Iranian 
national identity, does this mean that there is also a process of demonisation? If so, who is 
the enemy?
Parallels  can  be  drawn  here  with  Said’s  Orientalism and  how  the  “Orient”  is 
‘Orientalised’. In his discussion about how Europe relates to the “Orient” Said argues:
A group of people living on only a few acres of land will set up boundaries 
between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, 
which they call  “the land of the barbarians.” In other words, this  universal 
practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is “ours” and an 
unfamiliar  space  beyond  “ours”  which  is  “theirs”  is  a  way  of  making 
geographical  distinctions  that  can  be entirely  arbitrary.  I  use  the  word 
“arbitrary” here because imaginative geography of “our land-barbarian land” 
variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is 
291 Cox, Robert W. ‘Thinking about civilizations’ in Review of International Studies, 26, 5. December 
2000., pp. 217-234, p. 217; see pp. 217-219 for the historical context of ‘civilisation’ in the English 
language.
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enough for “us” to set up these boundaries in our own minds; “they” become 
“they” accordingly  and both  their  territory and mentality  are  designated as 
different from “ours”.292
By referring to what is “ours” or the “self” as civilisation and to what is “theirs” or the 
“other” as not civilised, or barbarian, the “other” is demonised. In the case of Iranian 
national identity, the ‘demonised enemy’ is not only an international actor, but also within 
Iran. The “enemy” or “other” in the Islamist discourse is the Iranist discourse and vice 
versa. Furthermore, a discourse that refers to one’s culture in terms of civilisation creates 
not only a ‘self-other’ dynamic internally, but also externally. In other words, the “other” 
is also that which is not Iran. Although the West is referred to in terms of civilisation, it is 
perceived to be not as advanced as Islamic/Iranian civilisation in cultural terms.
Similarly, how culture is used can also illustrate the ‘self-other’ dynamic. Said, in Culture 
and Imperialism, argues:
In time, culture comes to be associated often aggressively, with the nation or the 
state;  this  differentiates  “us”  from  “them”,  always  with  some  degree  of 
xenophobia. Culture in this sense is a source of identity, and a rather combative 
one at that, as we see in recent “returns” to culture and tradition. These “returns” 
accompany rigorous codes of intellectual and moral behaviours that are opposed 
to  the permissiveness associated with such relatively liberal philosophies as 
multiculturalism and hybridity. In the formerly colonised world, these “returns” 
have produced varieties of religious and nationalist fundamentalism.293 
While this definition is problematic because it assumes that a nation or state has one 
culture,  it  does reflect how national identity is  articulated in the Islamist and Iranist 
discourses. In their claim to authenticity, both discourses can be considered as ‘“returns” 
to culture and tradition’. However, the ‘culture and tradition’ is contested; for one the 
“authentic” or “true” culture and civilisation is Īrānīyat, for the other it is Īslāmīyat. To 
this end, Cox argues:
Civilisation is something we carry in our heads which guides our understanding 
of  the  world;  and for  different peoples this  understanding is  different. The 
common sense of one people is different from that of another and their notions 
of reality differ.294
For those articulating the discourse, civilisation, and also culture, may be very much a 
reality, a truth. In the case of the discourses of national identity under discussion here, 
civilisation is constructed as part of the basis of ideology and is one of the guiding forces 
in the construction of the nation and its identity. However, what happens when a country 
like Iran is perceived to have two civilisations to say the least needs to be addressed. 
292 Said, Edward. Orientalism: Western Perceptions of the Orient. London: Penguin Books, 1978. p. 54
293 Op. cit. Said 1993, pp. xiii-xiv
294 Op. cit. Cox 2000, p. 220
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Furthermore,  how  the  two  civilisations  are  negotiated  also  needs  to  be  taken  into 
consideration. As Cox asserts, ‘it may even be that a single individual has to reconcile 
within him or herself the perspectives and the claims of two different civilisations’.295 
These issues will be explored in the coming chapters.
Crucial to the discussion of the meanings attached to culture and civilisation is whether it 
is perceived to be fluid or static. Hall raises this issue in his discussion of the Caribbean 
experience. On the one hand, culture is perceived, as Hall points out, but does not contend 
himself, as ‘one true self … which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in 
common’. He elaborates saying that this perception provides ‘unchanging and continuous 
frames of  reference and meaning’.296 However,  Hall  also  offers  another approach to 
culture:
This second position [of cultural identity] recognises that, as well as the many 
points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep significant difference 
which constitute “what we really are”; or rather - since history has intervened – 
“what we have become”. We cannot speak for very long, with any exactness, 
about “one experience, one identity”, without acknowledging its other side – the 
ruptures and discontinuities … Cultural identity in this … sense, is a matter of 
“becoming” as well as “being”.297
In other words, while the previous reference describes culture as static, in the above 
reference, in contrast to this, culture is fluid. Although these approaches are in relation to 
the post-colonial experiences of the Caribbean community, they are relevant to the Iranian 
case. This is the approach adopted by both the Islamist and Iranist discourses to the role 
of culture and civilisation in the construction of national identity. Culture is perceived in 
terms of the static ‘one true self’, rather than something more fluid. The contestation 
occurs because there are different perceptions  of  the ‘one true self’;  the “authentic” 
culture is contested. Despite the perception of culture, civilisation and nation as static in 
the  context of  the  Iranist  and  Islamist discourses,  it  is  necessary  to  assert  that  the 
contention here is that these notions are fluid and social constructions.
1.21.2 Īslāmīyat   and Īranīyat   
While the similarity of the Iranist and Islamist discourses is the approach to culture and 
civilisation, the difference between them is based on what is considered Iran’s authentic 
culture and civilisation -  Īslāmīyat or  Īrānīyat.  It  is  worth pointing out  here that on 
occasion in the texts these terms will refer to civilisation and on others to culture. Īrānīyat 
literally means being Iranian, but is understood as being Iranian in terms of Iran’s pre-
295 Ibid. p. 220
296  Op. cit. Hall 1990, p. 223
297 Ibid., p. 225
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Islamic culture. However, Iran’s pre-Islamic existence was vast. Consequently,  Īrānīyat 
can essentially be used to refer to Parthian, Sasanian or Achaemenid Iran, among others. 
Īrānīyat, as will be illustrated in the third section of this chapter, is not a monolith.
Īslāmīyat literally means being Islamic, or being Muslim. But, in Iran, as everywhere else 
in the world, being Muslim or Īslāmīyat means such different things to different people. 
The terms Īslāmī or hizbullāhi (literally ‘of the party of God’) are often used to refer to 
those  who are  or  are  or  are  suspected of  being politically  Islamic; in  other  words, 
associated with the government or following the Islamic principles of the government. 
They are dawlatī (of the state), or Islamic in a political way. This correlates with Islamist, 
rather than Muslim, in the English language. Those who are considered to be Muslim in a 
religious, rather than secular, sense are often referred to as m’umin (believer) or bā ‘itiqād 
(with belief). These labels refer to those who have belief in Islam but do not consider 
Islam in political terms. Both groups may wear the chador298, but do not necessarily have 
the same attitude towards the role of Islam in society. The chador is often used in British 
media  as  the  symbol  of  the  Islamic  Revolution  and  consequently  has  political 
connotations.  This  is  an inaccurate image. While  many who do wear the chador are 
considered to have or do have political allegiance with the government, many reject Islam 
as a political concept. Thus, just as the conceptualisation of Islam is contested299, so is 
Īrānīyat as will be explored in more detail below.
Comments such as ‘Iran before Muslim’; ‘We are only Muslim because we were born 
here; if we were born somewhere else we would be something else’; and ‘Islam isn’t our 
religion, it comes from the Arabs … History is our identity’, illustrate that there is a very 
real  sense  of  the  issue  of  Īrānīyat and  Īslāmīyat in  Iranian identity.  The  first  two 
statements come  from  two  Iranian  women  who  pray  regularly,  go  on  pilgrimage, 
including to Mecca and would not wear hejab in public if they were not obliged to. The 
final statement is from an Iranian man who prays regularly and fasts. The point here is 
that there is an interesting combination of Īrānīyat and Īslāmīyat; the division between the 
two aspects of Iranian identity for many are not clear-cut, nor is it the case that being 
Muslim is necessarily political. 
The perceived dichotomy of Īrānīyat and Īslāmīyat and how the two are balanced in the 
constructions of Iranian identity is by no means unique to the Khatami period and is an 
issue that has been somewhat discussed in both in the literature on the subject of Iranian 
national identity, but also in non-academic spaces. The discussion considers whether the 
298 The chador is a traditional Iranian covering worn by women
299 Op. cit. Ansari. Islam, Iran and Democracy. 2000, p. 17
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two are at all compatible and what it means to be Iranian. For example, Ahmadi has 
addressed the issue of Īrānīyat and Īslāmīyat in some detail. In his article ‘Religion and 
Nationhood in Iran’ he points out that the discussion of  Īrānīyat and  Īslāmīyat existed 
before  the  Islamic  Revolution300;  Afshin  Matin-Asgari  asks:  ‘why  should  our 
understanding of Iran, or any society, be so contingent on its being Islamic?’301 Boroujerdi 
critiques ‘heritage-ism’, which is similar to the Iranist construction used here, and the role 
of historians for helping its creation.302 This critique will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Six. The aim of this chapter is to examine the meanings attached to Īslāmīyat and 
Īrānīyat in the Islamist and Iranist discourses during the Khatami period and how they are 
used to construct Iranian national identity.
In historical terms, the Pahlavi regime prioritised  Īrānīyat at the expense of  Īslāmīyat. 
The dominant discourse of the Islamic Revolution, at least until Khatami’s presidency, 
has been the prioritisation of  Īslāmīyat at the expense of  Īrānīyat. As Ahmadi argues, 
Īrānīyat  was  ‘made ideological’ at  the  expense of  the  ‘spiritual  element  of  Iranian 
identity’, in other words Īslāmīyat. With the Islamic Revolution, he argues, Īrānīyat or in 
his  words,  huvīyat-i  millī –  national  identity,  rather  than  religious  identity  –  was 
weakened.303 Furthermore,  the  polarisation  of  Īrānīyat and  Īslāmīyat can  be  partly 
attributed to the restriction on the public articulation of national identity, whether by the 
Pahlavi regime or by the Islamic Revolution. This is a natural reaction and is reflected on 
more than one occasion in Iran’s history. For example, as was illustrated in the previous 
chapter,  the work of Al-e Ahmad and Shari‘ati can be considered as reactions to the 
official or public exclusion of Islam by the Pahlavis among other things. Another example 
is the visible resistance to the Islamist regime by young women in urban areas, reflected 
in how they wear the rū sarī (headscarf) and māntaw. Thus, it is the hegemonic nature of 
the constructions that has caused a polarised clash between Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat. Thus, 
the continued perceived clash between the two cultures can be partly attributed to the 
extreme nature of politics during the Pahlavi era and since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
1.21.3 Tradition and Modernity  
Another recurring theme in the discussion of national identity is the issue of tradition and 
modernity. How tradition and modernity are defined is a complex issue. While it is not the 
300 Op. cit. Ahmadi. ‘Huvīyat-i Millī-yi Īrān’. 1383 (2004/2005), pp. 194-195
301 Matin-Asgari, Afshin. ‘The Rise of Modern Subjectivity in Iran’ Critique, 14, 3, Fall 2005, pp. 333-
337, p. 333 
302 Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. ‘Contesting Nationalist Construction of Iranian Identity’ Critique, 7, 12, January 
1998, pp. 43-55, pp. 45-46
303 Op. cit. Ahmadi. ‘Dīn va Millīyat dar Īrān’. 1383 (2004/2005), p. 87
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aim here to engage with the existing literature that addresses tradition and modernity in 
Iran, the aim is to illustrate how notions of tradition and modernity come up in relation to 
how national identity is constructed, often in contradictory ways. 
A common assumption and one that is often perceived as a natural assumption would be 
to correlate tradition with Islam. However, this is an uncomfortable correlation. While 
there are certainly aspects of Islam that are traditional in the sense of original or old, this 
is not always the case. If a linear approach is adopted, that is to consider tradition as old 
and  modern as  new,  the  association  between  Islam  and  tradition  does  not  follow. 
Following this argument would mean that the more modern you are the more you have 
taken on the new. With particular reference to the issue of national identity, this can be 
understood in terms of adopting characteristics that are new to your identity,  such as 
taking  on  a  new belief  system,  adapting  language to  accommodate new words,  or 
adopting a new form of dress brought in from somewhere else. The problem with this 
approach is  how far one goes back. According to this approach, in the case of Iran, 
traditional identity may be considered the aspects of identity from the time of the Medes 
or the Elamites of antiquity. An alternative approach considers modernity as synonymous 
with Western and modernisation as Westernisation. This is an approach often adopted by 
Islamist and  anti-imperialist  discourses. Finally,  modernity  is  also  seen  in  terms of 
“progress”.
1.22 Islamist Discourse of National Identity
The overarching ideology embedded in the Islamist construction of national identity is 
political Islam. As is the case with many other Islamist movements or ideologies, Islam 
represents an “authentic” culture and therefore identity. It is also perceived as a means of 
resisting imperialism and regaining “progress” or an “advanced” society. It must be noted, 
however, that Islamism here not only means political Islam, but also the prioritisation or 
tendency towards Islam as opposed to any other identity or heritage. Despite the different 
understandings of being Muslim in Iranian society, the Īslāmīyat of the Islamist discourse 
is a politicised approach to Islam that only accepts one understanding of Islam. In terms 
of the definitions outlined above, they are considered by many as Īslāmī and also by some 
as distorting Islam. 
During Khatami’s presidency the Islamist discourse of national identity is embodied in 
and articulated through the  sermons and speeches of  the  Islamic Republic  of  Iran’s 
Supreme Leader,  Ayatollah  Seyyed Ali  Khamene’i,  among other  places. It  could  be 
argued that  Khamene'i  is  the  symbol the  Islamist discourse. He represents the more 
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conservative elements of the Islamic Republic. Although the Islamist discourse is a state 
discourse, it would be inaccurate to argue that it does not have popular support. As will be 
reflected in the section on the Iranist discourse of national identity and in the following 
two chapters,  there is  considerable resistance to  the  Islamist construction  of  Iranian 
national identity. 
It is the contention of Wilfried Buchta that the Islamic revolutionary leadership is divided 
into two main ideological factions. This is reflected in the main political factions: ‘the 
Islamic left (chap-i Īslāmī), the traditionalist right (rāst-i sunnatī), and the modernist right 
(rāst-i mudirn)’.304 However, with the creation of the Islamic Iran Participation Front who 
support Khatami, the label the modern left (chap-i mudirn) was added to refer to ‘its 
openness  to  all  reform-orientated forces’.  Ayatollah  Khamene'i is  positioned  in  the 
traditionalist right as a member of the Militant Clergy Association, the strongest group.305 
The Militant Clergy Association takes its legitimacy from  vilāyat-i faqīh and is more 
concerned with the continued existence of Islam and Islamic scholars than with the notion 
of the people’s will or constitution.306 It is worth mentioning that Khamene'i does not have 
the  title  of  ayatollah  ‘uzma (grand ayatollah) as  was  the  case with  his  predecessor 
Khomeini. For this reason, Khamene'i is unable to be a proper marja‘-i taqlīd and thus 
cannot lay claim to the Shi'i world’s highest religious authority. Buchta presents this as 
Khamene’i’s theological Achilles’ heel.307
This section is divided into two parts: ‘The Prioritisation and Politicisation of Īslāmīyat’ 
and ‘Occidentalism and Anti-imperialism’. The focus of the first is on the ‘self’ and how 
it is constructed. The way in which Īslāmīyat is embedded in the construction of Iranian 
national identity is demonstrated. The second turns to how the ‘other’ is constructed.
1.22.1 The Prioritisation and Politicisation of  Īslāmīyat  
The construction of the ‘self’ is reflected in how Īslāmīyat is both prioritised as the basis 
of  Iranian  national  identity  by  excluding  Īrānīyat,  and  also  how  it  is  politicised. 
Furthermore, as will be illustrated, the ‘self’ is also constructed in terms of civilisation. 
Thus, in many ways the Iranian nation is synonymous with  Īslāmīyat,  nizām-i Īslāmī 
(Islamic political system) and Islamic civilisation.
304 Buchta, Wilfried. Who rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. Washington DC: 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000. p. 11
305 Ibid., p. 13 See pp. 13-16 for more detail on significant members of this group and the several 
associations that form its membership.
306 Ibid., p. 15
307 Ibid., p. 53
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Khamene'i is very clear about the relationship between Islam, nation and culture. In The 
Cultural  Viewpoints  of  the  Leader of  the  Islamic  Revolution  of  Iran (published  in 
English), culture is defined as encompassing the ‘memories, mentalities, thoughts, beliefs, 
faiths,  traditions,  and  intellectual,  mental  reserves of  a  nation.’308 Furthermore,  ‘the 
identity of every nation is determined by its culture.’309 Bearing these convictions in mind, 
it is possible to interpret the following extract as a definition of Iranian national identity:
Islam is the most important pillar of our national culture. Today, the Iranian 
nation is proud of the fact that after the passage of fourteen centuries its culture, 
language and customs intermingled with Islam. Islamic culture, customs and 
practices are part of our culture and in this regard, being national is tantamount 
to being Islamic and these two aspects never confront each other.310
Here,  Khamene'i outlines the relationship between Islam and  Iran’s  national identity. 
Three points can be made with regard to this. First of all, it  is evident that as far as 
Khamene’i is concerned, the nation is synonymous with Islam alone. Thus, this statement 
reflects the  absolute  prioritisation  of  Īslāmīyat and  the  exclusion  of  Īrānīyat  in  the 
construction of national identity. Secondly, this is precisely the type of culture Hall is 
criticising; the Islamist discourse of national identity is based on a perception of culture 
that is ‘one true self’. Essentially, their way is the only way and to move away from that 
is  simply  a  digression  from the  “true”  and  “authentic” Iranian national  identity.  If 
Fairclough’s approach is used, the discourse of national identity can be considered to be 
effectively articulating  or  communicating  an  ideology  in  that  it  has  established  its 
assumptions about how the Iranian nation is constructed as common sense.311
The third point is that this statement also reflects the hegemonic nature of the Islamist 
discourse; the very exclusion of Īrānīyat in itself has a hegemonic nature. The following 
statement elaborates on the hegemony of the Islamist discourse. Khamene'i states: ‘No 
strong system can create these values and ethical norms in society unless it succeeds in 
reforming and rectifying the culture and attitude of the people.’312 Since ‘Islam is the most 
important pillar  of [Iran’s]  national culture’, it  is  assumed that  society’s  ‘values and 
ethical norms’ are those of Islam. While the ideological nature of Islam is evident, it is 
also perceived as  an all-encompassing system of ideas. Furthermore, the extract also 
suggests that  Īslāmīyat must play a role in reforming the people. Thus, the hegemonic 
308 Op. cit. Khamene’i  2000. p. 3
309 Ibid., p. 13
310 Ibid., p. 7
311 Op. cit. Fairclough 1989, p. 77
312 Op.cit. Khamene’i 2000 , p. 4
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nature of the discourse is also clear; Islam is the means of ‘political, cultural and moral 
leadership’313 over other groups and identities. 
However, it is worth mentioning here that while the Islamist discourse of national identity 
is hegemonic in its approach to the expected culture and values of the people or millat, it 
is also counter-hegemonic in more than one way. On one level, the Islamist discourse 
resists the Iranist discourse of national identity. On another, it resists the Islamist-Iranian 
discourse, and on a third level it resists the perceived hegemony of the West or Western 
civilisation. The issue of counter-hegemony will be dealt with in more detail below.
In addition to the hegemonic nature, the exclusive nature of Khamene'i’s construction of 
Iranian national identity must be stressed. Not only does he impose Islam as a means of 
‘reforming and rectifying the culture and the attitude of the people’, but he also uses it as 
the basis for the national culture. Iran is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country and 
although the majority are Muslim, some are Jewish, Christian, Bahai and Zoroastrian. 
Khamene'i explicitly excludes these groups. For this reason, Khamene'i’s construction can 
really only be considered as an aspiration of what the identity of the  millat should be, 
regardless of whether the millat identifies itself as such.
As has been mentioned, the notion of civilisation is very important in the construction of 
Iranian nation identity. In the case of the Islamist discourse of national identity Iran as a 
nation is often perceived in terms of Islamic civilisation or even as synonymous with 
Islamic  civilisation.  There  are  several  meanings  attached  to  this  idea  of  Islamic 
civilisation. The following extract is from a speech given by Khamene'i on 7 November 
2000 at  one of the Qom  huwzih314,  Fayziyih,  to students,  researchers, and professors. 
Fayziyih, founded during the Safavid dynasty, is the focal point of the Qom huwzih. He 
states:
without doubt Islamic civilisation is able to enter the arena of mankind with that 
same method of the great civilisations of history and take possession of a region, 
small  or  large,  and  meet  the  needs  of  their  blessing  or  hardship;  Islamic 
civilisation is also able to overcome this complicated, long and difficult process 
to reach that point. Of course Islamic civilisation will only exist completely in 
the era of the appearance of the hidden imam. In the era of appearance, the true 
Islamic civilisation and the true Islamic world will come into existence.315
313 Op. cit. Forgacs, p. 194
314 A huwzih is a religious centre that often has several theological colleges.
315 Khamene’i, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali. ‘Bayānat-i Rahbar-i Mu‘azam-i Inqilāb-i Īslāmī dar Ijtima‘a-i 
Tulāb, Pizhuhishgarān, va Asātīd-i  Huwzih-yi ‘Ilmī-yi  dar Madrisih-yi Qom’ (‘The Speech of the 
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution at a Meeting of Students, Researchers, and Professors of 
the Huwzih-yi ‘Ilmī-yi  Qom at the Fayziyyeh School’) 14 Aban 1379  (7 November 2000). in 
Khamene’i, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali, 1380 (2001). Kalām-i Vilāyat-i Tarīq-i Hidāyat: Bayānat-i Rahbār-i 
Mu‘azam-i Inqilāb-i Īslāmī Hizarat-i Ayatullah Aluzma Khamene’i. (A Speech by the Supreme Leader of the 
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The  reference  to  ‘the  appearance of  the  hidden  imam’ demonstrates that  Islamic 
civilisation is essentially one of Shi‘ism rather than Islam as a whole. Thus, the discourse 
is not only exclusive in the sense that it is only Īslāmīyat that is considered as the base of 
Iranian national identity, but it is in fact only Shi‘ism. However, a point that must be 
raised here, taking into consideration the argument that the Safavids Iranianised Islam, as 
mentioned in Chapter Two, is the extent to which this Shi‘i Īslāmīyat is in fact Iranian. In 
this case, as was the case with the discourses of Al-e Ahmad and Shari‘ati, the division 
between Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat are not so clearly defined. Furthermore, it is also evident 
that the aspirations of civilisation are not restricted to the current territorial boundaries of 
Iran.  As will  be illustrated in  the following chapter,  this  is  similar to  the notion of 
civilisation  articulated  by  Khatami.  However,  Khatami’s  articulation  of  Iran  as  a 
civilisation is not explicitly based on Īslāmīyat. Ironically, neither is Khamene'i’s Islamic 
civilisation dissimilar to the notion of civilisation articulated by the Iranist discourse of 
national identity in the sense that it is not restricted to the current territorial boundaries of 
Iran. 
The final point to be made here is with regard to the context of the speech. It must be 
mentioned that the audience here are those who attend the seminaries in Qom, thus the 
terminology and ideas are adapted accordingly. The link between Islamic civilisation and 
the return of  the hidden imam are not  necessarily views that  would  be accepted or 
tolerated by an audience in other contexts. It is also possible that Khamene'i is illustrating 
his legitimacy as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is significant 
since,  as  Buchta  argues,  there  is  ‘resistance to  …  Khamene’i’s  claim  to  religious 
autocracy’. He also argues that the huwzih in Qom is ‘one of the strongest bulwarks’ of 
this resistance.316
Having illustrated how Īslāmīyat is prioritised, it will now be demonstrated how it is also 
politicised. In other words, Īslāmīyat, or Islamic culture and heritage, is politicised and it 
is this politicisation that is the basis of the Iranian nation, i.e. not only Islam in a non-
political dimension. The political interpretation of  Īslāmīyat is evident in the following 
extract from a speech given to a group of young people in Isfahan on 3 November 2001. 
Khamene'i states:
The countries of the world normally stress the concept of nationality (millīyat); 
some place stress on ethnicity. What is nationality? It is a collective identity that 
with  its  enjoyment,  every  country  is  able  to  use  to  its  own  ability  for 
advancement and success. …  [The]  national  and  collective  identity  in  our 
Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamene'i). Tehran: Zafar, 1380 (2001).  pp. 7-52, pp. 13-14
316 Op. cit. Buchta 2000, p. 86
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country has an even higher [status] than nationality.  … [T]he collective and 
national identity of the nation of Iran is the Islamic system (nizam-i Īslāmī) 
which is even more … attractive and influential than Iranian nationality. The 
importance of this collective identity is influential on the level of being Iranian 
…, it  is  also influential  on the Islamic level, also on the global scale  it  is 
influential;  that  is,  it  is  something  no  other  nations  have;  it  is  something 
transnational … it is trans-Islamic. The circle of some transnational slogans is 
limited.  For  example Arabs  stress  Arab  identity  and  nationalism  or  Arab 
ethnicity;  but  first  of  all  this  identity  is  limited  to  Arab circles and is  not 
applicable beyond them; secondly, being Arab (‘arabiyyat) is an existence that 
does not have a trans-nationality ideal that is attractive to the other nations of 
the world …. . The Islamic system has a national application. It also has an 
Islamic application, and also a global application, that is, it is trans-Islamic.317
This  extract  is  particularly  interesting  because  several  values  and  ideologies  are 
embedded in Khamene’i’s use of language regarding the Iranian nation and therefore also 
in how he constructs Iranian national identity. The first point of interest is his reference to 
nizām-i Īslāmī. It is unambiguous that nizām -i Īslāmī or Islamic system is tantamount to 
national identity. Therefore, Īslāmīyat is political in the sense that it is synonymous with a 
particular political system. Not only is Īslāmīyat politicised, it is also superior to Īrānīyat. 
This is reflected in the discussion on millīyat. As has been mentioned in Chapter Two this 
has several meanings. Here it is translated as ‘nationality’ and it is to be understood as 
Īrānīyat as opposed to  religion (dīn) or  Īslāmīyat. This meaning is further clarified by 
Khamene'i’s statement that ‘this national and collective identity in our country has an 
even higher [status] than nationality’. Thus, it is clear that millīyat is not to be understood 
as nationality in the English language sense, or as citizenship. Therefore,  Īslāmīyat is 
more superior to Īrānīyat. 
Once again, the hegemonic nature of the Islamist discourse of national identity is shown 
in this extract. In this case, it is embedded in the construction of Iranian national identity 
as  a  transnational  identity  and  its  assumed superiority  over  Arabs and  being  Arab. 
Parallels can be drawn between the notions of ‘trans-Islamic’ and Islamic civilisation, as 
mentioned above. The Islamic identity of the Iranian nation is one based on that which 
goes beyond its current territorial borders. This also suggests that, in Khamene’i’s eyes, 
the Iranian nation, as an Islamic nation, is superior to other nations because its identity 
transcends its borders. Khamene’i’s reference to ‘trans-Islamic’ not only illustrates the 
perception that an Iranian national identity based on Īslāmīyat is more influential, but it is 
also superior to other Islamic identities. The final point is that it is evident that the identity 
of the Iranian nation is also constructed in relation to Arab identity, which is seemingly 
317 Khamene’i, Seyyed Ali. Kalām-i Vilāyat-i Nūrhidāyat: Sukhanrānī-yi Muqām-i Mu‘azam-i Rahbāri dar 
Jāmi’i Javānān-i Isfihān, 12 Ābān 1380 (The Supreme Leader’s speech to a group of young people in 
Isfahan, 3 November 2001) (no publisher given), 1380 (2001). pp. 12-13
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less appealing and  less powerful because it  is  not  appreciated on  the several levels 
mentioned previously. 
As has already been mentioned, while the Islamist discourse of national identity has a 
hegemonic function it is also counter-hegemonic. This is reflected in the following extract 
from the  same  speech as  those  above,  which illustrates  resistance to  the  perceived 
hegemony of a system of government based on monarchy. Khamene’i states: 
The  importance of  the  Islamic system (nizām-i Īslāmī)  is  because it  is  the 
permanent system fixed system with roots that came into existence by the hand 
of the people themselves; it is not a system imposed on the people; it is against 
the  ideology  of  monarchy.  Monarchy  has  one  ideology;  the  ideology  of 
monarchy is that same thing that you witness among all the monarchies of the 
world in its [different] types; that is despotism.318
In this  speech Khamene'i is  justifying the  nizām-i Īslāmī to the youth of Isfahan by 
presenting it in such a way that shows that the system of government was that chosen by 
the people during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Worthy of mention here, however, is 
that the ideals of the Islamic Revolution are contested, as will be illustrated in the analysis 
of Khatami’s discourse. The resistance to monarchy not only illustrates a rejection of a 
particular system of government, but also a rejection of the what monarchy in the case of 
Iran symbolises – the Pahlavi regime and an Iranist interpretation of national identity. As 
has been addressed in the previous chapter, the Pahlavi regime was Iranist in the sense 
that it excluded Īslāmīyat in the construction of Iranian national identity. 
In sum, Īslāmīyat represents a number of values that are embedded in the construction of 
Iranian national identity. These are reflected in how Iran as a nation is considered as 
synonymous with  nizām-i Īslāmī and Islamic civilisation. To this  end, an appropriate 
statement to end this section is one given by Khamene’i in the speech at the  Fayziyih 
seminary in Qom: ‘The general direction of the Islamic system is to achieve an Islamic 
civilization.’319 Thus, the aim of the political apparatus, which gains its legitimacy from 
the meanings attached to  Īslāmīyat,  is  to achieve Khamene'i's construction of Islamic 
civilisation which is loaded with the above mentioned values. 
1.22.2 Occidentalism and Anti-imperialism  
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that the ‘self’ in this Islamist discourse is 
largely constructed on the basis of ideas associated with a particular notion of Islamic 
civilisation.  The  purpose of  this  section,  therefore,  is  to  address how the  ‘other’ is 
constructed. This is essentially the West. As will be illustrated, the way in which the West 
318 Ibid., pp. 13-14
319 Op. cit. Khamene’i. Qom. 14 Aban 1379 (7 November 2000), p. 11
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is constructed is typical of Occidentalist discourse. Furthermore, the attitude towards the 
West is based on anti-imperialist sentiment. Before deconstructing selected texts, it is first 
necessary to briefly address the notion of Occidentalism. 
In his analysis of interviews carried out with four Islamist movements in the Arab Middle 
East, Sadiki discusses the notion of Occidentalism.  Drawing on Ibrahim Abu-Lughod’s 
Arab Rediscovery of the West and Keddie’s An Islamic Response to Imperialism, Sadiki 
points out:
[there is a] strong contrast made between the “West” as a secular mechanistic, 
technological culture and the “East” as a culture dominated by “the spirit” of 
Islam. … Just as the “West” defines the “East” as the exotic, seductive, magical 
“other”, the “East” has defined the “West” as the material, mechanistic “other”, 
completely lacking the vital  spirit  of  Divine Revelation.  Each considers the 
other through these stereotypes and defines them by what they do not possess.320 
As will be demonstrated, this ideology is embedded in how Khamene'i constructs the 
West.  Sadiki  also suggests  that  ‘Islamist representations  of  the West  are  not  always 
derived from some Islamist discourse that constructs the West in the way Orientalism 
produced and continues to produce the Orient.’ Rather,  it  the case that ‘many of the 
essentialist  “Occidentalist”  views  …  are  based  on  self-constructions  and  self-
representations of and by the “West” to the “non-West”’.321 This is a very interesting point. 
However, this is not addressed in relation to the Islamist discourse under discussion here. 
It would, nevertheless, be an interesting research subject for the future.  
Just as the ‘self’ is constructed in terms of a civilisation, so is the ‘other’. However, the 
characteristics attributed  to  the  two  civilisations  are  far  from similar.  The  ‘self’ is 
spiritual, whereas the ‘other’ is materialistic. This is reflected on a number of occasions. 
The  first  extract  is  taken  from Khamene'i’s  speech at  the  inaugural  session  of  the 
Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference (OIC)  in  December 1997.  He  states:  ‘The 
materialistic Western civilisation is leading mankind toward materialism, which portrays 
money, sensuality and voracity as the main goals of life.’322 The West has been defined as 
the  ‘materialistic  other’  and  therefore  typical  of  Occidentalist  discourse.  The 
essentialisation of  the West  is  unmistakable;  the  image of  the West  is  simplified by 
representing it as a monolithic entity. Its overarching identity is that it is materialistic. The 
320 Op. cit. Sadiki, p. 109
321 Ibid., p. 96
322 Khamene’i, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali. Leader’s speech at Inaugural Ceremony of 8th Summit of OIC. 9 
December 1997. http://www.khamenei.ir/EN/Speech/detail.jsp?id=19971209A – date accessed 7 May 
2007
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following extract from The Cultural Viewpoints of the Leader of the Islamic Republic of  
Iran juxtaposes the identities of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Khamene'i states: 
Iran lags behind the West in industry and modern technological know-how. But 
it  does not lag behind it  in culture. We are not behind the West in cultural 
heritage. Our literature, poetry, prose, and overall our culture – national culture 
– do not have any shortcoming.323
While there is recognition of Iran’s lack of progress in relation to the West, Iran remains 
superior because it has culture; the West only has ‘industry and modern technological 
know-how’. 
The following extract, also from The Cultural Viewpoints of the Leader of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran,  provides the intellectual and historical heritage to this Occidentalist 
Islamist discourse. Khamene'i states: 
If the culture, morality, beliefs and convictions of the enemies and aliens are 
spread among a nation, such a nation, despite independence in political and 
economic affairs, cannot claim to  be independent. A human society can be 
considered independent only when it can immunise itself against the poisonous 
cultural waves created by aliens.324
Here, there is a clear rejection and essentialisation of the West. This approach to Iran is 
not unique to the Khatami period. Rather, it is reminiscent of Jalal Al-e Ahmad and his 
Gharbzadagī or Westoxification published in 1962. As mentioned in Chapter Three, in his 
first  chapter  entitled  ‘Diagnosing  an  Illness’  Al-e  Ahmad  compares  gharbzadagī 
(translated into the English as ‘occidentosis’)  with tuberculosis  and an infestation of 
weevils. His point is that gharbzadagī is a disease that requires a diagnosis and hopefully 
a cure.325 Al-e Ahmad’s Islamic discourse is also significant in that it was influenced by 
the  belief  that  Shi‘ism,  since  the  Safavid  dynasty,  ‘had  become  an  indispensable 
component of Iranian identity’.326 It is also worth mentioning that the Occidentalist nature 
of the discourse is also reminiscent of that of Shari‘ati. This is evident in the binary nature 
of the perceived relationship between Iran and the West. 
Also  mentioned in  Chapter Three and worthy of  mention here, Boroujerdi identifies 
Gharbzadagī as a crucial point in the discussion by intellectuals of the ‘West as other’ and 
that it gave birth to a discourse, which he contends was ‘the modern Iranian articulation 
of  nativism’.327 In  other  words,  this  is  the  re-establishment of  what  is  perceived as 
323 Op. cit. Khamene'i 2000, p. 7
324 Ibid., p. 7
325 Op. cit. Al-i Ahmad , p. 27
326 Op. cit. Boroujerdi 1996, p. 72
327 Ibid., p. 53
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authentic  culture.  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  Boroujerdi  argues  that  ‘xenophobic 
nationalism, a conspiratorial mind-set, a garrison-state mentality, and unqualified anti-
Westernism are come of the end products of the nativist discourse.’328 This has certainly 
been evident in the above extracts. 
Both Khamene'i and Al-e Ahmad perceive any aspect of so-called Western culture as an 
illness being inflicted on the nation. Thus, what was previously, to a certain extent, a 
popular discourse, or that of part of the millat, or nation, became that of the dawlat, or 
state with the 1979 Revolution and continues to be so during Khatami’s presidency. In the 
case of Khamene’i, it is the view of part of the state authority, whereas in Al-e Ahmad’s 
case it  is  representative of a discourse resisting the state, namely that of the Pahlavi 
regime. The resistance to the ideals of the Pahlavi regime also continue with Khamene'i, 
this has been illustrated above in relation to the perception of monarchy.
A fundamental  value attached to  how the West  is  constructed is  the notion of  anti-
imperialism. Thus, the trend of anti-imperialism as a crucial factor in the construction of 
Iranian national identity continues during the Khatami period. In the Islamist construction 
of Iranian national identity, an anti-imperialist attitude towards the West is essential in 
order to preserve the “authenticity” of the Iran nation, which is based on  Īslāmīyat. In 
other words, anything that hinders or contaminates  Īslāmīyat is  considered an enemy 
because it endangers its authenticity and independence. Both the historical interaction 
outlined above and the essentialisation of the West have become a justification as well as 
a reason for an anti-imperialist discourse reflected both in the rhetoric and actions of parts 
of the Iranian government. An example of this is evident in the speech at the inaugural 
session of the OIC. Khamene'i states:
Unfortunately,  during the  past  two  centuries,  the  plots  of  the  enemies and 
inefficiency and lack of competence of some Islamic states have brought the 
Islamic ’ummah to a deplorable condition. The global arrogance, motivated by 
its discriminatory and biased attitude toward mankind and using its political, 
military, economic and scientific capabilities, has played a major part in creating 
the present condition for Muslim nations. An instance of this neo-colonialism 
can be seen in the present political, economic and even military campaign of the 
global arrogance led by the United States against the Islamic ’ummah.329
In  this  case, through the reference to  the Islamic ’ummah,  Khamene'i is  once again 
illustrating how Iran’s national identity is transnational. However, unlike the construction 
reflected in the above speech in Qom, the idea here is more inclusive; it is the Islamic 
’ummah as a whole, rather than those who follow Shi‘ism. Clearly, since this speech is at 
328 Ibid., p. 19
329 Op. cit. Khamene’i 9 December 1997. 
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the OIC, references to Islamic civilisation based on Shi‘ism would not be welcome. Not 
only does Khamene'i justify legitimacy by referring to the Islamic ’ummah as a whole, 
but he also implies that they are all  – the Islamic ’ummah - facing ‘neo-colonialism’ 
together. This notion of ‘neo-colonialism’ is also stressed in the speech in Qom when 
Khamene'i states that Western civilisation removes all culture and civilisations that stand 
in its way through ‘materialist power and capitalism on the one hand and military and 
political power on the other hand’.330
This ever-present historical consciousness can be seen as a reason for the obsession with 
the possibility  of the enemy from outside taking hold within as well as strong anti-
imperialist sentiments. The discourse of the fear of the external enemy and its possible 
impact on national interests is reflected in a speech by Hussein Shari‘atmadari, Director 
of the newspaper Kayhān, at a meeting with the national-wide Islamic political student 
groups  at  Azad  University.  It  is  reported  in  Kayhān on  4  October  2000  that 
Shari‘atmadari discusses the role and duty of Iran’s press in his speech. According to 
Kayhān , Shari‘atmadari commences with a complaint that some of the media is not being 
transparent and truthful  about  their identity and how, as a result  of this, the external 
enemy can take advantage of such members of the media and thus use the media as an 
internal ‘launch pad’, presumably for an attack on national interests.  Later on in the 
speech it becomes clear that such a complaint may be in reference to Kayhān Magazine. 
Shari‘atmadari  refers  to  a  report  in  ‘Asr-i  Azādigān  Newspaper on  the  American 
foundation of  Halqih-yi Kīyān and the subsequent forming of  Kayhān  Magazine and 
Halqih-yi  Kīyān in  Iran and how the  foundation  searched for  those  opposed to  the 
Revolution and regime as it members. His comment with regard to this is that by a mere 
glimpse at the views of Soroush, a leading figure in the Kīyān School of Thought, it is 
clear that the Iran-based foundation and magazine is ‘of the same blood’ as the America-
based foundation. In his speech Shari‘atmadari also states:
One of the duties of the press is to inform the people about the individuals and 
groups that threaten religious identity and national interests. Nowadays there is 
a current that follows the foreign powers and great capitalist cartels in the name 
of Reformism which has come to the stage. Kayhān … considers alarming the 
notion of such dangers as its religious duty and the duty of the press. … But 
how can we not prefer God’s wishes and the nation’s interests over the wishes of 
the enemies of the people.331
330 Op. cit. Khamene’i. Qom. 14 Aban 1379 (7 November 2000), pp. 11-12
331 Kayhān Newspaper ‘Anyone who knows freedom as the product of second of Khordad puts the 
legitimacy of the election of Khatami under question: Hussein Shari‘atmadari at a national meeting with 
political Islamic groups at the Azad University’. 13 Mehr 1379 (4 October 2000).
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Thus, once again, the essentialisation of the West is asserted. Furthermore, the reactions 
of the newspaper Kayhān are justified in the name of preserving national interests and 
religious  identity.  It  can  be  concluded,  therefore,  that  the  basic  ideology  in  this 
construction of Iranian national identity is Īslāmīyat. However, this is contested and the 
contestation is articulated in several ways. This chapter now turns to one of the sources of 
contestation.
1.23 Iranist Discourse of National Identity
As the title of this chapter suggests, there is a polarisation of what is perceived to be 
Iran’s  “authentic”  culture.  The previous  section  dealt  with  the  Islamist  discourse of 
national identity, which can be considered to be positioned at one end of the spectrum. 
This section now turns to the Iranist discourse of national identity, which is positioned at 
the  other  end  of  the  spectrum. The  overarching ideology  embedded in  the  Iranist 
construction of Iranian national identity is that the nation should be based on Īrānīyat. In 
other words, it is the culture of pre-Islamic Iran, whether it is the territorial boundaries 
and/or what are perceived to be the values of pre-Islamic Iran, which are used in the 
construction of Iran’s national identity. Therefore the ‘self’ is constructed on the basis of 
how Īrānīyat is perceived. Thus, in sharp contrast to the Islamist discourse, the Iranist 
discourse of national identity, at its most extreme, rejects the position of Islam as part of 
Iranian national identity; rather it is the absolute prioritisation of Īrānīyat. 
As  has  been illustrated in  the  previous  chapter,  Īrānīyat has  been used by  various 
individuals and governments as the basis of Iranian national identity. Furthermore, the 
Iranist discourse did not cease to exist with the Islamic Revolution. Rather, it is the case 
that  its  position  in  society  and  the  political  arena  has  changed.  Prior  to  the  1979 
Revolution, it was very much a hegemonic state discourse, not to say that it did not exist 
outside of the state. However, post-1979 it is forced to the non-state level and to a certain 
extent  underground.  It  has  become a  counter-hegemonic discourse  in  terms  of  its 
relationship with the state discourses of national identity. Nevertheless, this discourse of 
national  identity  remains  hegemonic,  as  its  aspirations  are  hegemonic,  as  will  be 
illustrated below. 
The contention of this section is to illustrate that a discourse of national identity that is 
based on the prioritisation of  Īrānīyat and exclusion of  Īslāmīyat continues to exist in 
Iran. However, because it is no longer an officially sanctioned state discourse it is not so 
easily articulated. Thus, unlike the Islamist and Islamist-Iranian discourses of national 
identity there are no speeches, such as those of Khamene'i and Khatami, which are easily 
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available for deconstruction. Therefore, this section is based on a combination of different 
sources that have been pulled together to illustrate that Īslāmīyat is rejected by some in 
Iranian society as the basis of Iranian national identity. There is no claim that the extracts 
outlined below are representative of Iranian society. The aim, however, is to show that a 
discussion of Iranian national identity during the Khatami period cannot be based only on 
those constructions of Iranian national identity articulated on the state level; indeed the 
sub-altern has its own constructions.
This  section  illustrates  how  Īrānīyat is  used in  the  construction  of  Iranian national 
identity. In this case it is the idea of Sasanian Iran that is used for “authentic” Iranian 
culture and identity. 
1.23.1 A Rediscovery of Sasanian Iran  
The use of Sasanian Iran as the basis of “authentic” Iranian national identity is reflected in 
the discourse of  Anjuman-i Farhangi-yi Īrānzamīn - The Cultural Society of Iranzamin 
(Afraz).  The  language  used  by  Afraz illustrates  how  Īrānīyat is  embedded in  the 
construction of Iran’s national identity. Thus, it can be argued that Afraz reflects an Iranist 
discourse of national identity. Furthermore, the reference to Iranzamin, and to Iranshahr 
(below), is of particular significance because while it is Īrānīyat that is being used in the 
construction of Iranian national identity, it is not Achaemenid Iran as was the case with 
the Pahlavi shahs. This indicates a departure, in the case of this group, from the Iranist 
and Persianist discourses of the Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah.
Afraz considers itself a ‘cultural (non-political), popular (non-state)’ institution that was 
formed with the following aims:
the familiarisation of members with Iranian culture-civilisation; the revisiting of 
the religions [of one God], specifically exalted Islam; [and] the endeavour to 
understand better  the  history  of  contemporary Iran  (with  emphasis on  the 
Islamic Revolution).332
This part of Afraz’s constitution is of particular interest because it states that is it a non-
political institution; yet, the implications of its aims can be understood as political. It is 
not clear what is exactly meant by ‘Iranian culture-civilisation’. Nevertheless, the idea of 
civilisation is importance in their construction of Iranian national identity. Thus, just as is 
the case with the Islamist and Islamist-Iranian discourses, Iran is perceived in terms of 
civilisation. In addition to this, in the context of the Islamic Republic where Islam is 
considered as the “truth” and non-negotiable, any suggestion of revisiting Islam or the 
332 Asās Nāmi-yi Anjuman-i Farhangi-yi Īrānzamīn (Constitution for the Cultural Society of Iranzamin)’ 
http://www.afraz.ir/afraz%law.pdf – date accessed 11 July 2006
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Islamic Revolution is highly controversial. Taking these issues in consideration, it can be 
assumed therefore that  a  familiarisation  with  ‘Iranian culture-civilisation’ is  itself  a 
political action. Furthermore, by taking into consideration the use of Iranzamin in the 
name of Afraz, it can be assumed that it is Sasanian Iran’s culture or at least Iran’s culture 
prior to the arrival of Islam, with which the members should be familiarised.
The meanings embedded in Afraz’s construction of Iranian national identity can be further 
elaborated in their reference to Iranshahr in their newsletter. It is worth mentioning that 
due to the nature of its content it is presumably published unofficially without passing 
through the Ministry of Culture and Guidance.  The extracts, to be discussed below, are 
from the seventh edition of Afraz Newsletter and enable a better picture of the nature of 
Afraz. The following is the opening paragraph: 
Greetings to the readers of the Afraz Newsletter and salutations for naw rūz and 
entry into the New Year … this ancient Iranian celebration! Also congratulations 
for the selection of Mr Jalal Talebani as the president of the Republic of Iraq, the 
heart of Iranshahr.333 
Of particular interest here is that Iraq is considered here as the ‘the heart of Iranshahr’. 
Consequently, the belief in the notion of Iranshahr is clearly indicated. 
The idea of  Iranshahr and its  use  in  the  construction of  Iranian national  identity  is 
significant not only because of the association with Sasanian Iran, but also because it is 
linked to the debate regarding the idea of Iran. According to  Gherado Gnoli and  Josef 
Wiesehőfer, the political concept of Iran was said to have derived from the Sasanian 
period (AD 205 – 651) and their use of the term Iranshahr, which literally means ‘Empire 
of the Aryans’.334 However, it is argued that this idea of Iran has deeper roots. According 
to Wiesehőfer, the Middle Persian word Īrān can be traced back the concept ariya from 
the Achaemenid period (550 BC –  AD 330) and that  the  Sasanians constructed the 
concept of Iranshahr in  order to  legitimise their power by  linking  their reign  to the 
Achaemenids. It should be pointed out, however, as Wiesehőfer indicates, that Aryan in 
this context is not synonymous to that used by the Nazis.335 Rather, it refers to the eastern 
Iranian part of the Indo-Europeans.336 However, the idea of Iranshahr, and also Iranzamin, 
is  questioned.  Vaziri queries the notion that the labels  Iranshahr and  Iranzamin were 
333 Afraz Newsletter, Number 7, Autumn 1383 (2004) to Spring 1384 (2005), p. 1
334 Gnoli, Gherardo. The Idea of Iran. Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estermo Oriente, 1989, pp. 
175, 179, 183 and Wiesehőfer, Josef. Ancient Persia from 550 BC to 650 AD, London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 2001, p. xi
335 Ibid. Wiesehőfer, p. xi
336 The Aryans migrated from their home in southern Russia for Central Asia and eventually what is now 
Iran. For more see Olmstead, A. T. History of the Persian Empire. Chicago & London: Phoenix books, 
University of Chicago Press, 1966. pp. 16-33
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associated with an ethnic or political concept. He argues that they were initially labels 
used to name the land.337 All these arguments are refuted by A. Shapur Shahbazi in his 
article ‘The History of the Idea of Iran’. Not only does he argue that ‘Iran as a national 
entity  –  that  is,  a  country with  linguistic,  political  and ethnic identity’338 existed  in 
antiquity, but also that it originated with the Avestan period, thus pre-dating the Sasanians. 
Shahbazi’s article can also be considered as an example of the academic literature by 
Iranians or those of Iranian heritage on Iranian national identity  that subscribes to a 
particular discourse. In this case, the nature of this literature on Iranian national identity is 
prescriptive rather than analytical. Shahbazi states:
one should not ignore the fact that, once established, a national identity keeps its 
ideological conception even when the name is eclipsed by a different political 
appellation. … the collapse of the Sasanian Iranshahr in AD 650 did not end 
Iranians’ national idea.339
Here, Shahbazi refers to the idea of Iranian national identity and its perceived ‘ideological 
conception’ as a ‘fact’. Shahbazi is writing with the conviction that the idea of Iranshahr 
and the meanings attached to it  are essentially a “truth”. He proceeds to explain how 
during the Saffarid, Samanid, Buyid, and Saljuq eras, in unofficial settings, the labels 
Iranshahr and ‘Mamālik-i Īrān or ‘Iranian Lands’, which are exact translations from the 
old Avestan term Airyanąm daiŋunąm, were used.340 This is despite Iran no longer being 
the official name.
To a certain degree, the debate on the actual origins of the idea of Iran and whether or not 
it started with the Sasanians’ Iranshahr is irrelevant. What is important, however, is what 
is believed and constructed by the community in question and how that is reflected in 
their construction of Iranian national identity. In this case, Iraq is considered the centre of 
Iranshahr. This implies a construction of the Iranian nation on the basis of that of the 
Sasanian dynasty, who ruled a large part of western Asia.341 Iraq would not have been at 
the heart of the Avestan Iranshahr; Avestan geography is generally agreed to be regions of 
the eastern Iranian plateau and the Indo-Iranian border.342 Nonetheless, in the case of this 
construction, the meanings attached to these concepts are tied to both political an ethnic 
337 Op. cit. Vaziri, p. 87
338 Shahbazi, A. Shapur. ‘The History of the Idea of Iran’ in Sarkhosh Curtis, Vesta and Stewart, Sarah. 
(eds) The Idea of Iran Volume 1: Birth of the Persian Empire. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, pp. 100-
111, 2005. p. 100
339 Ibid., p. 111
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341 Morony, M. ‘Sasanids’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition (EI2), 9: 70-83
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identities. Not only is culture perceived here in terms of the pre-Islamic culture as the 
basis of national identity, but also the concept of land. As has been mentioned in Chapter 
Three with regard to the Pahlavi shahs, notions of ‘grandeur and superiority’ are attached 
to the idea of land. 343 Furthermore, because of the belief by some that Iranshahr was the 
first original political concept of Iran, it is possible that this is why Afraz have selected 
Sasanian Iran, as opposed to Achaemenid Iran. In other words, it is possible that it is the 
“true” “authentic” Iran in political terms.
A consideration  of  the  Abolqasem Ferdowsi’s  Shahnameh (Book of  Kings),  and the 
meanings  attached to  Iranzamin may bring  light  to  the  values  embedded in  Afraz’s 
construction of Iranian national identity. The Shahnameh was completed at the turn of the 
eleventh  century,  which  is  three  centuries  after  the  Arab/Islamic  conquest  of  the 
Sasanians. According to Ansari, the Shahnameh ‘not only provided the terms of reference 
for a distinct ‘national’ memory, but  an effective means for its social absorption and 
dissemination.’344 Indeed, as is contended by Dick Davis, the epic poem represents ‘the 
revival of interest in indigenous Persian culture … which sought to celebrate the cultural 
and ethnic inheritance of ancient Iran’.345 This, as he argues, is reflected in the fact that 
although Ferdowsi was believed to be a ‘sincere Muslim’, he made no attempt to ‘include 
any elements of the Qur’anic/Muslim cosmology in his poem’. Thus, unlike the likes of 
historians  such  as  Tabari  and  Mas’udi,  ‘he  simply  ignores  Islamic  cosmology  and 
chronology altogether and places the Persian creation myths centre stage.’346 ‘The revival 
of interest in indigenous Persian culture’ is also reflected in his strict use of the Persian 
language. 
There are several references in the Shahnameh to Iranzamin which is interchanged with 
Shahr-i  Īrān and  Jahān (world). For  example, the  ironmonger Kaveh mobilises  the 
savārān (those on horseback) to search for the rightful King of Iranzamin so as to depose 
Zahhak.347 Feraydun ultimately becomes the rightful king and is referred to as  Shāh-i 
Zamīn (king  of  the  land)  and  Jahāndār (literally,  possessor  of  the  world).348 The 
significance of Iranzamin is that it appears that this is something to be aspired to. This is 
also evident in the story of Rostam and Sohrab. Sohrab, the son of both Rostam and 
343 Op. cit. Kashani-Sabet 2000, pp. 3-4
344 Op. cit. Ansari 2005, p. 322
345 Davis, Dick. ‘Introduction’ in Ferdowsi, Abolqasem. Shahnameh: The Persian Book of Kings. trans. 
Dick Davis, foreword by Azar Nafisi. New York & London: Penguin Books. 2007. pp. xiii-xxxvii, p. xix
346 Ibid., pp. xix-xx
347 Foroghi, Mohammad Ali (Zaka-ol-Molk). (ed) Shāhnāmīh-yi Fīrdawsī (Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh). 
Tehran: Sazman-i Intisharat-i Javidan. undated. p. 9
348 Ibid. p. 15
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Tahmineh, states that he wants to make Tahmineh the ‘bānū [lady] of Iranzamin, Shahr-i 
Īrān’.349 It is worth mentioning that while references to Iranzamin and Shahr-i Īrān are in 
the original text, they are not mentioned in Davis’ translations of these stories. 
According to Davis, the  Shahnameh is ‘the record of the passing of a deeply mourned 
civilisation whose loss is seen as disaster’.350 Taking this argument and the references to 
Iranzamin into consideration, it is possible that like Ferdowsi, the community of Afraz are 
also longing for the pre-Islamic civilisation of the Sasanians that has been ‘lost’.  The 
Shahnameh is significant not only because of the reference to Iranzamin, but also because 
Zahhak, as Davis comments, is ‘the first evil person [to be mentioned] … who brings 
disaster on Iran and who is  identified as an Arab.’351 It  is  Davis’ contention that the 
Shahnameh demonstrates ‘a fairly forthright hostility toward the Arabs and the political 
culture, if not the religion, they brought with them.’352 Thus, once again parallels can be 
drawn with the values embedded in Afraz’s  construction of Iranian national identity. 
Davis’ comment on the significance of the  Shahnameh certainly appears applicable to 
Afraz: ‘revival of interest in indigenous Persian culture … which sought to celebrate the 
cultural and ethnic inheritance of ancient Iran’.353 
The reference to Iranshahr and Iranzamin by Afraz also demonstrates the continued use of 
this term to refer to Iran. Not only was the idea of Iranshahr/Iranzamin referred to in the 
eleventh  century  by  Ferdowsi  but  also  by  the  geographer Abu  Isahq  Ibrahim  bin 
Mohammad al-Farisi al-Istakhri in the tenth century, who ‘expressed particular fondness 
for  “Iranshahr”’.354 Furthermore,  ‘the  notion  of  “Iranshahr” persisted  well  after  al-
Istakhri’s time’.355 According Kashani-Sabet, the historian Hamd Allah Mustawfi writing 
in the fourteenth century under Mongol rule made references to Iranzamin.356 Taking these 
into consideration, it can be argued therefore, that the use of Sasanian Iran in Afraz’s 
construction of Iranian national identity also reflects a persistent undercurrent whereby 
Iran is imagined as Iranshahr or Iranzamin.
A benefit of discourse analysis of the articulation of national identity is the ability to look 
at the power relations between the multiple constructions or discourses. This is reflected 
349 Ibid. p. 85
350 Op. cit. Davis, p. xvi
351 Ibid., p. xx
352 Ibid., p. xx
353 Ibid., p. xix
354 Op. cit. Kashani-Sabet 2000, p. 15
355 Ibid., p. 15
356 Ibid., p. 16
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in the counter-hegemonic nature of the Iranist discourse of national identity as articulated 
by Afraz. This second extract from the seventh edition of the  Afraz Newsletter clearly 
elaborates on  the  political  aspirations  of  Afraz. It  is  also  crucial  in  delineating the 
parameters or aspects of this construction of national identity. It states:
If one day Afraz creates the opportunity to give birth to something out of its 
positioning of similar thinkers risen from Iran worshipers (Īrān  parastān) we 
will have got closer to achieving our greatest ideals; the Iranian with his/her 
breadth and able culture, and not in the tight framework of imposed politics; and 
its worshipers, those who stand in the margins and protectors, who constantly 
worship yazdān and nurse the motherland (mām-i mīhan).357
The language used is  of particular  note; it  is  recognised as pure Persian rather than 
Arabised Persian, which is commonly used in contemporary texts and official government 
documents.358 This is particularly pertinent in the use of the terms ‘Īrān parastān’ (Iran 
worshipers), ‘yazdān’ (creator) and ‘mām-i mīhan’ (motherland). While yazdān and mām-
i mīhan may be used on a daily basis as well as those that have come to the language 
through Arabic – Allah and vatan respectively – it is the deliberate use of the non-Arabic, 
as opposed to a mixture, that is of significance. Once again, a parallel can be drawn here 
with Ferdowsi’s use of only the Persian language in the Shahnameh. As for Īrān parastān, 
or patriots, bearing in mind that Iranshahr means ‘Empire of the Aryans’, parallels can be 
drawn  between  ‘Īrān parastān’  and  ‘nizhād   parastān’,  which  is  literally  ‘race 
worshipers’. This term, which has been used for the concept of nationalism in the past, 
now has very negative connotations. Nizhād parastān’ implies nationalism in the sense of 
the superiority of one race over another; in this  case that of the Aryans. This was a 
common theme in the Pahlavi Persian nationalist construction of Iranian national identity. 
Thus, it  can be argued here that  what  is  implied by the term  ‘Īrān parastān’ is  the 
worshiping of Iran over other nations. Furthermore, bearing in mind the above-mentioned 
Iranshahr, it can also be understood that the Iran that is to be worshiped over other nations 
is the imperialist Iran of the pre-Islamic eras and Sasanian Iran more specifically. 
When looking at these extracts as a whole, the sense is that the “true” Iran is that of old, 
and more specifically that of Sasanian Iran. Even though the perception of Iran and its 
identity is static in this case, it is crucial to point out here that, like all discourses, the 
357 Op. cit. Afraz Newsletter, p. 1
358 The Western technical and academic term for the current Persian language is New Persian, which has 
generally been the language of from the ninth century AD. Old Persian is the language of the 
Achaemenids in the sixth to fourth centuries BC and Middle Persian is the language of the Sasanian in the 
third century BC to the seventh century AD. The evolution of New Persian is associated with the fall of 
the Sasanian empire and the arrival of the Arabs, hence the emergence of Arab terminology and Arab 
script in the language. For more, see Jeremiás, Éva M. ‘Iran – languages’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam 
Supplement, (New Edition). pp. 425-448
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Iranist discourse is fluid and constructed. This is reflected in the fact that it is not always 
the same aspect of Iran’s pre-Islamic culture that is used in the construction of Iranian 
national identity.
The use of Iranshahr, which implies a particular territorial space, raises the issue of how 
land is used in the construction of Iranian national identity. If nation is a ‘limited’ socially 
constructed political unit, one that is based on Iranshahr is very different to one based on 
the current territorial boundaries of Iran. To this regard, similarities can be drawn here 
with the Islamist discourse. However, unlike the Islamist discourse, which is based on the 
prioritisation of  Īslāmīyat, the idea here is primarily based on land. Furthermore, if the 
idea of land that is used is Iranshahr or that of Sasanian Iran, it is also therefore an Iranist 
construction of national identity because Iranshahr is ultimately based on Īrānīyat. It is 
for this reason that constructions of Iranian national identity based on the notion that the 
land of Iran or the territory of Iran as the most fundamental character are included in here. 
This  is  even though they do  not  necessarily have the same ideological  basis  as  the 
discourse outlined above. 
An example of the articulation of this discourse is evident in the work of Ahmadi. He 
argues that the overriding element of Iranian identity is the continuous existence of a land 
named Iran and its political territorial core. It is in this context that he argues that Iranian 
identity is at least two thousand years old going back to the ‘state’ of the Medes, despite 
the argument of others that Iranian identity stretches back to the ‘state’ of the Elamites of 
four thousand years ago.359 
The notion of Iran as integral to Iran’s national identity is also argued by both Cottam and 
Ehteshami. It is Cottam’s contention that Iran’s geographical isolation is a factor that 
strengthened Iranian nationalism because it  encouraged the belief that  Iranians are a 
people who are culturally and historically unique. He argues that as long as geography is 
partly responsible for the uniqueness of Iranian character,  culture, and history,  it  is a 
factor that helped create national particularism and the growth of national sentiment.360 It 
is Ehteshami’s contention that a crucial factor in Iran’s current national identity is that it 
considers itself as one of the only ‘natural’ states in the Middle East because of its ‘old 
and territorially established civilization’, which is based on the notion of Iranzamin.361 He 
argues that it  is this territorial nationalism that is one of the guiding forces of Iran’s 
359 Op. cit. Ahmadi. ‘Huvīyat-i Millī-yi Īrān’. 1383 (2004/2005), p. 194-195
360 Op. cit. Cottam, p. 24
361 Op. cit. Ehteshami, pp. 286-287
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foreign policy.  The significance of these arguments is  that it  is  not Īslāmīyat that is 
considered as the overriding element of Iranian identity. 
1.24 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to show how culture is used as the basis of Iranian 
national identity  construction. Through a  discourse analysis  of the texts,  it  has been 
possible to  illustrate that culture, as  a  set  of values or ideology,  is  embedded in  the 
construction of Iranian national identity. Furthermore, one of the values attached to the 
notion of culture is the idea of authenticity. However, as has been illustrated, that which is 
perceived as authentic is contested. On the one hand, it is Īslāmīyat that is considered as 
Iran’s “true” and “authentic” culture, while on the other hand it is Īrānīyat. Thus, Iran’s 
national identity is also contested and consequently there is more than one discourse of 
national identity. The Islamist discourse prioritises Īslāmīyat and excludes Īrānīyat from 
the construction of national identity. The Iranist discourse, on the other hand, prioritises 
Īrānīyat and it is  Īslāmīyat that is rejected. The construction of national identity in this 
way reflects an ideology that prioritises either Īrānīyat or Īslāmīyat, at the exclusion of 
the other. This prioritisation of culture also demonstrates a polarisation of culture. 
The perception of either  Īslāmīyat or  Īrānīyat as Iran’s “authentic” culture is used to 
legitimise  and  justify  a  particular  political  system.  Consequently,  culture  is  also 
politicised. Since authenticity is contested, then so too is what is considered as Iran’s 
appropriate political  system.  Khamene'i,  as  the  principal  articulator  of  the  Islamist 
discourse of national identity advocates nizām-i Īslāmī, which in the case of Iran is an 
Islamic theocracy. For the Iranist discourse of national identity it is a political system of 
pre-Islamic Iran that is preferred, namely monarchy. It becomes evident therefore that for 
both the Iranist and Islamist discourses it is not only huvīyat-i millī that is prescribed, but 
also  huvīyat-i dawlat.  Furthermore, it  can be understood that  huvīyat-i millī  is  to  be 
achieved through the political apparatus based on a particular  huvīyat-i dawlat.  Thus, 
national identity and state identity become very close. These constructions can only be 
really considered as aspirations of what the identity of the nation should be, regardless of 
whether the nation identifies itself as such. 
Furthermore, the existence of these two discourses, each advocating a different political 
system, also reveals something about the nature of the state in general. It is clear that the 
state is made up of ‘systems of meaning that are the object and the mechanism of social 
control and contestation.’362 In this case, the Islamist discourse and those propagating it 
362 Op. cit. Finlayson and Martin 2006, p. 159
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are the ‘object of control and contestation’; they are resisting a political system that has 
controlled them in an earlier period and reacting to its existence by rejecting the use of 
Irānīyat in the construction of national identity.
This chapter has also demonstrated that for both the Islamist and Iranist discourses the 
notion of civilisation is integral to the construction of Iranian nation identity. However, 
just as culture, authenticity and national identity is contested, so is civilisation. In the 
Islamist discourse of national identity, Iran is articulated in terms of Islamic civilisation, 
whereas for the Iranist discourse is it is Iranian civilisation. For Afraz, this is based on 
what is to be perceived Sasanian Iran. The idea of civilisation in both cases demonstrates 
not only a belief in a set of values based on “advanced culture”, but also an idea of Iran 
that extends beyond Iran’s current territorial boundaries. In the case of Afraz,  this  is 
explicitly physical; it is the territory of Sasanian Iran that is aspired to. The notion of 
Islamic civilisation, which is not explicitly physical, alludes to former “glory” and the 
superiority of Islamic identity based on it being transnational. In both cases, the notion of 
civilisation reflects the sense that in earlier times Iran was more “civilised”. 
The insistence on the “true” Iranian national identity reflects the exclusive and hegemonic 
nature of both the discourses. The exclusivity of the Islamist discourses is evident in the 
conviction that Iranian identity is Islamic and that the nation is synonymous with Islam. 
This  excludes  Iran’s  non-Muslim  communities  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  non-Shi‘i 
communities. The Iranist discourse is also exclusive. It does not allow for the inclusion of 
those who are Muslim, and possibly those who are not perceived as Persian. Furthermore, 
the approach to Īslāmīyat reflects a sense of cultural, moral and political superiority. The 
articulation of the Islamist discourse demonstrates the conviction that any values, whether 
cultural, moral or political, that divert from a particular interpretation of  Īslāmīyat are 
considered as a divergence from the “true” way and the “real” Iranian national identity. 
This is reflected in the way the West is constructed. Similarly, the meanings attached to 
Īrānīyat in the Iranist discourse also prescribe certain cultural, moral and political values 
that are considered more superior than others. 
While these discourses are hegemonic, they are also counter-hegemonic. This is reflected 
in their resistance to each other. The Iranist discourse is resisted by the Islamist discourse 
on the basis of a contestation of what is considered as Iran’s authentic national identity 
and vice versa. The perceived dichotomy between Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat creates an ‘us-
them’ or  ‘self-other’  dynamic.  The  relationship  between  the  Iranist  and  Islamist 
discourses is one whereby each sees the other as the ‘other’. In the attempt to prove the 
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authenticity of what is perceived to be Iranian identity, the discourses either consciously 
or unconsciously ‘otherise’ those who do not subscribe to the discourse. 
The ‘self’ and ‘other’ dynamic not only exists on an internal level but also on an external 
level. Iran’s heritage of high culture is what, as far as the two discourses are concerned, 
differentiates them from their neighbours in general, and the Arabs in particular. It is also 
what is perceived to be a differentiating factor from the West. Since part of the process of 
constructing identity is not only how one perceives the ‘self’, or in this case perceives the 
nation, but also how one differentiates oneself from the other; i.e. not the nation, then 
high culture can be considered as an aspect of Iranian national identity. The Iranist and 
Islamist discourses of national identity are a recognition of the concept of Iran’s long-
standing heritage of high culture as an integral part of Iranian national identity, which 
both legitimises their construction of the Iranian nation, and also justifies their attitude to 
the ‘other’. Thus, in a sense is symptomatic of the notion of ‘Orientalism’. In this case, 
however, Iran is the ‘occident’, the civilised ideal, and the rest including the West and the 
Arabs, are the ‘other’, which are in need of civilising or are lacking civilisation.
Although the Islamist and Iranist discourses are seemingly irreconcilable,  the way in 
which  the  identity  of  the  nation  is  constructed  is  very  similar.  For  example, 
methodologically both discourses are based on a particular “authentic” culture that is 
static. This is precisely the type of culture Hall is criticising. In the case of Iran, the 
contestation occurs because there is  conflict regarding  what is  the ‘one true self’.363 
Essentially, their way is the only way and to move away from that is simply a digression 
from the “true” and “authentic” Iranian national identity. If we use Fairclough’s approach, 
the constructions of national identity can be considered as effective ideologies in that they 
have  established  their  assumptions  about  how  the  Iranian  nation  is  constructed  as 
common sense.364 However, since more than one construction of Iranian national identity 
exist, surely this alludes to the argument that nation is indeed constructed and fluid. The 
fact that the Iranist and Islamist constructions have changed positions with regard to their 
role as a state identity also illustrates that how national identity is constructed is not static. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that for those constructing nation, the national identity 
defined is indeed the Iranian national identity.
As has been illustrated in the previous chapter, Iran has a history of multiple nationalisms 
and discourses of national identity; this trend continues in the Khatami period. There is no 
single construction of Iranian national identity, and nor can the construction of national 
363 Op. cit. Hall 1990, p. 223
364 Op. cit. Fairclough, 1989, p. 77
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identity be considered as being restricted to that which the state articulates. As has been 
illustrated, Iranian national identity  is  constructed on both state and non-state levels. 
Thus, neither of  the discourses of national  identity portrayed here are unique to  the 
Khatami period. Many of the ideas and ideals used in the construction of the Islamist and 
Iranist discourse in the Khatami period are also evident in earlier construction of Iranian 
national  identity.  For  example,  parallels  can  be  drawn  between  the  discourses  of 
Khamene'i and Al-e Ahmad. However, where as prior to the Islamic Revolution it was 
very  much  a  counter-hegemonic  discourse,  following  the  Revolution  it  has  been 
“elevated” to the state level, with a degree of popular support. Likewise, similarities can 
be drawn between the Iranist discourse discussed in this chapter and the discourses of the 
Pahlavi dynasty and that of certain individuals during the Constitutional period. Whereas 
prior to the Islamic Revolution it was a public and state construction, it is now confined to 
the private space within in Iran, but still in the public space in some cases outside of Iran. 
It  could be argued, therefore that  the Islamist  and Iranist  constructions have changed 
places in terms of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic positions. However,  it  must be 
stressed that in the case of Afraz and to a certain extent Jaleh, the rediscovery of Sasanian 
Iran indicates a departure from the Achaemenid Iran used by the Pahlavis. It is possible 
that this is indicative of a new discourse of Iranian national identity that not only wants to 
distance and differentiate  itself  from the Islamic Republic,  but also from the Pahlavi 
regime. 
By looking at the Iranist and Islamist discourses of national identity together, it becomes 
apparent that  there  are  concurrent competing discourses of  national  identity  during 
Khatami’s presidency. The Iranist discourse can be considered to be at one end of the 
spectrum with the prioritisation of  Īrānīyat as the principle factor in Iranian national 
identity,  while  at  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum is  the  Islamist  discourse with  the 
prioritisation  of  Īslāmīyat.  By  addressing  Īrānīyat in  discourses of  Iranian national 
identity, it has been demonstrated that Iranian national identity, despite it being an Islamic 
Republic, should not be considered simply in terms of it being Islamic. Furthermore, the 
Īslāmīyat of  the  Islamist discourse  of  national  identity  can be  regarded as  the  only 
interpretation of  Islam  in  Khatami’s  Iran.  A deconstruction  of  the  Islamist-Iranian 
discourse in the following chapter will show that even on the official state level Īslāmīyat 
is not monolithic. Indeed, the nature of Iranian national identity is complex. It is hoped 
that this  thesis  provides a more rounded approach to the discussion on the nature of 
national identity in Iran.
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Chapter Five: Islamist-Iranian Discourse of National Identity: 
Khatami’s State Counter-Discourse
Today’s world is Western in its orientation, techniques, and thoughts, such that  
if one lives outside the geographic boundaries of the West, one must incorporate 
the  West  into  one’s  values  and  life.  The  West  has  indeed  brought  great 
achievements to humanity, but it has also created great difficulties. But the key 
issue here is that our difficulties are more compounded than the West’s because 
Westerners at least have a culture that is in harmony with their civilisation and 
thus do not suffer from a precarious identity. But our problems are compounded 
precisely because on the one hand our personal and social lives are directly 
influenced by the West, a civilisation whose foundations we have not absorbed 
and  internalised.  On  the  other  hand,  aspects  of  our  culture  belong  to  a  
civilisation whose time has passed.365 
One of  our  most  central problems is  that  important  aspects of  our  culture  
belong to a civilisation whose time has long passed, and our life is influenced 
by modern civilisation which requires a culture appropriate for it.366
Seyyed Mohammad Khatami 
The Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity is essentially that of Khatami. The two 
above extracts from one of his speeches illustrate the dilemma facing Iranian identity in 
general and Iranian national identity in particular. As this chapter will illustrate, Khatami 
has  endeavoured to  reconcile these issues  in  the  construction of  an  Iranian national 
identity;  dealing  with  the  implications  of  the  West  on  daily  life  while  maintaining 
independence  and  “authenticity”.  While  there  has  been  considerable  discussion  of 
Khatami’s  presidency,  this  has  been mainly in  terms of  political  liberalisation  both 
internally reflected in discussions on Islamic democracy and calls for more democratic 
progress,  and  externally  reflected  in  the  notion  of  ‘dialogue  among  civilisations’. 
However, how Khatami perceives Iranian identity has been little covered. Through the 
notion  of  ‘discourse of  national  identity’ a  picture  of  how Khatami  perceives and 
constructs Iranian national identity can be built and the sets of values embedded in this 
construction can be identified. By using this approach, four contentions can be made. 
The first  contention is  that  Khatami’s  discourse of  national  identity  is  based on the 
politicisation of culture, namely Īslāmīyat. This, however, is not exclusive of Īrānīyat; the 
“authenticity” of  both  Īslāmīyat and  Īrānīyat are  acknowledged.  As  in  the  previous 
chapter, the politicisation of culture can be understood here in terms of culture being used 
as the basis or justification for a particular political system. In this case it  is Islamic 
democracy or Islamic mardumsālārī. Since the discourse is based on the politicisation of 
365 Khatami, Mohammad. Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society. Canberra: Centre for Arab and Islamic 
Studies, The Australian National University, 2000. p. 42 
366 Ibid., p. 42
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culture, namely Islam, it is referred to as ‘Islamist-Iranian’ in the thesis to illustrate the 
similarity with the Islamist and Iranist discourses. As with the Islamist discourse, Islamist 
here also implies a prioritisation of Islam. Bayat refers to the Reform movement as post-
Islamist. The contention here, however, is that it remains Islamist because it is still Islam 
that is used as the framework of the political system.
The second contention is that the determination to assert independence in face of the 
external ‘other’ is integral to how Khatami perceives the nation. However, unlike the 
Islamist discourse, he advocates ‘dialogue among civilisations’. The notion of ‘dialogue 
among civilisations’ also  illustrates that,  like  the  Islamist  and Iranist discourses, the 
Iranian nation is actually perceived in terms of civilisation. Related to this is the third 
contention; that is that democracy, or mardumsālārī to use Khatami’s terminology, acts as 
a means of popularising his construction of national identity. Like earlier discourses of 
national  identity,  the  notion  of  democracy  or  mardumsālārī is  also  linked  to  anti-
imperialist sentiment. 
Bearing in mind these arguments the Islamist-Iranian discourse can be understood in 
terms of three pillars that act as the basis of the construction of Iranian national identity: 
Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat, democracy, and the notion of ‘dialogue among civilisations’. It is 
the combination of these features and their articulation on the state level that differentiates 
Khatami’s articulation of national identity from others and also the period of Khatami’s 
presidency from other periods in Iran’s history. These three pillars will be used as the 
framework for analysis and the structure for the chapter. 
The fourth contention is that the Islamist-Iranian discourse is at once both a hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic discourse. It is the latter because it is a discourse of resistance on 
many levels. On the one hand, it resists the exclusivity and claim to hegemony of both the 
Islamist  and  Iranist  discourses  that  only  prioritise  either  Īslāmīyat or  Īrānīyat. 
Furthermore, as a state discourse, like the Islamist discourse, there is a hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic dynamic  within  the  Islamic  Republic’s  political  apparatus.  The 
counter-hegemonic nature of the discourse is also reflected in its resistance to the West 
and is articulated in the notion of ‘dialogue among civilisations’. On the other hand, the 
Islamist-Iranian discourse is  also hegemonic because it  claims cultural, political  and 
moral leadership. Additionally,  despite it  being more inclusive than the Islamist and 
Iranist discourses, it  also remains exclusive. However,  the question that must also be 
raised in this context is whether in fact the exclusivity of the Islamist-Iranian discourse of 
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national identity is due to the argument that political development is limited in the context 
of the Islamic Republic and it is forced to subscribe to certain values.
Before proceeding with the three pillars of the Islamist-Iranian discourses of national 
identity, it is first necessary to provide a brief  background to Khatami and the Reform 
Movement in general. This will be followed by the second section which addresses how 
culture is used in the construction of Iranian national identity. The third section returns to 
the  issue  of  civilisation  and  expands on  anti-imperialism,  common in  many of  the 
discourses of national identity throughout Iran’s history, through a deconstruction of the 
notion, ‘dialogue among civilisations’.
The fourth section considers the notion of Islamic mardumsālārī, or democracy. The aim 
is to illustrate first of all that since the notion of Islamic mardumsālārī is based on the 
politicisation  of  Īslāmīyat,  the  discourse of  national  identity  must  be  referred to  as 
Islamist-Iranian as  opposed to  Iranian-Islamic.  The second aim of  this  section  is  to 
illustrate how mardumsālārī is a means of popularising the Islamist-Iranian discourse of 
national  identity.  The  third  aim  of  this  section  is  to  illustrate  how  the  notion  of 
mardumsālārī  is linked to the idea of independence and anti-imperialist sentiment. The 
final section of the chapter offers some concluding remarks. 
1.25 Background to Khatami and the Reform Movement 
The intellectual and political origins of Khatami and the Reform Movement essentially lie 
in  the disillusionment with  the  Islamic Republic, as  discussed in  Chapter One.  Eric 
Hooglund argues that the Islamic Republic contains two general orientations – elitist and 
populist. The first believes in the ‘ultimate sovereignty’ of the government belonging to 
God; the second, however, believes that the government’s political sovereignty is ‘based 
on  a  consensual  contract  among citizens’.367 While  Khamene’i belongs  to  the  first, 
Khatami belongs to the second. As will be illustrated, this is clearly reflected in his call 
for Islamic mardumsālārī. This more relaxed approach to Iranian politics and society is 
also evident in Khatami’s position as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance between 
1983 and 1992. During this time he relaxed censorship and thus became popular among 
intellectuals.368 Because of this tolerance, he was often accused of being too lenient in face 
of  “tahajum-i  farhangī-yi  gharb”  (Western cultural  invasion).369 While  Khamene'i  is 
positioned in the traditionalist right, Khatami is positioned in the Islamic left. The largest 
367 Hooglund, Eric. ‘Khatami’s Iran’ in Current History, February 1999. pp. 59-64
368 Op. cit. Keddie 2003, p. 269
369 Op. cit. Buchta, p. 30
121
Islamic-left group, the Majma’-i Ruhāniyūn-i Mubāriz (Combatant Clerics Society) was 
founded by Khatami among others. The Reformists, referred to as ‘Second of Khordad 
Front’ because of the day they were elected, were made up of a coalition of a number of 
parties and groups, amongst which is the Combatant Clerics Society. Also included in this 
coalition were: 
“insiders” in  government who still  supported an Islamic state, headed by a 
ruling faqīh; secularists who wanted not only democracy and civil society but 
the  separation  of  religion  and  government;  and  the  Nationalist-Religious 
Alliance.370
Ansari attributes  the origins of  the  Reform Movement ‘to  the vigorous  debates and 
discussions that emerged in Iran’s universities following the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 
1988’.371 Their aim was to return to the origins of the Islamic Revolution, which was 
essentially reflected in the election of Khatami.372 However, it must be stressed that the 
original aims of the Revolution are contested. Ahmadinezhad has also claimed to return to 
the original aims of the Revolution. These, however, are quite different to those of the 
Reformists. It must also be noted that the Reform movement as a whole is not monolithic. 
As will be illustrated below, the relationship between vilāyat-i faqīh is contested.
The slogans of culture and democracy were at the centre of Khatami’s election campaign. 
He discussed ‘freedom of opinion, human rights, party pluralism, and the balancing of 
democracy and Islam.’373 On 23 1997 May, or, 2 Khordad 1376, Khatami was elected with 
a generally agreed seventy-seven percent of the vote. He gained support from ethnic and 
religious minorities, especially Sunnis.374 Among his most avid supporters were Iran’s 
women and youth. 
1.26 Culture and Identity
Having provided some background to Khatami and the Reform Movement, attention is 
now turned to the first of the three pillars of the Islamist-Iranian discourse of national 
identity,  namely  culture  –  Īslāmīyat and  Īrānīyat.  Khatami defines  culture  ‘as  the 
collection of rooted beliefs, as well as habits of thought and emotion in society.’375 As 
Mahmoud Alinejad points out,  the notion of culture is  integral to  Khatami’s  idea of 
370 Mir-Hosseini, Ziba and Tapper, Richard. Islam and Democracy in Iran: Eshkevari and the Quest for 
Reform. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006. p. 29
371 Op. cit. Ansari. Confronting Iran. 2006, p. 148
372 Op. cit. Ansari. Islam, Iran and Democracy. 2006, p. 113
373 Op. cit. Buchta, p. 29
374 Ibid., p. 31
375 Op. cit. Khatami. Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society. 2000, p. 42
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‘nationality’.376 However,  unlike the Islamist and Iranist discourses, Khatami considers 
both  Īrānīyat and  Īslāmīyat as “authentic” to Iranian identity. The combining of both 
these cultures is reflected in Khatami’s  election campaign. For example, posters had a 
picture of the Iranian flag and the slogan: ‘Iran for all Iranians’. It is also reflected in the 
way in which Khatami addresses the issue of Īslāmīyat and Īrānīyat in his speeches.
Like the Islamist and Iranist discourses of national identity, the Islamist-Iranian discourse 
of national identity is based on the politicisation of culture, namely Īslāmīyat. This is not 
to say that culture in itself is not political, rather culture is politicised in the sense that it is 
used as the basis of nation, a political unit, and of a particular political apparatus. This is 
illustrated in the following section where it becomes evident that Khatami considers Islam 
as the framework for democracy; thus, Īslāmīyat is politicised and a particular system of 
government is prescribed. 
1.26.1 ‘Iranian-Islamic’ Identity  
In Khatami’s speech to inaugurate the state Jam-i Jam television network on 6 December 
1997, only seven months after his election, he states:
Several times I have said that we must have dialogue with other civilisations 
and cultures, but before that we have to know what is this ‘we’ that we are. My 
answer … is that our identity is Iranian-Islamic. We take pride in being Iranian. 
Of course there have been many struggles, and possibly there is still this wrong 
image that we have to split being Iranian from being Islamic. On the one hand, 
people have said that we must focus on Islam and take away being Iranian; on 
the other hand, many have called for that in order to be Iranian we must take 
away Islam. Both these are a mistake and a digression from the true way.377
Several points can be made regarding this extract. First of all, the timing of the speech is 
worthy of note. Not long after his election, Khatami is making it very clear where he 
stands on the nature of Iranian identity. It is obvious that he is aware that the concept of 
Iranian identity is an issue and is keen to make his stand-point known. He does not uphold 
the view that is perhaps expected of him as a cleric and as part of the government; his 
construction of Iranian identity does not prioritise  Īslāmīyat at the expense of  Īrānīyat. 
While accepting that Islam is a fundamental part, so is being Iranian, in other words Iran’s 
pre-Islamic culture. Thus, Iran’s national identity is ‘Iranian-Islamic’; there is the need for 
a balance between the two. This demonstrates the shift of emphasis from that articulated 
376 Alinejad, Mahmoud. ‘Coming to terms with Modernity: Iranian Intellectuals and the Emerging Public 
Sphere’ in Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 13, 1, 2002. pp. 25-48, p. 33
377 Khatami, Seyyed Mohammad. ‘Farhang-i Irani-Islami (Iranian-Islamic culture)’. 1376 (1997). in 
Khatami, Seyyed Mohammad.  Īslām, Rūhānīyat va Inqilāb-i Īslāmī; bā muqaddimay az Seyyed 
Mohammad Ali Abtahi (Islam, Clericism and the Īslāmīc Revolution; with an introduction from Seyyed 
Mohammad Ali Abtahi), Tehran: Tarh-e No Publications, 1379 (2000/2001). pp. 17-20, p. 18
123
